Return to Transcripts main page

American Morning

How Did Street Kid from Chicago End Up Pitching Deadly Plan to Bin Laden's Operation Chief?

Aired June 17, 2002 - 09:04   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
BILL HEMMER, CNN ANCHOR: Word came out over the weekend about a second suspect tied to the so-called dirty bomb plot. Authorities arrested Adham Amin Hassoun last week, saying there was evidence linking him to Jose Padilla. Hassoun has been charged in immigration violations, and we've also been learning more, too, about Padilla, the man in the picture here, in custody for allegedly plotting to use a dirty bomb in an attack against America.

He's in a military jail, labeled "enemy combatant." But how did a street kid from Chicago end up pitching this potentially deadly plan to one of Osama bin Laden's operation's chiefs? It's a topic covered in this week's edition of "TIME" magazine. And joining us now from Washington to talk about the disturbing trail of Jose, Padilla, "TIME" senior correspondent, Michael Weisskopf.

Michael, good morning to you. Good article, by the way.

MICHAEL WEISSKOPF, SENIOR CORRESPONDENT "TIME": Good morning. Thanks.

HEMMER: One of the things that you comment on, and you say it repeatedly, is that this article should give Americans reassurance. How so?

WEISSKOPF: Because Padilla's plans were actually much larger than they ended up being described by the attorney general. And we were lucky to have avoided any of them. And Padilla himself, when he was preparing for a meeting with a bin Laden operation's chief last March in Pakistan, had really come up with bigger plans than the dirty bomb.

He wanted to build and to detonate a nuclear weapon in this country. He had searched the Internet, came upon a laughably inaccurate, but still to him, credible Web site describing the construction of the hydrogen bomb, as one of our sources tells us. And presented the idea to Abu Zubaydah in this meeting last March. Zubaydah realized his earnest recruit may have overreached a bit and asked him to think smaller and suggested the dirty bomb.

The reason that also reassuring is that it shows that he was probably less of a deadly skilled operative than Attorney General Ashcroft described him. And it does give us confidence that the FBI is able to track down a figure like this. HEMMER: Michael, let me pull a quote from this article I'm reading now. "al Qaeda appears to be relying on irregulars, inexperienced operatives..." -- that's what the article says -- "... rather than the highly-trained, disciplined jihadists who carried out the September 11th attacks." Is this essentially the B team? And, if so, how effective or not effective have they become?

WEISSKOPF: Well they're certainly ineffective measured by attacks in this country. And the reason that al Qaeda is relying on them is that bin Laden, if he's still alive, and his closest allies are disbursed. The headquarters of al Qaeda is probably pretty fractured.

Therefore, they need to stay in contact with, and rely on, operatives around the globe. And they certainly don't have the depth of passion or the training or the discipline of the 19 hijackers who were so destructive on September 11th.

HEMMER: Nonetheless, they're still out there, as you point out in your article. And we have heard many various news reports over the past ten days or so. Have you been able to discern how Jose Padilla went from being a Catholic kid on the streets of Chicago to talking and sitting down and having conversations with Abu Zubaydah in the country of Pakistan?

WEISSKOPF: It's a fairly long odyssey, and it begins with his release from prison and his relationship with the owner of Taco Bell where he worked. The owner was Pakistani and introduced Padilla and wife at the time to the Islamic faith. Padilla liked it and wanted to learn more. Went to the Middle East to study it.

There he was initially dissatisfied with the sort of secular state-controlled approach to Islam in places like Egypt. He kept on seeking a more pure, as he saw it, and more radical form of it. And finally found himself in al Qaeda land, Afghanistan and Pakistan, where he first made contact with al Qaeda.

HEMMER: Michael, in your article you mention many times that al Qaeda is now fractured, essentially on the run. Two hours ago, Judith Miller from "The New York Times" says now may be more dangerous because they're more difficult to track. Your article, if you read it closely, suggests that they are not nearly as effective now. How do we draw the distinction between their level of effectiveness, now that we know that they have been scattered and have been essentially on the run in various parts of the world?

WEISSKOPF: The way you measure it, of course, is by the number of attacks which are aborted and the number of attacks which actually occur. And while there have been incidents abroad which we can trace to al Qaeda, in this country we've been lucky. We've stopped them before they've come off. That's one measure, and it also is a measure of the higher capability and focus of our intelligence services.

HEMMER: Michael, thank you. michael Weisskopf, good article, "TIME" magazine. It's on news stands today.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com