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American Morning

Iraq Promising Full Cooperation

Aired November 20, 2002 - 08:02   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


PAULA ZAHN, CNN ANCHOR: Iraq is promising full cooperation, according to two weapons inspectors -- or that's top weapons inspectors -- who are back in Cyprus this morning. After two days of high level talks with Iraqi officials, Hans Blix and Mohamed El- Baradei are now hoping the road's been paved for Iraq to follow through on some of those promises.
Nic Robertson joins us now with more from Baghdad -- Nic, good morning.

What kinds of issues were the Iraqis raising during these meetings?

NIC ROBERTSON, CNN CORRESPONDENT: Well, I think one of the important things we understand from the inspectors at these meetings was the tone of the meetings, that the Iraqis did seem to want to engage and they did seem to want to learn what they needed to do to meet their commitment under Resolution 1441, that is, make that declaration by December 8.

What they wanted to know from the inspectors, well, what were all the details, how many details, how much information did they need to put forward about the weapons of mass destruction, but not just the weapons of mass destruction. They have to also submit what all their chemical plants, whether these are chemical plants producing chemicals for the oil industry here or for other businesses. They also need to put down information about biological plants that they could be, for example, producing vaccines for foot and mouth.

The Iraqis wanting to know what kind of level of information they need to put down, what sort of factory constitutes a factory with a chemical component. So, some very specific issues coming forward. And for the inspectors, this group of inspectors, unlike inspectors before, finding that the Iraqis were very willing to listen and talk business straight away -- Paula.

ZAHN: They report that they seemed to have wanted to have been engaged. I'm just curious how much skepticism there is about these kinds of questions and really whether they meant what they asked.

ROBERTSON: Well, I think perhaps that's best judged through some of the comments Hans Blix made afterwards. He did say up to now Iraq says it has no weapons of mass destruction. And he said if Iraq did go down that road still and decided to say it has no weapons of mass destruction and there was going to, they were going to need to put forward some really hard evidence to back that up, documents to show what had happened to some of the things, the precursors, chemicals, V.X. nerve agent that was an issue unresolved by the previous inspection teams.

And Hans Blix actually said, he said in the areas he's concerned with -- missiles, chemical weapons, biological weapons -- he said that the Iraqis, from his point of view, just haven't done enough already to demonstrate that they cleared the slate there. So completely saying that Iraq really needs to put forward some pretty strong and credible evidence about all those issues.

So I would say from his point of view, a reasonably high level of skepticism there at this stage -- Paula.

ZAHN: Nic Robertson, thanks so much.

And despite the skepticism over some of those questions that the Iraqi officials asked the inspection team, our next guest says war is the only answer to the Iraq situation.

Kenneth Pollack is the author of "The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq." And he analyzed that country during his time at the CIA.

And Kenneth Pollack joins us now from Washington.

Welcome back, Kenneth.

Good to see you again.

KENNETH POLLACK, FORMER CIA IRAQ ANALYST: Good morning, Paula.

It's good to see you.

ZAHN: First of all, what do you make of some of what Nic just reported, the, what appears to be the engagement by Iraqi officials in this process?

POLLACK: Well, I think it's par for the course. Right now I think the evidence that we have is that Saddam Hussein is concerned. He recognizes he's in a tight jam. But he's also very confident that he can get out of it. He knows that in the 1990s he completely fooled the inspectors. He was able to prevent the inspectors and all the intelligence agencies supporting them from finding any of his weapons of mass destruction once he stopped cooperating.

And I think that's the key. What you're going to see in the future is the Iraqis are going to cooperate with the inspectors. That's what they've made clear. They're going to cooperate. They're going to let the inspectors go wherever they want to. But they're not going to comply with the resolution. The resolution says that Iraq must disarm itself, it must give up all of its weapons of mass destruction. And everything that we're hearing from the Iraqis is they have no intention of doing so.

ZAHN: Well, they say not only that, they say they don't have anything. So what happens, do you think, come December 8, when this filing is due? What are they going to report? POLLACK: Well, my guess is that the Iraqis are going to turn in a very long list of things that the inspectors already know about. They're going to mention every single facility that the inspectors inspected during the 1990s. They're probably going to list every facility out there in Iraq that could somehow be involved in chemical production or biological resolution, which pretty much anyone realizes could be used for production of biological and chemical agents. And the Iraqis will simply say we're not producing anything at those plants and feel free to go ahead and look and you'll see that they are doing normal civilian research and normal civilian production.

They're not going to declare any of the prohibited weapons. At least that's the body language that we're seeing from the Iraqis. They think that they can do what they did in the 1990s, which is force the inspectors to prove that they aren't disarmed. And that's extraordinarily difficult to do. They beat the inspectors the first time around. They seem very confident they can do it again.

ZAHN: Well, do you think they will this time around?

POLLACK: Unfortunately I do. Unfortunately what we found in the 1990s was that the Iraqis have gotten so good at hiding their weapons of mass destruction that neither the inspectors nor we in the United States government had any idea where they were hiding the stuff. And right now today we've got some information. We've got some leads. But nobody really knows where his weapons of mass destruction are located. Believe me, if we did, we would have bombed those facilities years ago.

ZAHN: So, explain to us, then, what happens when inspections get under way a month from today. You don't think that these inspectors are going to have any degree of success finding anything bad?

POLLACK: I think it's unlikely. I would never rule anything out. You can always get lucky. There were at least three occasions during the 1990s when we got kind of a lucky intelligence break and the inspectors were able to uncover some evidence, they actually didn't find any weapons, but they were able to uncover some evidence which demonstrated that the Iraqis were still cheating.

Now, the problem, of course, in the 1990s was when the inspectors took that to the Security Council, only we and the British were willing to do anything about it. Maybe that would be different this time around. But even then, I tend to suspect that the Russians, the French, the Chinese and the others will try to minimize any evidence. The Iraqis will come up with some cockamamie excuse for what the evidence means and the Russians, French and Chinese will probably support them.

So it's always possible, but I think it's most likely that what will happen is the inspectors will go into Iraq, they will be allowed to see whatever it is they like because the Iraqis will be very confident that they've hidden what they have so well that it is just extremely unlikely that the inspectors will ever get close to the stuff. ZAHN: Well, then given what you're saying about these other Security Council members, what kind of strategy should the U.S. be using? I assume that everybody in the administration feels pretty much the way, the same way you do right now.

POLLACK: Right. Well, it's clear that the administration also shares my doubts about whether or not the inspections can actually succeed, because everybody has great doubts that the Iraqis will actually comply. And I think the debate right now in the administration is how much Iraqi non-compliance would constitute a sufficient causus belli, a sufficient reason to actually go to war.

And there's one school of thought that says that it should be the initial declaration. On December 8 if the Iraqis stand up and say we have no weapons of mass destruction, the United States should use the intelligence information that we have indicating that they still do to make the case that, in fact, they're lying and the resolution, Resolution 1441, was cleverly written, very cleverly written so that that, in and of itself, would constitute a material breach.

The other side of the administration is arguing that, no, we've got to let the inspections play out a little bit. We have to accumulate added information, added Iraqi obstructions, even if they're minor, to make the case that the Iraqis still aren't complying and that we've gone that extra mile and given the inspectors every opportunity to try to find something and given the Iraqis every opportunity to comply.

ZAHN: Kenneth, we've just got about 10 seconds left. I'm trying to follow reasoning here. If you believe on December 8 the administration will have some sort of intelligence to suggest that the Iraqis are absolutely lying, then why isn't it that that's handed over to the inspectors so the inspections will be more successful?

POLLACK: Well, the problem is that the information that we have indicates that the Iraqis are continuing to cheat. We've got quite a bit of information indicating that they continue to hide weapons and to hide the production facilities for them. The problem is that we don't know where they're doing it. And that's the key, because the inspectors have to be able to go to a site and find the stuff.

ZAHN: Got you.

Kenneth Pollack, the author of "The Threatening Storm," always appreciate your insights.

POLLACK: Always good to see you, Paula.

ZAHN: Appreciate it.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com








Aired November 20, 2002 - 08:02   ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
PAULA ZAHN, CNN ANCHOR: Iraq is promising full cooperation, according to two weapons inspectors -- or that's top weapons inspectors -- who are back in Cyprus this morning. After two days of high level talks with Iraqi officials, Hans Blix and Mohamed El- Baradei are now hoping the road's been paved for Iraq to follow through on some of those promises.
Nic Robertson joins us now with more from Baghdad -- Nic, good morning.

What kinds of issues were the Iraqis raising during these meetings?

NIC ROBERTSON, CNN CORRESPONDENT: Well, I think one of the important things we understand from the inspectors at these meetings was the tone of the meetings, that the Iraqis did seem to want to engage and they did seem to want to learn what they needed to do to meet their commitment under Resolution 1441, that is, make that declaration by December 8.

What they wanted to know from the inspectors, well, what were all the details, how many details, how much information did they need to put forward about the weapons of mass destruction, but not just the weapons of mass destruction. They have to also submit what all their chemical plants, whether these are chemical plants producing chemicals for the oil industry here or for other businesses. They also need to put down information about biological plants that they could be, for example, producing vaccines for foot and mouth.

The Iraqis wanting to know what kind of level of information they need to put down, what sort of factory constitutes a factory with a chemical component. So, some very specific issues coming forward. And for the inspectors, this group of inspectors, unlike inspectors before, finding that the Iraqis were very willing to listen and talk business straight away -- Paula.

ZAHN: They report that they seemed to have wanted to have been engaged. I'm just curious how much skepticism there is about these kinds of questions and really whether they meant what they asked.

ROBERTSON: Well, I think perhaps that's best judged through some of the comments Hans Blix made afterwards. He did say up to now Iraq says it has no weapons of mass destruction. And he said if Iraq did go down that road still and decided to say it has no weapons of mass destruction and there was going to, they were going to need to put forward some really hard evidence to back that up, documents to show what had happened to some of the things, the precursors, chemicals, V.X. nerve agent that was an issue unresolved by the previous inspection teams.

And Hans Blix actually said, he said in the areas he's concerned with -- missiles, chemical weapons, biological weapons -- he said that the Iraqis, from his point of view, just haven't done enough already to demonstrate that they cleared the slate there. So completely saying that Iraq really needs to put forward some pretty strong and credible evidence about all those issues.

So I would say from his point of view, a reasonably high level of skepticism there at this stage -- Paula.

ZAHN: Nic Robertson, thanks so much.

And despite the skepticism over some of those questions that the Iraqi officials asked the inspection team, our next guest says war is the only answer to the Iraq situation.

Kenneth Pollack is the author of "The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq." And he analyzed that country during his time at the CIA.

And Kenneth Pollack joins us now from Washington.

Welcome back, Kenneth.

Good to see you again.

KENNETH POLLACK, FORMER CIA IRAQ ANALYST: Good morning, Paula.

It's good to see you.

ZAHN: First of all, what do you make of some of what Nic just reported, the, what appears to be the engagement by Iraqi officials in this process?

POLLACK: Well, I think it's par for the course. Right now I think the evidence that we have is that Saddam Hussein is concerned. He recognizes he's in a tight jam. But he's also very confident that he can get out of it. He knows that in the 1990s he completely fooled the inspectors. He was able to prevent the inspectors and all the intelligence agencies supporting them from finding any of his weapons of mass destruction once he stopped cooperating.

And I think that's the key. What you're going to see in the future is the Iraqis are going to cooperate with the inspectors. That's what they've made clear. They're going to cooperate. They're going to let the inspectors go wherever they want to. But they're not going to comply with the resolution. The resolution says that Iraq must disarm itself, it must give up all of its weapons of mass destruction. And everything that we're hearing from the Iraqis is they have no intention of doing so.

ZAHN: Well, they say not only that, they say they don't have anything. So what happens, do you think, come December 8, when this filing is due? What are they going to report? POLLACK: Well, my guess is that the Iraqis are going to turn in a very long list of things that the inspectors already know about. They're going to mention every single facility that the inspectors inspected during the 1990s. They're probably going to list every facility out there in Iraq that could somehow be involved in chemical production or biological resolution, which pretty much anyone realizes could be used for production of biological and chemical agents. And the Iraqis will simply say we're not producing anything at those plants and feel free to go ahead and look and you'll see that they are doing normal civilian research and normal civilian production.

They're not going to declare any of the prohibited weapons. At least that's the body language that we're seeing from the Iraqis. They think that they can do what they did in the 1990s, which is force the inspectors to prove that they aren't disarmed. And that's extraordinarily difficult to do. They beat the inspectors the first time around. They seem very confident they can do it again.

ZAHN: Well, do you think they will this time around?

POLLACK: Unfortunately I do. Unfortunately what we found in the 1990s was that the Iraqis have gotten so good at hiding their weapons of mass destruction that neither the inspectors nor we in the United States government had any idea where they were hiding the stuff. And right now today we've got some information. We've got some leads. But nobody really knows where his weapons of mass destruction are located. Believe me, if we did, we would have bombed those facilities years ago.

ZAHN: So, explain to us, then, what happens when inspections get under way a month from today. You don't think that these inspectors are going to have any degree of success finding anything bad?

POLLACK: I think it's unlikely. I would never rule anything out. You can always get lucky. There were at least three occasions during the 1990s when we got kind of a lucky intelligence break and the inspectors were able to uncover some evidence, they actually didn't find any weapons, but they were able to uncover some evidence which demonstrated that the Iraqis were still cheating.

Now, the problem, of course, in the 1990s was when the inspectors took that to the Security Council, only we and the British were willing to do anything about it. Maybe that would be different this time around. But even then, I tend to suspect that the Russians, the French, the Chinese and the others will try to minimize any evidence. The Iraqis will come up with some cockamamie excuse for what the evidence means and the Russians, French and Chinese will probably support them.

So it's always possible, but I think it's most likely that what will happen is the inspectors will go into Iraq, they will be allowed to see whatever it is they like because the Iraqis will be very confident that they've hidden what they have so well that it is just extremely unlikely that the inspectors will ever get close to the stuff. ZAHN: Well, then given what you're saying about these other Security Council members, what kind of strategy should the U.S. be using? I assume that everybody in the administration feels pretty much the way, the same way you do right now.

POLLACK: Right. Well, it's clear that the administration also shares my doubts about whether or not the inspections can actually succeed, because everybody has great doubts that the Iraqis will actually comply. And I think the debate right now in the administration is how much Iraqi non-compliance would constitute a sufficient causus belli, a sufficient reason to actually go to war.

And there's one school of thought that says that it should be the initial declaration. On December 8 if the Iraqis stand up and say we have no weapons of mass destruction, the United States should use the intelligence information that we have indicating that they still do to make the case that, in fact, they're lying and the resolution, Resolution 1441, was cleverly written, very cleverly written so that that, in and of itself, would constitute a material breach.

The other side of the administration is arguing that, no, we've got to let the inspections play out a little bit. We have to accumulate added information, added Iraqi obstructions, even if they're minor, to make the case that the Iraqis still aren't complying and that we've gone that extra mile and given the inspectors every opportunity to try to find something and given the Iraqis every opportunity to comply.

ZAHN: Kenneth, we've just got about 10 seconds left. I'm trying to follow reasoning here. If you believe on December 8 the administration will have some sort of intelligence to suggest that the Iraqis are absolutely lying, then why isn't it that that's handed over to the inspectors so the inspections will be more successful?

POLLACK: Well, the problem is that the information that we have indicates that the Iraqis are continuing to cheat. We've got quite a bit of information indicating that they continue to hide weapons and to hide the production facilities for them. The problem is that we don't know where they're doing it. And that's the key, because the inspectors have to be able to go to a site and find the stuff.

ZAHN: Got you.

Kenneth Pollack, the author of "The Threatening Storm," always appreciate your insights.

POLLACK: Always good to see you, Paula.

ZAHN: Appreciate it.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com