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American Morning

Interview With David Kay

Aired October 02, 2002 - 07:08   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


PAULA ZAHN, CNN ANCHOR: The U.N.'s chief weapons inspector says he got what he wanted in the deal with Iraq: immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to most sites.
But the Bush administration says weapons inspectors should not go back into Iraq without a tough, new mandate from the Security Council.

And this morning, Iraq's deputy prime minister, Tariq Aziz, said the real reason the U.S. wants tougher inspections is so it can have an excuse to attack Iraq.

David Kay is a former U.N. weapons inspector. He joins us now from Washington.

Welcome back, sir -- glad to have you with us.

DAVID KAY, FORMER U.N. INSPECTOR: Good morning, Paula.

ZAHN: Let's first talk about the agreement that was reached between the U.N. and Iraq yesterday.

We're going to take a look at what the agreement actually allows:

"All sites subject to immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access, except eight presidential sites."

"Airspace will be safe for fixed-wing planes and helicopters to conduct inspections, except in no-fly zones."

How meaningful are these exceptions, Mr. Kay?

KAY: Well, they are very meaningful. In fact, this is not a new deal. This is exactly the deal that existed in 1998, and broke down and led the Clinton administration to decide to conduct a three-day bombing campaign.

I think the great surprise is why anyone at the U.N. is really happy about this deal.

ZAHN: So, let me ask you this: There are people who suggest that you look at the Europeans looking at this U.N. resolution saying that they think this is the best chance to thwart war, while the U.S. continues to say these inspections are the best way to create military action.

KAY: Well, look, what you've got under the deal that was struck yesterday is absolutely no sanction for Saddam Hussein if he lies again.

And you must remember, there were at least 25 times -- two in 1991 -- in which inspections were frustrated, and the conclusion was, Saddam said, oh, well, next time, I'll give you unrestricted access. And the second thing, you still have large areas of the country that are off-limits to inspections.

It seems to me neither of the conditions for effective inspections, nor particularly the conditions the president laid down in his U.N. speech.

ZAHN: Let's come back to the major sticking point of the U.S., and those are the eight presidential palaces, which have huge grounds. What do you think they're hiding there?

KAY: Well, you don't know, and that's the whole purpose of meaningful inspections. They're really not palaces, although there are palaces on several of them. They are very large presidential sites. One of them has almost 100 buildings on it.

If you can't conduct effective, surprise inspections at these places with an adequate number of inspectors, you'll never know what they're hiding.

ZAHN: So, what is your understanding of how this would work based on this U.N. resolution? That a diplomat would accompany the inspectors if they were allowed access to a presidential site?

KAY: Well, the most important thing is you have to give advance notice to the Iraqis that you intend to conduct that inspection. And the advance notice looks like it could run as long as a week, because you have to have diplomats that accompany it, and a limited number of inspectors.

One of those sites is about the size of the District of Columbia. Three or four inspectors going in with three or four diplomatic nannies is not an effective inspection. It's barely a good tourist program.

ZAHN: So, what can you do in that week from the time you are tipped off that the diplomats and the inspectors are coming back in and they have been notified?

KAY: Well, let me give you my experience. Even when you conduct a genuine surprise inspection, unless you surround the site, you find the Iraqis moving material and documents out the back gate. So, in a week, you have time to move everything out.

ZAHN: So, you're talking about a major game of hide-and-seek here.

KAY: Look, we've had this major game going on since 1991. I don't like the term "hide-and-seek." That's a harmless game of children. This game has involved shots fired at inspectors, major portions of a WMD program -- nuclear, chemical, biological -- being moved and frustrating the will of the Security Council. ZAHN: So, do you think Colin Powell is on the right track now? We're going to share with our audience what he had to say about pushing the U.N. to accept a much tougher resolution -- let's listen.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE: We will not be satisfied with Iraqi half-truths or Iraqi compromises or Iraqi efforts to get us back into the same swamp that they took the United Nations into back in 1998.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

ZAHN: David, let me ask you about that. There are folks who say that U.N. inspectors could be in Iraq within two weeks, inspections getting under way by the end of the month. How practical is it, if this new U.N. resolution isn't passed until weeks from now?

KAY: I think Secretary Powell is absolutely right. Why go down the same path that failed from 1991 through 1998 with no guarantee that it's going to be any different?

Really, what you hold at risk here is, quite frankly, the reputation of the U.N. as being an effective multilateral organization. It seems foolish to embark on a failed policy without putting in place new tools that make the inspectors effective, and new sanctions that make the Iraqis realize, if they frustrate the inspectors, they are going to pay an immediate, serious price.

ZAHN: Do you think we're closer to war, even though this old deal is considered a new deal now between the U.N. and Iraq?

KAY: I think we're much closer to war. I'm -- you know, it's extremely disturbing for someone who actually believes that if you tried to conduct inspections with the right resources and the right rights, you could make a serious dent in their weapons program, although not eliminate it.

I think what you've done is embarked on a policy that any serious observer is going to have a hard time giving it credence.

ZAHN: As always, we appreciate your perspective and your candor.

KAY: Thank you, Paula.

ZAHN: Former U.N. weapons inspector, David Kay.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com.







Aired October 2, 2002 - 07:08   ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
PAULA ZAHN, CNN ANCHOR: The U.N.'s chief weapons inspector says he got what he wanted in the deal with Iraq: immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to most sites.
But the Bush administration says weapons inspectors should not go back into Iraq without a tough, new mandate from the Security Council.

And this morning, Iraq's deputy prime minister, Tariq Aziz, said the real reason the U.S. wants tougher inspections is so it can have an excuse to attack Iraq.

David Kay is a former U.N. weapons inspector. He joins us now from Washington.

Welcome back, sir -- glad to have you with us.

DAVID KAY, FORMER U.N. INSPECTOR: Good morning, Paula.

ZAHN: Let's first talk about the agreement that was reached between the U.N. and Iraq yesterday.

We're going to take a look at what the agreement actually allows:

"All sites subject to immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access, except eight presidential sites."

"Airspace will be safe for fixed-wing planes and helicopters to conduct inspections, except in no-fly zones."

How meaningful are these exceptions, Mr. Kay?

KAY: Well, they are very meaningful. In fact, this is not a new deal. This is exactly the deal that existed in 1998, and broke down and led the Clinton administration to decide to conduct a three-day bombing campaign.

I think the great surprise is why anyone at the U.N. is really happy about this deal.

ZAHN: So, let me ask you this: There are people who suggest that you look at the Europeans looking at this U.N. resolution saying that they think this is the best chance to thwart war, while the U.S. continues to say these inspections are the best way to create military action.

KAY: Well, look, what you've got under the deal that was struck yesterday is absolutely no sanction for Saddam Hussein if he lies again.

And you must remember, there were at least 25 times -- two in 1991 -- in which inspections were frustrated, and the conclusion was, Saddam said, oh, well, next time, I'll give you unrestricted access. And the second thing, you still have large areas of the country that are off-limits to inspections.

It seems to me neither of the conditions for effective inspections, nor particularly the conditions the president laid down in his U.N. speech.

ZAHN: Let's come back to the major sticking point of the U.S., and those are the eight presidential palaces, which have huge grounds. What do you think they're hiding there?

KAY: Well, you don't know, and that's the whole purpose of meaningful inspections. They're really not palaces, although there are palaces on several of them. They are very large presidential sites. One of them has almost 100 buildings on it.

If you can't conduct effective, surprise inspections at these places with an adequate number of inspectors, you'll never know what they're hiding.

ZAHN: So, what is your understanding of how this would work based on this U.N. resolution? That a diplomat would accompany the inspectors if they were allowed access to a presidential site?

KAY: Well, the most important thing is you have to give advance notice to the Iraqis that you intend to conduct that inspection. And the advance notice looks like it could run as long as a week, because you have to have diplomats that accompany it, and a limited number of inspectors.

One of those sites is about the size of the District of Columbia. Three or four inspectors going in with three or four diplomatic nannies is not an effective inspection. It's barely a good tourist program.

ZAHN: So, what can you do in that week from the time you are tipped off that the diplomats and the inspectors are coming back in and they have been notified?

KAY: Well, let me give you my experience. Even when you conduct a genuine surprise inspection, unless you surround the site, you find the Iraqis moving material and documents out the back gate. So, in a week, you have time to move everything out.

ZAHN: So, you're talking about a major game of hide-and-seek here.

KAY: Look, we've had this major game going on since 1991. I don't like the term "hide-and-seek." That's a harmless game of children. This game has involved shots fired at inspectors, major portions of a WMD program -- nuclear, chemical, biological -- being moved and frustrating the will of the Security Council. ZAHN: So, do you think Colin Powell is on the right track now? We're going to share with our audience what he had to say about pushing the U.N. to accept a much tougher resolution -- let's listen.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE: We will not be satisfied with Iraqi half-truths or Iraqi compromises or Iraqi efforts to get us back into the same swamp that they took the United Nations into back in 1998.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

ZAHN: David, let me ask you about that. There are folks who say that U.N. inspectors could be in Iraq within two weeks, inspections getting under way by the end of the month. How practical is it, if this new U.N. resolution isn't passed until weeks from now?

KAY: I think Secretary Powell is absolutely right. Why go down the same path that failed from 1991 through 1998 with no guarantee that it's going to be any different?

Really, what you hold at risk here is, quite frankly, the reputation of the U.N. as being an effective multilateral organization. It seems foolish to embark on a failed policy without putting in place new tools that make the inspectors effective, and new sanctions that make the Iraqis realize, if they frustrate the inspectors, they are going to pay an immediate, serious price.

ZAHN: Do you think we're closer to war, even though this old deal is considered a new deal now between the U.N. and Iraq?

KAY: I think we're much closer to war. I'm -- you know, it's extremely disturbing for someone who actually believes that if you tried to conduct inspections with the right resources and the right rights, you could make a serious dent in their weapons program, although not eliminate it.

I think what you've done is embarked on a policy that any serious observer is going to have a hard time giving it credence.

ZAHN: As always, we appreciate your perspective and your candor.

KAY: Thank you, Paula.

ZAHN: Former U.N. weapons inspector, David Kay.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com.