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Pakistan's Key Nuclear Scientist Confesses to Smuggling Secrets
Aired February 09, 2004 - 14:32 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
KYRA PHILLIPS, CNN ANCHOR: Pakistan's military spokesperson vehemently denying today that terrorists obtained nuclear weapons or know-how from its former top nuclear scientist.
That scientist admitted last week to sharing nuclear secrets.
CNN's Mike Chinoy takes a look at scandal and what and when the CIA knew about it.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
MIKE CHINOY, CNN CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): Last October, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage came to Islamabad and met with Pakistani leaders, including President Pervez Musharraf.
RICHARD ARMITAGE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE: I was able to have a rather in-depth discussion with President Musharraf on the question of our whole strategic relationship.
CHINOY: What Armitage didn't say, according to Pakistani officials, was that he had just provided Musharraf with the CIA's evidence of the nuclear smuggling ring run by the architect of Pakistan's nuclear program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, evidence the CIA's director referred to in public for the first time last week.
GEORGE TENET, CIA DIRECTOR: We discovered the extent of Khan's hidden network. We tagged the proliferaters. We detected the network stretching across fourth continents, offering its wares to countries like North Korea and Iran.
Working with our British colleagues, we pieced together the picture of the network, revealing its subsidiaries, its scientists, its front companies, its agents, its finances, and manufacturing plants on three continents.
CHINOY: The intelligence Armitage shared with Musharraf, officials say, included details of Khan's overseas travels, his meetings with intermediaries, his nuclear technology transfers and his bank accounts.
The officials confirm that Armitage asked Musharraf, a key U.S. ally, to conduct his own investigation and act swiftly against Khan, warning that failure to do so would jeopardize Pakistan's ties with Washington.
Musharraf then ordered his own intelligence agent agency to follow up. Its investigation confirmed the CIA's findings. That evidence was buttressed by revelations from the International Atomic Energy Agency late last year of Khan's nuclear dealings with Iran and Libya, leaving Musharraf little choice but to act.
(on camera) With Khan's confession, one chapter in this extraordinary drama has come to an end. But another, identifying all the members of his global smuggling network and putting them out of business, has only just begun.
Mike Chinoy, CNN, Islamabad.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
PHILLIPS: Some argue the U.S. knew all along that Pakistan's leading scientist was giving away nuclear secrets but remained friendly with Pakistan, because it need its help on this war on terror.
Here to talk about it, Jim Walsh, an expert on international security at Harvard University.
Jim, great to see you.
JIM WALSH, HARVARD UNIVERSITY: Good to see you again, Kyra.
PHILLIPS: We start talking about how this is possibly one of the most important stories of the decade. Why?
WALSH: Well, it's important -- I think it's more important in Iraq, arguably more important than the Indian and Pakistani nuclear test back in 1998.
Why? Because this is a country that is perhaps unstable. It is ruled by a military dictatorship; it has economic problems; and it has nuclear weapons. And on top of all of that, it appears to be out selling these -- this technology aggressively, perhaps not only to Iran, North Korea and Libya but to others, as well.
It has really become a marketplace for nuclear technology.
PHILLIPS: So when you say others as well, what other countries are you talking about? Is this just a tip of the iceberg? And why now all of a sudden are we hearing this -- hearing Dr. Khan come forward and this formal apology?
WALSH: Well, those are two good questions, Kyra.
First, on what other countries might be involved, well, I think the guide here has to be A.Q. Khan's statements himself. He has said explicitly, and has done so for decades, that Muslim countries should not be discriminated against when it comes to the bomb.
And so I think we have to put every major Muslim country on the list of countries that he may have approached and offered to sell nuclear technology to. And that would include Saudi Arabia. Perhaps it includes Egypt, maybe others as well, Syria. And of course, there have been allegations that he tried to sell technology to Iraq prior -- just on the eve of the first Gulf War.
So I think there's quite a bit of investigation left to do.
PHILLIPS: So it's not just information that was sold here. You're saying it got even as specific not only as parts, but even weapons designs. How do we know how far this has gone or could go and these other countries do have?
WALSH: Well, I think you're absolutely right. It isn't only information.
And one of the startling and scary revelations recently was that actual bomb designs were transferred to Libya. But it was not only bomb designs. It's the components the you would go to make enrichment technology, which gives you the stuff of the bomb, the material you need to make nuclear weapons.
Now where do we go from here? I think we allow IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as the CIA and other foreign intelligence operatives, to bring the suspects in, begin to interrogate them and follow the paper trail: the bank accounts, the invoices, the various business transactions that will provide us some guide.
But there's also another way to find it. And you know, there's an old joke in the proliferation community that if you want to track proliferation, the most effective way to do it is get A.Q. Khan's travel itinerary. And you know, that's a joke that has a certain realism about it.
We should find out who he has been visiting, who he's been talking to over the past decade. And my guess is that will provide us with some clues as to who may have been interested in that technology.
PHILLIPS: And Jim, when talking about the next conflict, we've heard word of Iran, we've heard North Korea. Now I have military sources telling me behind closed doors they're talking about Pakistan. Do you agree? Is that a reality?
WALSH: Well, maybe not tomorrow, but I certainly think that many people, many of my colleagues in this business, when you ask them, what's the most dangerous country in the world, their answer is Pakistan, not North Korea.
Because again, you've got this terrible brew of economic instability, a lack of democracy. It seems as if Musharraf is becoming more unpopular. The Islamists are become more popular. And you've got nuclear weapons and terrorists. You mix that all together, and it becomes a worrisome situation.
In particular, what I think folks are worried about is perhaps not this generation of the military which runs Pakistan, but the junior officer ranks. What is Pakistan going to be like in five or ten years when those folks rise in the ranks and take over the military in Pakistan?
A lot of those people do not have a very fond view of the United States, and it is worrisome to U.S. officials.
PHILLIPS: Also, too, these assassination attempts on Musharraf, you wonder what will happen if, indeed, one of these attempts takes his life.
Now Pakistan has been an ally of the U.S. Well, that's what has been out in the open. What did the U.S. know this whole time? Did the U.S. know anything? Is it something they just decided not to talk about, government officials?
WALSH: That's the $64,000 question: what did we know, and when did we know it? And I think a lot of folks who have worked on this problem for awhile suspect that we knew something about these activities for quite awhile.
As I've suggested before, there's this joke that says follow Khan and you'll find out what's happened. That's been around for a long time.
Khan has repeatedly made public statements insisting that the Islamic world is entitled to nuclear technology and is making threats, and having, even, sales brochures related to technology that might be sold.
I think it's hard to imagine that the U.S. was unaware of that.
And then the question would be, if they knew about it, why wasn't something said earlier? And I'm afraid there the answer is probably pretty obvious, if we're going to speculate.
The answer is that we've had other fish to fry with Pakistan. We needed their help against the Soviet Union, so maybe we looked the other way. And now we need their help against the -- in the war against al Qaeda. And perhaps we looked away again.
Those are questions that also, I think, require investigation.
PHILLIPS: Jim, quickly before we let you go, any good news here?
WALSH: Well, I think there is some good news. The good news is that, despite the fact that there's all this loose nuclear material in the Soviet Union, and despite the fact that Khan was out there selling his wares, really a supplier pushing it like a cigarette tobacco company or a drug pusher, not every country want it. A lot of countries appear to have said no.
And I think that is good news for the nuclear age.
PHILLIPS: Supply driven, not demand driven. Jim Walsh, thank you.
WALSH: Thank you, Kyra.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com
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Aired February 9, 2004 - 14:32 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
KYRA PHILLIPS, CNN ANCHOR: Pakistan's military spokesperson vehemently denying today that terrorists obtained nuclear weapons or know-how from its former top nuclear scientist.
That scientist admitted last week to sharing nuclear secrets.
CNN's Mike Chinoy takes a look at scandal and what and when the CIA knew about it.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
MIKE CHINOY, CNN CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): Last October, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage came to Islamabad and met with Pakistani leaders, including President Pervez Musharraf.
RICHARD ARMITAGE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE: I was able to have a rather in-depth discussion with President Musharraf on the question of our whole strategic relationship.
CHINOY: What Armitage didn't say, according to Pakistani officials, was that he had just provided Musharraf with the CIA's evidence of the nuclear smuggling ring run by the architect of Pakistan's nuclear program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, evidence the CIA's director referred to in public for the first time last week.
GEORGE TENET, CIA DIRECTOR: We discovered the extent of Khan's hidden network. We tagged the proliferaters. We detected the network stretching across fourth continents, offering its wares to countries like North Korea and Iran.
Working with our British colleagues, we pieced together the picture of the network, revealing its subsidiaries, its scientists, its front companies, its agents, its finances, and manufacturing plants on three continents.
CHINOY: The intelligence Armitage shared with Musharraf, officials say, included details of Khan's overseas travels, his meetings with intermediaries, his nuclear technology transfers and his bank accounts.
The officials confirm that Armitage asked Musharraf, a key U.S. ally, to conduct his own investigation and act swiftly against Khan, warning that failure to do so would jeopardize Pakistan's ties with Washington.
Musharraf then ordered his own intelligence agent agency to follow up. Its investigation confirmed the CIA's findings. That evidence was buttressed by revelations from the International Atomic Energy Agency late last year of Khan's nuclear dealings with Iran and Libya, leaving Musharraf little choice but to act.
(on camera) With Khan's confession, one chapter in this extraordinary drama has come to an end. But another, identifying all the members of his global smuggling network and putting them out of business, has only just begun.
Mike Chinoy, CNN, Islamabad.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
PHILLIPS: Some argue the U.S. knew all along that Pakistan's leading scientist was giving away nuclear secrets but remained friendly with Pakistan, because it need its help on this war on terror.
Here to talk about it, Jim Walsh, an expert on international security at Harvard University.
Jim, great to see you.
JIM WALSH, HARVARD UNIVERSITY: Good to see you again, Kyra.
PHILLIPS: We start talking about how this is possibly one of the most important stories of the decade. Why?
WALSH: Well, it's important -- I think it's more important in Iraq, arguably more important than the Indian and Pakistani nuclear test back in 1998.
Why? Because this is a country that is perhaps unstable. It is ruled by a military dictatorship; it has economic problems; and it has nuclear weapons. And on top of all of that, it appears to be out selling these -- this technology aggressively, perhaps not only to Iran, North Korea and Libya but to others, as well.
It has really become a marketplace for nuclear technology.
PHILLIPS: So when you say others as well, what other countries are you talking about? Is this just a tip of the iceberg? And why now all of a sudden are we hearing this -- hearing Dr. Khan come forward and this formal apology?
WALSH: Well, those are two good questions, Kyra.
First, on what other countries might be involved, well, I think the guide here has to be A.Q. Khan's statements himself. He has said explicitly, and has done so for decades, that Muslim countries should not be discriminated against when it comes to the bomb.
And so I think we have to put every major Muslim country on the list of countries that he may have approached and offered to sell nuclear technology to. And that would include Saudi Arabia. Perhaps it includes Egypt, maybe others as well, Syria. And of course, there have been allegations that he tried to sell technology to Iraq prior -- just on the eve of the first Gulf War.
So I think there's quite a bit of investigation left to do.
PHILLIPS: So it's not just information that was sold here. You're saying it got even as specific not only as parts, but even weapons designs. How do we know how far this has gone or could go and these other countries do have?
WALSH: Well, I think you're absolutely right. It isn't only information.
And one of the startling and scary revelations recently was that actual bomb designs were transferred to Libya. But it was not only bomb designs. It's the components the you would go to make enrichment technology, which gives you the stuff of the bomb, the material you need to make nuclear weapons.
Now where do we go from here? I think we allow IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as the CIA and other foreign intelligence operatives, to bring the suspects in, begin to interrogate them and follow the paper trail: the bank accounts, the invoices, the various business transactions that will provide us some guide.
But there's also another way to find it. And you know, there's an old joke in the proliferation community that if you want to track proliferation, the most effective way to do it is get A.Q. Khan's travel itinerary. And you know, that's a joke that has a certain realism about it.
We should find out who he has been visiting, who he's been talking to over the past decade. And my guess is that will provide us with some clues as to who may have been interested in that technology.
PHILLIPS: And Jim, when talking about the next conflict, we've heard word of Iran, we've heard North Korea. Now I have military sources telling me behind closed doors they're talking about Pakistan. Do you agree? Is that a reality?
WALSH: Well, maybe not tomorrow, but I certainly think that many people, many of my colleagues in this business, when you ask them, what's the most dangerous country in the world, their answer is Pakistan, not North Korea.
Because again, you've got this terrible brew of economic instability, a lack of democracy. It seems as if Musharraf is becoming more unpopular. The Islamists are become more popular. And you've got nuclear weapons and terrorists. You mix that all together, and it becomes a worrisome situation.
In particular, what I think folks are worried about is perhaps not this generation of the military which runs Pakistan, but the junior officer ranks. What is Pakistan going to be like in five or ten years when those folks rise in the ranks and take over the military in Pakistan?
A lot of those people do not have a very fond view of the United States, and it is worrisome to U.S. officials.
PHILLIPS: Also, too, these assassination attempts on Musharraf, you wonder what will happen if, indeed, one of these attempts takes his life.
Now Pakistan has been an ally of the U.S. Well, that's what has been out in the open. What did the U.S. know this whole time? Did the U.S. know anything? Is it something they just decided not to talk about, government officials?
WALSH: That's the $64,000 question: what did we know, and when did we know it? And I think a lot of folks who have worked on this problem for awhile suspect that we knew something about these activities for quite awhile.
As I've suggested before, there's this joke that says follow Khan and you'll find out what's happened. That's been around for a long time.
Khan has repeatedly made public statements insisting that the Islamic world is entitled to nuclear technology and is making threats, and having, even, sales brochures related to technology that might be sold.
I think it's hard to imagine that the U.S. was unaware of that.
And then the question would be, if they knew about it, why wasn't something said earlier? And I'm afraid there the answer is probably pretty obvious, if we're going to speculate.
The answer is that we've had other fish to fry with Pakistan. We needed their help against the Soviet Union, so maybe we looked the other way. And now we need their help against the -- in the war against al Qaeda. And perhaps we looked away again.
Those are questions that also, I think, require investigation.
PHILLIPS: Jim, quickly before we let you go, any good news here?
WALSH: Well, I think there is some good news. The good news is that, despite the fact that there's all this loose nuclear material in the Soviet Union, and despite the fact that Khan was out there selling his wares, really a supplier pushing it like a cigarette tobacco company or a drug pusher, not every country want it. A lot of countries appear to have said no.
And I think that is good news for the nuclear age.
PHILLIPS: Supply driven, not demand driven. Jim Walsh, thank you.
WALSH: Thank you, Kyra.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com
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