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Is the Front Growing in Iraq?

Aired November 24, 2003 - 13:35   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


MILES O'BRIEN, CNN ANCHOR: Now let's get back to the situation in Iraq. Clearly took a very ugly and murderous turn, really over the weekend with the brutal killings of two American personnel in Mosul.
We are going to bring in our CNN military analyst, retired Brigadier General David Grange joining us from Chicago to talk about the trend that we may or may not be witnessing today.

General Grange, good to have you back with us.

BRIG. GEN. DAVID GRANGE (RET.), CNN MILITARY ANALYST: Thank you.

O'BRIEN: First of all, we have the sense that the front appears to be broadening outside that core area we've been calling the Sunni Triangle sort of around Baghdad region. Is that for real or is that meant as by the guerrillas to give the perception of that front broadening?

GRANGE: Two purposes, I believe. One is the one you just stated. They want to at least obtain perception that they are far reaching, that this insurgency truly is spreading throughout all of Iraq because some of the areas that are very successful is obviously against their purposes.

And also, No. 2, in some of these other areas, they want to spread the coalition forces thinner than they already are spread. In other words, hit in all different fronts and all different areas to really tax the coalition force which is a economy force strategy of the guerrillas.

O'BRIEN: All right, let's talk about one other thing here. This seemed to take a different turn. Instead of the cold, calculating methodical terrorist attacks we've been seeing, the rocket launchers on donkeys or hidden inside trailers that are disguised to be other things.

In this case it was a case of mob violence. We haven't seen as much of that heretofore. What's going on?

GRANGE: Well, again, the first indications -- and I don't think all of the information's been released -- but the first indications are that here you had a target of opportunity.

In other words, the vehicle was not targeted, I don't believe, early on. But became a target because of the opportunity that was presented to common criminals or paid gunmen to take out American GIs. And then from there on it was a -- some leaders that were the catalysts in a kind of a mob setting that caused the people into a frenzy to do something to the GIs after, I believe, they were shot.

The questions that come to mind is it was the vehicle alone? If there was there another vehicle covering it what happened? Why was reaction not there sooner than it was? It's hard to say because we don't have all of the information yet.

O'BRIEN: Counteracting mob violence though is tricky business, especially when you're trying to win the hearts and minds of the people. You can't just start mowing down civilians to stop a mob. There are non-lethal alternatives that can be considered. I mean police in the United States would use tear gas. Do U.S. troops have non-lethal means at their disposal to quell this kind of violence?

GRANGE: Non-lethal capabilities are out there. Whether they're distributed to the lowest level of the fighters, the leaders in the field. For instance, the sergeants and lieutenants, because guerrilla war is really a sergeants and lieutenant fight. It's decentralized and so it should be anyway.

And so is it -- do they have the means pushed down to them to execute other than lethal force? It's all about graduating use of force, whether it be lethal or non-lethal. And what you really want your forces to have is the flexibility to employ these different capabilities so they only kill who they have to kill, and if they don't have to kill someone they don't, yet they can still accomplish their mission. Very important capability to have.

O'BRIEN: Would a typical patrol be equipped with some sort of gas to disperse people, tear gas, if you will, rubber bullets and that kind of thing?

GRANGE: Normally not. Because of the Geneva Convention it's considered a chemical and usually it takes the highest level to obtain release authority to employ it. But in any case, in my experience, for instance in Bosnia it's usually too late. The decision has to be made by the corporal on the ground at the time of the incident. And so I would -- I would doubt that it's really down to that level.

O'BRIEN: All right, General David Grange, thanks for the insights. Appreciate it and we always appreciate you dropping by.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT WWW.FDCH.COM






Aired November 24, 2003 - 13:35   ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
MILES O'BRIEN, CNN ANCHOR: Now let's get back to the situation in Iraq. Clearly took a very ugly and murderous turn, really over the weekend with the brutal killings of two American personnel in Mosul.
We are going to bring in our CNN military analyst, retired Brigadier General David Grange joining us from Chicago to talk about the trend that we may or may not be witnessing today.

General Grange, good to have you back with us.

BRIG. GEN. DAVID GRANGE (RET.), CNN MILITARY ANALYST: Thank you.

O'BRIEN: First of all, we have the sense that the front appears to be broadening outside that core area we've been calling the Sunni Triangle sort of around Baghdad region. Is that for real or is that meant as by the guerrillas to give the perception of that front broadening?

GRANGE: Two purposes, I believe. One is the one you just stated. They want to at least obtain perception that they are far reaching, that this insurgency truly is spreading throughout all of Iraq because some of the areas that are very successful is obviously against their purposes.

And also, No. 2, in some of these other areas, they want to spread the coalition forces thinner than they already are spread. In other words, hit in all different fronts and all different areas to really tax the coalition force which is a economy force strategy of the guerrillas.

O'BRIEN: All right, let's talk about one other thing here. This seemed to take a different turn. Instead of the cold, calculating methodical terrorist attacks we've been seeing, the rocket launchers on donkeys or hidden inside trailers that are disguised to be other things.

In this case it was a case of mob violence. We haven't seen as much of that heretofore. What's going on?

GRANGE: Well, again, the first indications -- and I don't think all of the information's been released -- but the first indications are that here you had a target of opportunity.

In other words, the vehicle was not targeted, I don't believe, early on. But became a target because of the opportunity that was presented to common criminals or paid gunmen to take out American GIs. And then from there on it was a -- some leaders that were the catalysts in a kind of a mob setting that caused the people into a frenzy to do something to the GIs after, I believe, they were shot.

The questions that come to mind is it was the vehicle alone? If there was there another vehicle covering it what happened? Why was reaction not there sooner than it was? It's hard to say because we don't have all of the information yet.

O'BRIEN: Counteracting mob violence though is tricky business, especially when you're trying to win the hearts and minds of the people. You can't just start mowing down civilians to stop a mob. There are non-lethal alternatives that can be considered. I mean police in the United States would use tear gas. Do U.S. troops have non-lethal means at their disposal to quell this kind of violence?

GRANGE: Non-lethal capabilities are out there. Whether they're distributed to the lowest level of the fighters, the leaders in the field. For instance, the sergeants and lieutenants, because guerrilla war is really a sergeants and lieutenant fight. It's decentralized and so it should be anyway.

And so is it -- do they have the means pushed down to them to execute other than lethal force? It's all about graduating use of force, whether it be lethal or non-lethal. And what you really want your forces to have is the flexibility to employ these different capabilities so they only kill who they have to kill, and if they don't have to kill someone they don't, yet they can still accomplish their mission. Very important capability to have.

O'BRIEN: Would a typical patrol be equipped with some sort of gas to disperse people, tear gas, if you will, rubber bullets and that kind of thing?

GRANGE: Normally not. Because of the Geneva Convention it's considered a chemical and usually it takes the highest level to obtain release authority to employ it. But in any case, in my experience, for instance in Bosnia it's usually too late. The decision has to be made by the corporal on the ground at the time of the incident. And so I would -- I would doubt that it's really down to that level.

O'BRIEN: All right, General David Grange, thanks for the insights. Appreciate it and we always appreciate you dropping by.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT WWW.FDCH.COM