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American Morning

Crew Undergoes Debriefing

Aired April 13, 2001 - 10:31   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
LEON HARRIS, CNN ANCHOR: It is 4:30 a.m. in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii where those 24 crew members face another day of extensive debriefing. But there are larger questions facing their superiors, such as the value of such surveillance flights, as well as their future. For that, we turn now to our next guest.

He's Melvin Goodman. And he is a professor of international security at the National War College. He is also a former senior analyst with the CIA. Mr. Goodman, we thank you very much for your time this morning.

PROF. MELVIN GOODMAN, NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE: Thank you, Leon.

HARRIS: Let's begin with trying to explain to folks watching this morning exactly what might be going on with this debriefing process? For those of us who have never been through one, besides what happened during this collision, what is it that those who are conducting the debriefings might be asking?

GOODMAN: Well, there will be three major phrases as part of the briefing. The most sensitive phase will be discussed first. And that will be the damage assessment? What did the crew actually destroy? Did they destroy all of the sensitive equipment that was on that plane?

And that debriefing will be done in a sensitive facility called a skiff (ph), a special compartment or information facility. It will be done by the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as military intelligence.

The second phase will be done primarily by the military. And that will get into operational intelligence. What actually happened in the air? And just as importantly, what did this crew see once they were on the ground in terms of the base where they were located, where they were kept, what kind of equipment did they see? What kind of repair was this equipment in? And how did the military conduct itself, the Chinese military in their relations with the Americans?

Then the phase done by the political analysts I would imagine from the State Department, the CIA, and as well as the military. That will deal with military-to-military relations. Did the military seem confident in dealing with their United States counterparts? Did their attitudes change as they went through the three phases of the crisis, the hard phase and the first several days, then the period of trying to send signals back and forth between Beijing and Washington to see if a release could be worked out, and then the final conciliatory phase.

So this will be s the three important phases of the debriefing. And it will be very intensive.

HARRIS: And how long will this period go for?

GOODMAN: I think this would take a couple of days. It's already in its second day. It's possible it could go into a third day. And it's possible when they get back to their base in the state of Washington there will be more debriefings, especially of key personnel who were on that plane. Again, remember, this was not just a military mission. This was an intelligence mission, or an espionage mission. And they were carrying out collection guidance from the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office.

HARRIS: Well, let me ask you this. What could actually be learned by asking them how the Chinese conducted themselves? You said that a minute ago. What do you mean by that?

GOODMAN: Well, I think it's very important to know whether the Chinese military felt confident or not in dealing with the Americans. My guess is that there may have been some embarrassment or uncertainty on the part of the military. I think we've assumed for too long that the military is the key voice in the decision-making power in Beijing.

I happen to think that is not the case. I would like to know whether the military was uncertain in their dealings with the Americans, how they behaved. Were they aggressive? Were they confident? Were they haughty? Or were they kind of restrained? Were they careful?

Did their attitudes change during this period, which would suggest they were following political signals. When the political leadership was moving towards some conciliation and some resolution of the crisis, did the attitudes of the military change?

But there is another aspect that needs to be discussed with regard to a debriefing. And that is a debriefing not so much of this crew but of policy makers or decision-makers or the strategists in terms of what we learned from this kind of activity. Remember, this is tactical intelligence. Most of the intelligence we gather from China comes from satellites, our strategic intelligence.

So I think we have to make a very hard analysis of the kind of intelligence we collect in the air. Whether...

HARRIS: I'm sorry we're going to have to...

GOODMAN: I'm sorry.

HARRIS: ... I am sorry to cut you off, but I'm glad you brought that point up because it's a question that just popped in my head in the last couple of days or so. We understood that one of the courses of action that this crew actually had to consider was whether or not to ditch this plane and possibly lose all 24 lives onboard. Would that have been worth it considering what they might have picked up there?

GOODMAN: Certainly not. In fact, this pilot, this captain behaved admirably and courageously in this effort. I think his first mission was to protect his crew. And I think that's exactly what the military wanted him to do.

In terms of protecting the intelligence, I don't think that this is essential intelligence to our knowledge of what is going on in China. In fact, my concern is this kind of rigorous, almost daily intensive reconnaissance activity near Chinese international waters and airspace could be a self-fulfilling prophecy. If we want a crisis down the road with China, we can do certain things that will almost assure this kind of confrontation.

This was an accident waiting to happen. And I am not saying that this kind of activity should stop. But I would seriously question whether it has to be as rigorous or intensive as it is.

Again, our strategic intelligence comes from satellites. We will continue to collect that. And we will continue to be knowledgeable about China.

But we have to decide whether we're going to have a one-China policy or a two-China policy. Then other decisions will stem from that because if it's a one-China policy, then we should be looking for the day of a moderate Beijing. And reunification is to take place, it should be done in a diplomatic and conciliatory way.

The kinds of steps we are taking really suggest a two-China policy in our protection of Taiwan. And this could be a self- fulfilling prophecy in terms of the confrontation of Washington and Beijing, which seems totally unnecessary.

HARRIS: These are very interesting points you are bringing up that raise many more questions that no doubt will be discussed in the days to come. Melvin Goodman, thanks much. We appreciate your insight this morning.

GOODMAN: Thank you, Leon.

HARRIS: We'll talk to you again.

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