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Weapons Hunt: Kay on Saddam's WMD, "I Don't Think They Exist"
Aired January 26, 2004 - 13:05 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
CAROL LIN, CNN ANCHOR: All right now from -- on to the firestorm over Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction. A man who has dedicated much of his career to looking for them now concludes they probably don't exist, which raises the question what made two American administrations so convinced they did?
CNN national security correspondent David Ensor is following this story from Washington.
You finding some answers -- David?
DAVID ENSOR, CNN NATIONAL SECURITY CORRESPONDENT: Well quite so, Carol. David Kay, after all, was also one of those who was confident at the time he took the job to look for the weapons that he would find plenty of them. He has told the "New York Times" that U.S. intelligence failed to realize that Iraqi scientists presented ambitious but fanciful weapons programs to Saddam Hussein and then used the money for other corrupt purposes. He said -- quote -- "The regime was no longer in control. It was like a death spiral."
Now Kay is putting the blame squarely on the CIA and U.S. intelligence rather than President Bush and his advisors for the apparently incorrect assessment on WMD prior to the war. And he is saying that not finding weapons in Iraq isn't the only surprise for U.S. intelligence this year.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
DAVID KAY, FORMER HEAD OF IRAQ SURVEY GROUP: People forget that I'm one of the worst you focus on Iraq. We've had three surprises this year. We've had Iran and we've had Libya. The Iranian program was not found either by the international inspection agencies or by domestic intelligence services, it was Iranian defectors, Iranian opposition groups outside of Iran that brought that to the world's attention.
The Libyan one, I don't think we still know how it was found, but it had very surprising elements, Pakistan connections, plants in Malaysia producing parts. It is, in many ways, the biggest surprise of all and it was missed.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
ENSOR: Kay told the newspaper that he thinks U.S. intelligence collection and analysis capabilities may need to be reformed in light of all this. His comments put George Tenet in the hot seat. And senior administration officials are also saying it will be up to the director of Central Intelligence to answer questions about why no weapons have been found in Iraq. Tenet is scheduled to appear before Congress in February and again in March.
Intelligence officials are more than a little angered and frustrated by Kay's broadside of the last few days, especially since Kay was one of those before the war publicly saying he was convinced Iraq had weapons. He has said that one reason he quit was that his staff in Iraq of well over 1,000 kept getting raided as experts were moved to the efforts to stop insurgent attacks on American forces.
One official talking to me today said that's true, that from time to time Kay's people were indeed loaned to the U.S. military to help stop people who were trying to kill, among others, David Kay himself. U.S. officials say that the weapons search team remains over 1,000 strong. And they insist it is too soon for anyone, including David Kay, to prejudge what that team will find under Charles Duelfer, its new director -- Carol.
LIN: David, what are your sources saying, though, about whatever back and forth is going on between the White House and the CIA and the FBI about this?
ENSOR: Well I do gather that senior officials in the administration were pleased that David Kay put the blame on the CIA and pointed out that the assessment that there were weapons in Iraq predated the Bush administration, that that was the assessment under the Clinton administration as well. Clearly intelligence officials, they're basically supposed to give the administration their best judgment. And when they get criticized in public, they're supposed to suck it up and take it quietly, which, at least today, they're doing -- Carol.
LIN: All right, a point of diplomacy at a very controversial time.
Thank you very much, David Ensor.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com
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Aired January 26, 2004 - 13:05 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
CAROL LIN, CNN ANCHOR: All right now from -- on to the firestorm over Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction. A man who has dedicated much of his career to looking for them now concludes they probably don't exist, which raises the question what made two American administrations so convinced they did?
CNN national security correspondent David Ensor is following this story from Washington.
You finding some answers -- David?
DAVID ENSOR, CNN NATIONAL SECURITY CORRESPONDENT: Well quite so, Carol. David Kay, after all, was also one of those who was confident at the time he took the job to look for the weapons that he would find plenty of them. He has told the "New York Times" that U.S. intelligence failed to realize that Iraqi scientists presented ambitious but fanciful weapons programs to Saddam Hussein and then used the money for other corrupt purposes. He said -- quote -- "The regime was no longer in control. It was like a death spiral."
Now Kay is putting the blame squarely on the CIA and U.S. intelligence rather than President Bush and his advisors for the apparently incorrect assessment on WMD prior to the war. And he is saying that not finding weapons in Iraq isn't the only surprise for U.S. intelligence this year.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
DAVID KAY, FORMER HEAD OF IRAQ SURVEY GROUP: People forget that I'm one of the worst you focus on Iraq. We've had three surprises this year. We've had Iran and we've had Libya. The Iranian program was not found either by the international inspection agencies or by domestic intelligence services, it was Iranian defectors, Iranian opposition groups outside of Iran that brought that to the world's attention.
The Libyan one, I don't think we still know how it was found, but it had very surprising elements, Pakistan connections, plants in Malaysia producing parts. It is, in many ways, the biggest surprise of all and it was missed.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
ENSOR: Kay told the newspaper that he thinks U.S. intelligence collection and analysis capabilities may need to be reformed in light of all this. His comments put George Tenet in the hot seat. And senior administration officials are also saying it will be up to the director of Central Intelligence to answer questions about why no weapons have been found in Iraq. Tenet is scheduled to appear before Congress in February and again in March.
Intelligence officials are more than a little angered and frustrated by Kay's broadside of the last few days, especially since Kay was one of those before the war publicly saying he was convinced Iraq had weapons. He has said that one reason he quit was that his staff in Iraq of well over 1,000 kept getting raided as experts were moved to the efforts to stop insurgent attacks on American forces.
One official talking to me today said that's true, that from time to time Kay's people were indeed loaned to the U.S. military to help stop people who were trying to kill, among others, David Kay himself. U.S. officials say that the weapons search team remains over 1,000 strong. And they insist it is too soon for anyone, including David Kay, to prejudge what that team will find under Charles Duelfer, its new director -- Carol.
LIN: David, what are your sources saying, though, about whatever back and forth is going on between the White House and the CIA and the FBI about this?
ENSOR: Well I do gather that senior officials in the administration were pleased that David Kay put the blame on the CIA and pointed out that the assessment that there were weapons in Iraq predated the Bush administration, that that was the assessment under the Clinton administration as well. Clearly intelligence officials, they're basically supposed to give the administration their best judgment. And when they get criticized in public, they're supposed to suck it up and take it quietly, which, at least today, they're doing -- Carol.
LIN: All right, a point of diplomacy at a very controversial time.
Thank you very much, David Ensor.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com
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