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Interview With Congresswoman Jane Harman

Aired July 15, 2003 - 15:13   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
SCOTT MCCLELLAN, WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY: It was laid out previously. I think we've addressed this. We've addressed this over the last couple of days about the timing of when we found out that the documents were forged.

QUESTION: But learning of the forgeries was one of this. But that...

(CROSSTALK)

MCCLELLAN: But the bottom line is that we should not have put that line in the speech, and we've made that clear.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

JUDY WOODRUFF, CNN ANCHOR: Well, that's the story that we've all been focusing on for the last few days. We know that. And we also know that California Congresswoman Jane Harman and three other members of the House Intelligence Committee just returned a few days ago from a trip to Iraq.

Representative Harman is the ranking Democrat on the Intelligence Committee. She joins me now from Capitol Hill. We also should say that we invited the committee chairman, Republican Porter Goss. He declined.

Congresswoman Harman, we're glad to have you with us.

REP. JANE HARMAN (D), CALIFORNIA: Nice to be on your show, Judy.

WOODRUFF: You are saying, as I understand it, that you think it is likely that the U.S. is going to find out details of the programs of weapons of mass destruction, but it is something else altogether in terms of whether there will actually be stockpiles of weapons found. Is it possible that the U.S. was sent off to this war under false pretenses?

HARMAN: It's possible. But let's remember why we went. And I did vote for the resolution authorizing the use of force, although I hoped -- and I think most Americans and most people around the world hoped -- that we could work this out diplomatically.

The reason we went to war was to prevent this man, who clearly committed enormous human rights abuses against his own citizens, from exporting weapons of mass destruction around the world and using them against Americans and American interests. And if these programs existed -- and I believe that they did and our WMD search team on the ground believes that they did exist -- if these programs could produce actual weapons that hurt people in short periods of time and disseminate them, that is, by my light, still a good reason to have done what we did.

WOODRUFF: In other words, you're saying, even if it's only the programs that are found, that still would have posed an imminent threat to the United States.

HARMAN: It depends what we find. I think it's still an open question.

But I think we had the wrong model in mind. Certainly, I did. And the intelligence did not make clear what the right model was. We have learned, from being in Baghdad last week and talking at length to Dr. David Kay, who is now in charge of the WMD search, a former weapons inspector, a former consultant to a major organization, a very knowledgeable guy, the right guy to be in charge of this, we have learned that denial and deception was built in to the design of Saddam Hussein's programs.

That means that, when he set out to design a biological weapons program, he made it portable. He miniaturized it. He compartmentalized who had information. This sounds eerily reminiscent of what some of the inspectors were telling us. But, nonetheless, what was not there was the Soviet-style program, a bunch of tanks and missiles all lying out on a huge field that we could come across, and then they would all be labeled, and then we'd see this giant arsenal. That was never what was in Iraq.

What was in Iraq was these special, limited, compartmentalized programs that could grow into full-blown programs quickly and then be disseminated effectively.

WOODRUFF: Let me also ask you about North Korea. Lead story today in "The New York Times," also a story "The Washington Post" reporting, essentially, that the North Koreans are now saying they have enough plutonium to make half-a-dozen nuclear weapons. The U.S. is, I would assume, frantically trying to determine if this is true. Do you have confidence now that the intelligence community can determine one way or another if it's true?

HARMAN: I think it's a question. And it's not just me. It's whether the world has confidence that we can rely on intelligence products. We have to answer the questions now about our intelligence on Iraq.

And the House Intelligence Committee had a bipartisan press conference today to say that our investigation is now fully under way. We're going to look at the Niger documents. We're going to look at a number of questions that are being asked in the Senate, the House and around the world. Let me say that, when Former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, a guy who doesn't hold press interviews easily, says that he thinks we're drifting toward war, I pay attention. And our intelligence that tells us whether the North Koreans are bluffing has to be accurate, timely and unbiased. And that question depends on whether we were capable of producing that kind of intelligence in Iraq. And if we were not, then we need to do more to make sure that our resources in our intelligence community are improved.

WOODRUFF: Does it bother you that this administration went to war with a country where it now turns out they apparently weren't trying to get nuclear material, at the same time it has the policy it has toward North Korea, a country that has nuclear weapons?

HARMAN: Well, I don't think we know the answer to that yet. We know that bogus documents were -- somehow got through channels and persuaded some people that there was an effort by Iraq to purchase uranium from Niger.

WOODRUFF: Right.

HARMAN: But we don't know that there was no nuclear program. There was evidence of a nuclear program 11 years ago. Saddam Hussein said, after the first Iraq war, that the mistake he made was not having nuclear capability before he invaded Kuwait. He actively was interested in it. And we need to know the answer to that question.

But, meanwhile, Judy, I am very concerned about North Korea. We need to prove whether or not it's bluffing. I don't know whether it's bluffing. Certainly, it is going to be harder to deal with a country that has already gone nuclear.

WOODRUFF: We're going to leave it there, Congresswoman Jane Harman, ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee.

HARMAN: Thank you.

WOODRUFF: Very good to see you. Thank you so much for joining us.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com







Aired July 15, 2003 - 15:13   ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
SCOTT MCCLELLAN, WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY: It was laid out previously. I think we've addressed this. We've addressed this over the last couple of days about the timing of when we found out that the documents were forged.

QUESTION: But learning of the forgeries was one of this. But that...

(CROSSTALK)

MCCLELLAN: But the bottom line is that we should not have put that line in the speech, and we've made that clear.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

JUDY WOODRUFF, CNN ANCHOR: Well, that's the story that we've all been focusing on for the last few days. We know that. And we also know that California Congresswoman Jane Harman and three other members of the House Intelligence Committee just returned a few days ago from a trip to Iraq.

Representative Harman is the ranking Democrat on the Intelligence Committee. She joins me now from Capitol Hill. We also should say that we invited the committee chairman, Republican Porter Goss. He declined.

Congresswoman Harman, we're glad to have you with us.

REP. JANE HARMAN (D), CALIFORNIA: Nice to be on your show, Judy.

WOODRUFF: You are saying, as I understand it, that you think it is likely that the U.S. is going to find out details of the programs of weapons of mass destruction, but it is something else altogether in terms of whether there will actually be stockpiles of weapons found. Is it possible that the U.S. was sent off to this war under false pretenses?

HARMAN: It's possible. But let's remember why we went. And I did vote for the resolution authorizing the use of force, although I hoped -- and I think most Americans and most people around the world hoped -- that we could work this out diplomatically.

The reason we went to war was to prevent this man, who clearly committed enormous human rights abuses against his own citizens, from exporting weapons of mass destruction around the world and using them against Americans and American interests. And if these programs existed -- and I believe that they did and our WMD search team on the ground believes that they did exist -- if these programs could produce actual weapons that hurt people in short periods of time and disseminate them, that is, by my light, still a good reason to have done what we did.

WOODRUFF: In other words, you're saying, even if it's only the programs that are found, that still would have posed an imminent threat to the United States.

HARMAN: It depends what we find. I think it's still an open question.

But I think we had the wrong model in mind. Certainly, I did. And the intelligence did not make clear what the right model was. We have learned, from being in Baghdad last week and talking at length to Dr. David Kay, who is now in charge of the WMD search, a former weapons inspector, a former consultant to a major organization, a very knowledgeable guy, the right guy to be in charge of this, we have learned that denial and deception was built in to the design of Saddam Hussein's programs.

That means that, when he set out to design a biological weapons program, he made it portable. He miniaturized it. He compartmentalized who had information. This sounds eerily reminiscent of what some of the inspectors were telling us. But, nonetheless, what was not there was the Soviet-style program, a bunch of tanks and missiles all lying out on a huge field that we could come across, and then they would all be labeled, and then we'd see this giant arsenal. That was never what was in Iraq.

What was in Iraq was these special, limited, compartmentalized programs that could grow into full-blown programs quickly and then be disseminated effectively.

WOODRUFF: Let me also ask you about North Korea. Lead story today in "The New York Times," also a story "The Washington Post" reporting, essentially, that the North Koreans are now saying they have enough plutonium to make half-a-dozen nuclear weapons. The U.S. is, I would assume, frantically trying to determine if this is true. Do you have confidence now that the intelligence community can determine one way or another if it's true?

HARMAN: I think it's a question. And it's not just me. It's whether the world has confidence that we can rely on intelligence products. We have to answer the questions now about our intelligence on Iraq.

And the House Intelligence Committee had a bipartisan press conference today to say that our investigation is now fully under way. We're going to look at the Niger documents. We're going to look at a number of questions that are being asked in the Senate, the House and around the world. Let me say that, when Former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, a guy who doesn't hold press interviews easily, says that he thinks we're drifting toward war, I pay attention. And our intelligence that tells us whether the North Koreans are bluffing has to be accurate, timely and unbiased. And that question depends on whether we were capable of producing that kind of intelligence in Iraq. And if we were not, then we need to do more to make sure that our resources in our intelligence community are improved.

WOODRUFF: Does it bother you that this administration went to war with a country where it now turns out they apparently weren't trying to get nuclear material, at the same time it has the policy it has toward North Korea, a country that has nuclear weapons?

HARMAN: Well, I don't think we know the answer to that yet. We know that bogus documents were -- somehow got through channels and persuaded some people that there was an effort by Iraq to purchase uranium from Niger.

WOODRUFF: Right.

HARMAN: But we don't know that there was no nuclear program. There was evidence of a nuclear program 11 years ago. Saddam Hussein said, after the first Iraq war, that the mistake he made was not having nuclear capability before he invaded Kuwait. He actively was interested in it. And we need to know the answer to that question.

But, meanwhile, Judy, I am very concerned about North Korea. We need to prove whether or not it's bluffing. I don't know whether it's bluffing. Certainly, it is going to be harder to deal with a country that has already gone nuclear.

WOODRUFF: We're going to leave it there, Congresswoman Jane Harman, ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee.

HARMAN: Thank you.

WOODRUFF: Very good to see you. Thank you so much for joining us.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com