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Worst-Case Scenarios
Aired March 14, 2003 - 13:18 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
MILES O'BRIEN, CNN ANCHOR: While the U.S. grapples with issues of diplomacy and a possible war, some analysts are trying to figure out how Iraqi President Saddam Hussein might react if fighting starts. But that response is not the only concern. Retired U.S. Air Force Colonel Mike Turner, who served on Central Command during Operation Desert Storm, and was a chief aid to Norman Schwarzkopf could talk about some of the other wild cards that might come into play.
Colonel, good to have you with us.
COL. MICHAEL TURNER, (RET.) U.S. AIR FORCE: Thank you. Happy to be here.
O'BRIEN: First of all, take us inside the planning sessions. Tommy Franks and his people coming up with the final plan, honing it down. What kind of discussions are under way?
TURNER: Well, really the focus is on any last-minute contingencies. We want to make sure that the forces have all been deployed, and are in position, and they're ready, when the call finally comes for them to go to war. We have fallen into a 24/7 schedule, as you might imagine.
And even though there are varying shifts, generally everybody is up an awful long time, every day reviewing the plans. One of the key functions of any military headquarters in this kind of operation, is really to process the flow of operation so the various military commanders can adequately assess that information and then issue orders based on a changing tactical and operational situation in the field.
So a lot of the staff, at this point, are beginning to know who their points of contact in the deployed units are. They will process the information quickly. There will be a daily schedule of briefings, in which the commanders will be provided a very concise and accurate picture of the enemy situation.
And then, orders will be issued, based on those discussions and sent back out to the field commanders. So, it becomes an information flow issue and challenge, which, of course, on the modern battlefield becomes paramount, because it moves so fast, and the situation changes so quickly.
O'BRIEN: How much concern is there at this juncture about the troops and when they peak? There is a report out today that the Pentagon says it doesn't really matter, the timing that much, but troops do get stale after a while, don't they? TURNER: Well, they do. But the Pentagon is absolutely correct on this. They know the mission. They know the job at hand. They know what they have to do. The air crews, the ground forces, they have reviewed probably the first 6 to 12 hours of the operations very, very carefully. They've gone over them and over them.
Many of the actions and movements will be committed to memory, by this point. And they find ways, once the job is done and the preparation has been made to relieve the stress and cycle in and cycle out of that very intense preparation. I remember when we started this in Desert Storm, there's sort of an underlying level of adrenaline that really never goes away. It's sort of a baseline adrenaline level, because you know the big one is right around the corner. There is a sense -- at least I had the sense of being caught up in a juggernaut, and each individual felt -- I did -- felt somewhat insignificant, and recognize that the decision had been made, the die has been cost. And I need to get my game face on and mind right about what we need to do. The prevalent thought in my mind at the time was "please, God, don't let me screw up and let down the people around me here." I happened to be in headquarters, but I'm sure the warriors in the field felt the same way.
O'BRIEN: Whenever the U.S. is in a situation like this, there's a lot of talk about the situation, viewed through the prism of the previous conflicts. Based on what you're seeing as it unfolds, are you seeing sort of a repeat of the Gulf War? Or are you seeing something else? Maybe a Vietnam or a Somalia type of scenario?
TURNER: Well, that's a concern, I think, in this operation. There's a predisposition on the part of the American public and possibly the administration, I think, to just consider this Desert Storm 2. That was a fundamentally different situation for a number of reasons. We had twice the force that we have now. We had a deployed Iraqi army, made vulnerable by virtue of their deployment in the field. We had a very precise and simple political objective, underlying the military actions, which was, essentially, to eject Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait. And to do as much destruction to his forces in the process. That's far more complex than this scenario. We are attacking their forces on their home ground.
Saddam Hussein, like us, has learned lessons since Desert Storm. I'm sure our military planning is attempting to address the SCUD issue. As in 1991, the very last thing that we want is for Israel to come into a war, and so I'm sure the administration is struggling and scrambling at this point to make sure that doesn't happen.
O'BRIEN: So, colonel, you're left with some misgivings? Do you see this as a potential scenario where the U.S. military could get quite bogged down in all this?
TURNER: Actually, I think that the overwhelming likelihood is that the United States forces will do precisely what they have -- will be asked to do, and they will do it lightning fast and with awesome power, that the concern I have is -- remember in 1991, we're looking back with 20/20 hindsight. Before we went to war in Desert Storm, they are the same variables we discussed, and we felt we'd addressed those, General Powell and Schwarzkopf and the senior Bush administration, had reduced the risk in the variables to what they thought was acceptable. I'm sure the discussions have taken place.
I'm personally a little concerned that we're doing this with half the size force against an army which will be fighting for its survival. That gives me pause. There are a number of other variables that I find a little bit disconcerting about this scenario, and that is a concern. But truthfully, all that is to me is a little bit heightened concern over what might happen. But I still think there's a pretty good likelihood this is going to go very smoothly and very effectively.
O'BRIEN: Mike Turner, retired Colonel, United States Army, thank you for being with us. Appreciate it.
TURNER: Thank you, Miles.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com
Aired March 14, 2003 - 13:18 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
MILES O'BRIEN, CNN ANCHOR: While the U.S. grapples with issues of diplomacy and a possible war, some analysts are trying to figure out how Iraqi President Saddam Hussein might react if fighting starts. But that response is not the only concern. Retired U.S. Air Force Colonel Mike Turner, who served on Central Command during Operation Desert Storm, and was a chief aid to Norman Schwarzkopf could talk about some of the other wild cards that might come into play.
Colonel, good to have you with us.
COL. MICHAEL TURNER, (RET.) U.S. AIR FORCE: Thank you. Happy to be here.
O'BRIEN: First of all, take us inside the planning sessions. Tommy Franks and his people coming up with the final plan, honing it down. What kind of discussions are under way?
TURNER: Well, really the focus is on any last-minute contingencies. We want to make sure that the forces have all been deployed, and are in position, and they're ready, when the call finally comes for them to go to war. We have fallen into a 24/7 schedule, as you might imagine.
And even though there are varying shifts, generally everybody is up an awful long time, every day reviewing the plans. One of the key functions of any military headquarters in this kind of operation, is really to process the flow of operation so the various military commanders can adequately assess that information and then issue orders based on a changing tactical and operational situation in the field.
So a lot of the staff, at this point, are beginning to know who their points of contact in the deployed units are. They will process the information quickly. There will be a daily schedule of briefings, in which the commanders will be provided a very concise and accurate picture of the enemy situation.
And then, orders will be issued, based on those discussions and sent back out to the field commanders. So, it becomes an information flow issue and challenge, which, of course, on the modern battlefield becomes paramount, because it moves so fast, and the situation changes so quickly.
O'BRIEN: How much concern is there at this juncture about the troops and when they peak? There is a report out today that the Pentagon says it doesn't really matter, the timing that much, but troops do get stale after a while, don't they? TURNER: Well, they do. But the Pentagon is absolutely correct on this. They know the mission. They know the job at hand. They know what they have to do. The air crews, the ground forces, they have reviewed probably the first 6 to 12 hours of the operations very, very carefully. They've gone over them and over them.
Many of the actions and movements will be committed to memory, by this point. And they find ways, once the job is done and the preparation has been made to relieve the stress and cycle in and cycle out of that very intense preparation. I remember when we started this in Desert Storm, there's sort of an underlying level of adrenaline that really never goes away. It's sort of a baseline adrenaline level, because you know the big one is right around the corner. There is a sense -- at least I had the sense of being caught up in a juggernaut, and each individual felt -- I did -- felt somewhat insignificant, and recognize that the decision had been made, the die has been cost. And I need to get my game face on and mind right about what we need to do. The prevalent thought in my mind at the time was "please, God, don't let me screw up and let down the people around me here." I happened to be in headquarters, but I'm sure the warriors in the field felt the same way.
O'BRIEN: Whenever the U.S. is in a situation like this, there's a lot of talk about the situation, viewed through the prism of the previous conflicts. Based on what you're seeing as it unfolds, are you seeing sort of a repeat of the Gulf War? Or are you seeing something else? Maybe a Vietnam or a Somalia type of scenario?
TURNER: Well, that's a concern, I think, in this operation. There's a predisposition on the part of the American public and possibly the administration, I think, to just consider this Desert Storm 2. That was a fundamentally different situation for a number of reasons. We had twice the force that we have now. We had a deployed Iraqi army, made vulnerable by virtue of their deployment in the field. We had a very precise and simple political objective, underlying the military actions, which was, essentially, to eject Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait. And to do as much destruction to his forces in the process. That's far more complex than this scenario. We are attacking their forces on their home ground.
Saddam Hussein, like us, has learned lessons since Desert Storm. I'm sure our military planning is attempting to address the SCUD issue. As in 1991, the very last thing that we want is for Israel to come into a war, and so I'm sure the administration is struggling and scrambling at this point to make sure that doesn't happen.
O'BRIEN: So, colonel, you're left with some misgivings? Do you see this as a potential scenario where the U.S. military could get quite bogged down in all this?
TURNER: Actually, I think that the overwhelming likelihood is that the United States forces will do precisely what they have -- will be asked to do, and they will do it lightning fast and with awesome power, that the concern I have is -- remember in 1991, we're looking back with 20/20 hindsight. Before we went to war in Desert Storm, they are the same variables we discussed, and we felt we'd addressed those, General Powell and Schwarzkopf and the senior Bush administration, had reduced the risk in the variables to what they thought was acceptable. I'm sure the discussions have taken place.
I'm personally a little concerned that we're doing this with half the size force against an army which will be fighting for its survival. That gives me pause. There are a number of other variables that I find a little bit disconcerting about this scenario, and that is a concern. But truthfully, all that is to me is a little bit heightened concern over what might happen. But I still think there's a pretty good likelihood this is going to go very smoothly and very effectively.
O'BRIEN: Mike Turner, retired Colonel, United States Army, thank you for being with us. Appreciate it.
TURNER: Thank you, Miles.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com
