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American Morning

Talk with Former U.N. Weapons Inspector Richard Spertzel

Aired November 12, 2002 - 08:17   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


PAULA ZAHN, CNN ANCHOR: It has been four years since U.N. inspectors have been inside Iraq. If there is an agreement that gets them back into that country, what obstacles might they face? How could they be truly sure that Saddam's regime has no weapons of mass destruction?
Well, let's turn to a man that knows an awful lot about that. He was an inspector himself, former U.N. weapons inspector Richard Spertzel.

Welcome back.

Good to see you again, sir.

RICHARD SPERTZEL, FORMER WEAPONS INSPECTOR: It's nice to be back, Paula.

ZAHN: Thank you.

You have written recently in a newspaper op-ed piece that Iraq has developed ingenious ways to interfere with the process. Let's go through a couple of those right now.

For starters, moving and hiding documents.

SPERTZEL: Yes, the Iraqis have been exceedingly good at not only removing documents and transporting them to other locations even while the inspections are going on, but they've actually on several occasions have said that the documents really represented something else, for example, their wife's medical records, something you wouldn't normally want to look at.

But in reality, in this particular case, they happened to be related to their resin work.

ZAHN: Another problem you chronicled was the locking of doors at inspection sites. How common was that?

SPERTZEL: That was probably one of the most common events that occurred, that the sites would either be, or doors or even whole buildings would be locked or bolted. For a long time we were accepting that argument. And, of course, you could always come back the next day, but you're not going to find anything.

ZAHN: So your suspicion was that everything would be moved, then, by the time you came back the next day? SPERTZEL: Absolutely. And in the latter years, months of UNSCOM existence, we actually encouraged a team to try to convince Iraqis to get into that room one way or the other, in some cases by the use of bolt cutters or in other cases the Iraqis actually themselves would break down the doors.

ZAHN: Wow.

SPERTZEL: And on several occasions we found items or equipment or things along that line that should have been declared and were not.

ZAHN: You also talked about the coaching or coercing of interviewees. How did that work?

SPERTZEL: What would happen under those circumstances is we would be interviewing an Iraqi scientist associated with the program and either by their own body motions, signals, the other Iraqis attending would basically indicate that they were saying the wrong thing. But in one case it was particularly outrageous. We had completed our interview and took a break because we had been going for two straight hours. When we came back from the break, the individual came back and gave us a completely opposite story. We eventually accused the members there of having coached this individual.

And ironically, the next day, in front of Mr. Tariq Aziz and the executive chairman, they actually admitted that they had, to use their phrase, they asked him if he really was recalling the material the way he said.

ZAHN: Wow, that's ridiculous.

Now, you also talked about a common practice of delaying convoys. We've heard a number of inspectors talk about the number of traffic jams that were created to slow you guys down.

SPERTZEL: Exactly. And on some occasions it was a matter of creating artificial jams. One of the most dangerous things, however, is that the Iraqi minders would insert their cars into the UNSCOM convoy and then slow down, thereby trailing the rear one, two or three cars away from the front group. And in order to stay together, the lead vehicles would have to slow down to match the pace. That gave the Iraqis an extra hour or two hours, depending on how far we were traveling.

ZAHN: Wow.

We've just got about 10 seconds left, sir. Given what you've said about how troubled this inspection process has been in the past, do you have any faith new inspections will reveal anything of any magnitude, given all the little tricks that Saddam can play?

SPERTZEL: I'm not very encouraged because the capability that Iraq has and the experience factor, they far outweigh the experience of the new inspectors. In the short time period allowed, I don't see that it's going to happen. I don't believe they can be effective.

ZAHN: Sorry to hear that.

Richard Spertzel, as always, good to have your perspective. Appreciate your dropping by AMERICAN MORNING this morning.

SPERTZEL: You're quite welcome, Paula.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com







Aired November 12, 2002 - 08:17   ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
PAULA ZAHN, CNN ANCHOR: It has been four years since U.N. inspectors have been inside Iraq. If there is an agreement that gets them back into that country, what obstacles might they face? How could they be truly sure that Saddam's regime has no weapons of mass destruction?
Well, let's turn to a man that knows an awful lot about that. He was an inspector himself, former U.N. weapons inspector Richard Spertzel.

Welcome back.

Good to see you again, sir.

RICHARD SPERTZEL, FORMER WEAPONS INSPECTOR: It's nice to be back, Paula.

ZAHN: Thank you.

You have written recently in a newspaper op-ed piece that Iraq has developed ingenious ways to interfere with the process. Let's go through a couple of those right now.

For starters, moving and hiding documents.

SPERTZEL: Yes, the Iraqis have been exceedingly good at not only removing documents and transporting them to other locations even while the inspections are going on, but they've actually on several occasions have said that the documents really represented something else, for example, their wife's medical records, something you wouldn't normally want to look at.

But in reality, in this particular case, they happened to be related to their resin work.

ZAHN: Another problem you chronicled was the locking of doors at inspection sites. How common was that?

SPERTZEL: That was probably one of the most common events that occurred, that the sites would either be, or doors or even whole buildings would be locked or bolted. For a long time we were accepting that argument. And, of course, you could always come back the next day, but you're not going to find anything.

ZAHN: So your suspicion was that everything would be moved, then, by the time you came back the next day? SPERTZEL: Absolutely. And in the latter years, months of UNSCOM existence, we actually encouraged a team to try to convince Iraqis to get into that room one way or the other, in some cases by the use of bolt cutters or in other cases the Iraqis actually themselves would break down the doors.

ZAHN: Wow.

SPERTZEL: And on several occasions we found items or equipment or things along that line that should have been declared and were not.

ZAHN: You also talked about the coaching or coercing of interviewees. How did that work?

SPERTZEL: What would happen under those circumstances is we would be interviewing an Iraqi scientist associated with the program and either by their own body motions, signals, the other Iraqis attending would basically indicate that they were saying the wrong thing. But in one case it was particularly outrageous. We had completed our interview and took a break because we had been going for two straight hours. When we came back from the break, the individual came back and gave us a completely opposite story. We eventually accused the members there of having coached this individual.

And ironically, the next day, in front of Mr. Tariq Aziz and the executive chairman, they actually admitted that they had, to use their phrase, they asked him if he really was recalling the material the way he said.

ZAHN: Wow, that's ridiculous.

Now, you also talked about a common practice of delaying convoys. We've heard a number of inspectors talk about the number of traffic jams that were created to slow you guys down.

SPERTZEL: Exactly. And on some occasions it was a matter of creating artificial jams. One of the most dangerous things, however, is that the Iraqi minders would insert their cars into the UNSCOM convoy and then slow down, thereby trailing the rear one, two or three cars away from the front group. And in order to stay together, the lead vehicles would have to slow down to match the pace. That gave the Iraqis an extra hour or two hours, depending on how far we were traveling.

ZAHN: Wow.

We've just got about 10 seconds left, sir. Given what you've said about how troubled this inspection process has been in the past, do you have any faith new inspections will reveal anything of any magnitude, given all the little tricks that Saddam can play?

SPERTZEL: I'm not very encouraged because the capability that Iraq has and the experience factor, they far outweigh the experience of the new inspectors. In the short time period allowed, I don't see that it's going to happen. I don't believe they can be effective.

ZAHN: Sorry to hear that.

Richard Spertzel, as always, good to have your perspective. Appreciate your dropping by AMERICAN MORNING this morning.

SPERTZEL: You're quite welcome, Paula.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com