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Interview With Former U.N. Weapons Inspector

Aired April 18, 2003 - 13:37   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


MILES O'BRIEN, CNN ANCHOR: For the Bush administration, another most wanted discovery in Iraq would involve some weapons of mass destruction. They are the primary reason the U.S. waged war on Iraq, and while the administration claimed that Saddam had a large, active program to make chemical, biological, and perhaps even nuclear weapons, so far, there hasn't been a shred of evidence to back up that claim.
Former U.N. weapons inspector David Albright joining us with some insight on all this. Mr. Albright, good to have you with us.

DAVID ALBRIGHT, FORMER U.N. WEAPONS INSPECTOR: Good to be here.

O'BRIEN: All right. The fact that no evidence has come to the fore at this juncture, given the extent of the alleged Saddam Hussein WMD program, is that surprising to you?

ALBRIGHT: Yes, it is surprising. I would have thought things would have been found by now. The claims really had to do with that a lot of these chemical weapons were deployed, and so you would think there'd be some indication of that, either commanders who said, you know, we decided not to fire them, or as U.S. troops overran Republican Guard positions, they'd find some evidence of orders to use them, or actually chemical weapons themselves. So I am surprised.

O'BRIEN: All right. So where does that leave the Bush administration then?

ALBRIGHT: Well, I think it certainly -- they have to, no matter what -- what turns out to be the case, they have to secure any weapons of mass destruction capabilities and assets Iraq has. I mean, that's got to be the first priority. There also has to be a reckoning of what -- what size stocks does Iraq actually have. And I think because of that reckoning, and because of the need for speed, it would be very helpful to get more people involved in this inspection effort, or investigation effort and I would hope that the United States would, in essence, get over its kind of anger at the U.N. and invite back the inspectors to help with the search, providing additional resources and actually providing credibility to whatever findings are found in Iraq.

O'BRIEN: Well, is it anger or is it what General Myers, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff said, which is, it's too dangerous for civilians to be in there? Do you buy that line of reasoning?

ALBRIGHT: No. I mean, your reporters are in there. I would, under certain circumstances, go. Civilians are willing to take risks. I think nobody understands better than the inspectors that we have to find and contain any weapons of mass destruction assets that are there. We have to locate the people and make sure they're not leaving. And so I think civilians have always shown a willingness. And I would point out that there -- there is precedent for inspectors to go in. I mean, the International Atomic Energy Agency went into Yugoslavia during the war over Kosovo to inspect a nuclear site. So again, I think the civilians do need some protection, but I think it's quite legitimate for them to want to go.

O'BRIEN: What about the line of reasoning that the Iraqi regime made it almost its entire -- they were entirely devoted and focused on hiding everything. If, in fact, that were the case, could they hide something as large as tons and tons of this material, as it is alleged they might have?

ALBRIGHT: Well, they could certainly hide tons of chemical weapons. The administration was claiming 100, 500 tons. But that -- but there's different theories of what Iraq did. I mean, many people believe that Iraq has maintained the capability and the infrastructure to make weapons of mass destruction. At different times, the view has been that Iraq would destroy its stocks, make it harder for the inspectors to find them, and then the inspectors would find where these agents or chemical weapons had been made.

And so it may be that with the onset of inspections, Iraq basically got rid of whatever stocks it had, and just tried to preserve its infrastructure so it could reconstitute very quickly. And so it may be a very different picture than what the administration presented, but still, I would expect that Iraq did not give up its ambitions to be able to make weapons of mass destruction, and I think we will uncover that.

O'BRIEN: One final point here. The administration keeps saying we're not going to go on a treasure hunt, we are going to find somebody who will take us on that hunt. Concurrent with all that, they've been focusing on this deck of cards, the 55 most wanted. It seems to me that the best sources for all this might be the person who swept the hall floors at these chemical weapons facilities, if they existed, low-level types, and surely there are a lot of those in Iraq who could help out.

ALBRIGHT: Yes. No, certainly. It could be, as you say, a lowly official or worker who says, Look, I was there, and I'll take you there. And I think that is going to be a very important part of this search. I think it's -- again, there is a worry that the United States has to face that if they do do this alone, they focus on people -- people are going to say that those people aren't telling the truth, that they're doing it for money, for example. And certainly, many defectors have turned out to provide bad information, because they were looking for a green card here or just a ticket out of Iraq. And so -- so I do think that while the focus on people is absolutely essential, I think it's better if it's done in a way that it's -- in a sense, pure, that there's creditability attached to that, and I think that would involve involving the inspectors much more.

O'BRIEN: David Albright, former weapons inspector, thanks very much for being with us. Appreciate your insights.

ALBRIGHT: Thank you.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com







Aired April 18, 2003 - 13:37   ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
MILES O'BRIEN, CNN ANCHOR: For the Bush administration, another most wanted discovery in Iraq would involve some weapons of mass destruction. They are the primary reason the U.S. waged war on Iraq, and while the administration claimed that Saddam had a large, active program to make chemical, biological, and perhaps even nuclear weapons, so far, there hasn't been a shred of evidence to back up that claim.
Former U.N. weapons inspector David Albright joining us with some insight on all this. Mr. Albright, good to have you with us.

DAVID ALBRIGHT, FORMER U.N. WEAPONS INSPECTOR: Good to be here.

O'BRIEN: All right. The fact that no evidence has come to the fore at this juncture, given the extent of the alleged Saddam Hussein WMD program, is that surprising to you?

ALBRIGHT: Yes, it is surprising. I would have thought things would have been found by now. The claims really had to do with that a lot of these chemical weapons were deployed, and so you would think there'd be some indication of that, either commanders who said, you know, we decided not to fire them, or as U.S. troops overran Republican Guard positions, they'd find some evidence of orders to use them, or actually chemical weapons themselves. So I am surprised.

O'BRIEN: All right. So where does that leave the Bush administration then?

ALBRIGHT: Well, I think it certainly -- they have to, no matter what -- what turns out to be the case, they have to secure any weapons of mass destruction capabilities and assets Iraq has. I mean, that's got to be the first priority. There also has to be a reckoning of what -- what size stocks does Iraq actually have. And I think because of that reckoning, and because of the need for speed, it would be very helpful to get more people involved in this inspection effort, or investigation effort and I would hope that the United States would, in essence, get over its kind of anger at the U.N. and invite back the inspectors to help with the search, providing additional resources and actually providing credibility to whatever findings are found in Iraq.

O'BRIEN: Well, is it anger or is it what General Myers, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff said, which is, it's too dangerous for civilians to be in there? Do you buy that line of reasoning?

ALBRIGHT: No. I mean, your reporters are in there. I would, under certain circumstances, go. Civilians are willing to take risks. I think nobody understands better than the inspectors that we have to find and contain any weapons of mass destruction assets that are there. We have to locate the people and make sure they're not leaving. And so I think civilians have always shown a willingness. And I would point out that there -- there is precedent for inspectors to go in. I mean, the International Atomic Energy Agency went into Yugoslavia during the war over Kosovo to inspect a nuclear site. So again, I think the civilians do need some protection, but I think it's quite legitimate for them to want to go.

O'BRIEN: What about the line of reasoning that the Iraqi regime made it almost its entire -- they were entirely devoted and focused on hiding everything. If, in fact, that were the case, could they hide something as large as tons and tons of this material, as it is alleged they might have?

ALBRIGHT: Well, they could certainly hide tons of chemical weapons. The administration was claiming 100, 500 tons. But that -- but there's different theories of what Iraq did. I mean, many people believe that Iraq has maintained the capability and the infrastructure to make weapons of mass destruction. At different times, the view has been that Iraq would destroy its stocks, make it harder for the inspectors to find them, and then the inspectors would find where these agents or chemical weapons had been made.

And so it may be that with the onset of inspections, Iraq basically got rid of whatever stocks it had, and just tried to preserve its infrastructure so it could reconstitute very quickly. And so it may be a very different picture than what the administration presented, but still, I would expect that Iraq did not give up its ambitions to be able to make weapons of mass destruction, and I think we will uncover that.

O'BRIEN: One final point here. The administration keeps saying we're not going to go on a treasure hunt, we are going to find somebody who will take us on that hunt. Concurrent with all that, they've been focusing on this deck of cards, the 55 most wanted. It seems to me that the best sources for all this might be the person who swept the hall floors at these chemical weapons facilities, if they existed, low-level types, and surely there are a lot of those in Iraq who could help out.

ALBRIGHT: Yes. No, certainly. It could be, as you say, a lowly official or worker who says, Look, I was there, and I'll take you there. And I think that is going to be a very important part of this search. I think it's -- again, there is a worry that the United States has to face that if they do do this alone, they focus on people -- people are going to say that those people aren't telling the truth, that they're doing it for money, for example. And certainly, many defectors have turned out to provide bad information, because they were looking for a green card here or just a ticket out of Iraq. And so -- so I do think that while the focus on people is absolutely essential, I think it's better if it's done in a way that it's -- in a sense, pure, that there's creditability attached to that, and I think that would involve involving the inspectors much more.

O'BRIEN: David Albright, former weapons inspector, thanks very much for being with us. Appreciate your insights.

ALBRIGHT: Thank you.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com