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American Morning
Interview With Richard Butler
Aired December 05, 2002 - 07:15 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
BILL HEMMER, CNN ANCHOR: Four years ago, Richard Butler and his U.N. inspection team, accused of spying on Iraq. The former chief weapons inspector with us throughout the week here and joins us again live from Sydney, Australia.
Richard, hello to you -- good evening to you half a world away.
RICHARD BUTLER, FMR. CHIEF U.N. WEAPONS INSPECTOR: Hi, Bill.
HEMMER: Listen, have these charges of spying, have they ever gained traction?
BUTLER: It was a brilliantly successful piece of Iraqi propaganda, Bill. There's no doubt of that. I'm sorry to admit it, but it's true. The charges were false, and I suspect that they're false again today. And as your correspondent, our person in Baghdad indicated, you have to take into account that Vice President Ramadan was speaking very much to an Arab audience, to Arab journalists, when he made that charge.
It will play well in the Arab street, as it did four years ago. It wasn't true four years ago, and I'm sure it's not true today. But it's propaganda that will have its effect, unfortunately.
HEMMER: But in some areas, though, it has been challenged, and a lot of people accept it. Three months ago, you and Scott Ritter were going at it almost on a daily basis from different satellites half a world away, and he thinks quite clearly that there were inspectors on certain teams that were deliberately taking photos in order to turn them into their home country.
Are you saying, once again, that Ritter was completely in the dark and in the water on this?
BUTLER: No, I'm not. I'm saying something more subtle than that. I really deeply regret what Scott has done. Scott robustly advised me, when he worked for me, that Iraq continued to retain weapons of mass destruction, and of course, he was quite right. Subsequently, he decided to change his mind -- and I've never known why -- and say that that wasn't true, and that was wrong.
And one of the things he also did was to pump up this idea that we were penetrated by intelligence agents.
Look, Bill, the truth is this: A number of countries had people on our staff who reported to them directly, not just to the United States, and this is what has to be understood. I had French and Russian officers on my staff who were reporting directly to their capitals.
But the point I've always made is this: The biggest penetration we suffered was from Iraq. There were people who were letting Iraq know where we were going and what we proposed to do. And you know, that was a far more serious thing than the idea that some persons on our staff were not only doing their job, but also reporting to their home governments.
The point I really want to emphasize, Bill, is that when the vice president of Iraq, Ramadan, steps forward and says, you know, these people are just spies, they are trying a time-worn and somewhat successful propaganda ploy. To seek to shoot the messenger because you don't like the potential message is one of the oldest games in the book, and that's what they're doing.
It wasn't true four years ago, and I suspect it's not true today.
HEMMER: Let me put up a quote here that we picked up from one of the high-ranking Iraqi officials yesterday about this inspection of this presidential palace. He says: "If there was any possibility of any chemical weapons in the palaces, the inspectors would have had to have to wear special clothing to protect themselves. This is evidence that the purpose was not to look for weapons, but rather a political attempt to provoke Iraq under American and Zion pressure on the committee."
Now, a point of fact here. Is the intent to find weapons in those palaces? Or is it the intent to intimidate Iraq? Or is it both?
BUTLER: The intent -- sorry. It's not to intimidate Iraq. Again, the quote that you've just read is quite frankly nonsense. The facts are these: The Security Council made clear that presidential sites -- palaces and associated buildings -- would now be treated the same as any other part of the country, and that's all it said in the resolution, Bill. It says, no differently from any other part of the country, and that's very important.
Secondly, I'll tell you why. We had evidence in the past that there were tunnels and deep caverns underneath a presidential palace and some presidential sites in which missiles and other weapons material were, we thought, probably stored. So, there was a substantive factual reason for wanting to go to look at these places.
And that's why it's important that the inspectors can now do so, where in the past, we were prevented from doing so, because of what was called the dignity and sovereignty of Iraq that attached to those presidential areas.
HEMMER: Richard, help me with this argument today. This is the way things are starting to shape up. The U.S. is not happy with the inspectors and the inspections, the way they're carrying them out. Iraq now has expressed its displeasure. The U.N. in the middle is saying, so far, so good.
Size these up from one end to the other, and then the middle, and tell us what we need to look for going forward and how this scenario plays itself out.
BUTLER: The U.S. is being a bit impatient. It knows very well that the game is not really afoot. It will start after we get the Iraqi declaration on the forthcoming weekend.
Iraq's stance at the other end of the spectrum is a bunch of propaganda, frankly. We've got President Saddam Hussein playing nice cop, saying to his people, be patient, be friendly to the inspectors, it will be OK. His vice president is calling them spies. I mean, it's the Iraqi propaganda machine at its best.
The U.N., of course, is talking them up, saying, so far, so good, which one can kind of understand. But frankly, the U.N. track record in this context is not terrific. Where I would put my money is actually on objective work by the inspectors, but provided Iraq is prepared to let them do that work.
HEMMER: Richard, listen...
BUTLER: And that part we will see...
HEMMER: We're out of time here.
BUTLER: ... in the weeks ahead.
HEMMER: We appreciate it. Tomorrow when we talk, I want to know whether or not you think it would be good or not, better or not, for you to be back on that inspection team today, would you want it or not? So, we'll tee that up tomorrow. Thank you, Richard, have a good evening in Sydney.
BUTLER: It's a theoretical question.
HEMMER: Well, we got a laugh out of you. That's new. Thank you, Richard -- talk to you tomorrow.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com.
Aired December 5, 2002 - 07:15 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
BILL HEMMER, CNN ANCHOR: Four years ago, Richard Butler and his U.N. inspection team, accused of spying on Iraq. The former chief weapons inspector with us throughout the week here and joins us again live from Sydney, Australia.
Richard, hello to you -- good evening to you half a world away.
RICHARD BUTLER, FMR. CHIEF U.N. WEAPONS INSPECTOR: Hi, Bill.
HEMMER: Listen, have these charges of spying, have they ever gained traction?
BUTLER: It was a brilliantly successful piece of Iraqi propaganda, Bill. There's no doubt of that. I'm sorry to admit it, but it's true. The charges were false, and I suspect that they're false again today. And as your correspondent, our person in Baghdad indicated, you have to take into account that Vice President Ramadan was speaking very much to an Arab audience, to Arab journalists, when he made that charge.
It will play well in the Arab street, as it did four years ago. It wasn't true four years ago, and I'm sure it's not true today. But it's propaganda that will have its effect, unfortunately.
HEMMER: But in some areas, though, it has been challenged, and a lot of people accept it. Three months ago, you and Scott Ritter were going at it almost on a daily basis from different satellites half a world away, and he thinks quite clearly that there were inspectors on certain teams that were deliberately taking photos in order to turn them into their home country.
Are you saying, once again, that Ritter was completely in the dark and in the water on this?
BUTLER: No, I'm not. I'm saying something more subtle than that. I really deeply regret what Scott has done. Scott robustly advised me, when he worked for me, that Iraq continued to retain weapons of mass destruction, and of course, he was quite right. Subsequently, he decided to change his mind -- and I've never known why -- and say that that wasn't true, and that was wrong.
And one of the things he also did was to pump up this idea that we were penetrated by intelligence agents.
Look, Bill, the truth is this: A number of countries had people on our staff who reported to them directly, not just to the United States, and this is what has to be understood. I had French and Russian officers on my staff who were reporting directly to their capitals.
But the point I've always made is this: The biggest penetration we suffered was from Iraq. There were people who were letting Iraq know where we were going and what we proposed to do. And you know, that was a far more serious thing than the idea that some persons on our staff were not only doing their job, but also reporting to their home governments.
The point I really want to emphasize, Bill, is that when the vice president of Iraq, Ramadan, steps forward and says, you know, these people are just spies, they are trying a time-worn and somewhat successful propaganda ploy. To seek to shoot the messenger because you don't like the potential message is one of the oldest games in the book, and that's what they're doing.
It wasn't true four years ago, and I suspect it's not true today.
HEMMER: Let me put up a quote here that we picked up from one of the high-ranking Iraqi officials yesterday about this inspection of this presidential palace. He says: "If there was any possibility of any chemical weapons in the palaces, the inspectors would have had to have to wear special clothing to protect themselves. This is evidence that the purpose was not to look for weapons, but rather a political attempt to provoke Iraq under American and Zion pressure on the committee."
Now, a point of fact here. Is the intent to find weapons in those palaces? Or is it the intent to intimidate Iraq? Or is it both?
BUTLER: The intent -- sorry. It's not to intimidate Iraq. Again, the quote that you've just read is quite frankly nonsense. The facts are these: The Security Council made clear that presidential sites -- palaces and associated buildings -- would now be treated the same as any other part of the country, and that's all it said in the resolution, Bill. It says, no differently from any other part of the country, and that's very important.
Secondly, I'll tell you why. We had evidence in the past that there were tunnels and deep caverns underneath a presidential palace and some presidential sites in which missiles and other weapons material were, we thought, probably stored. So, there was a substantive factual reason for wanting to go to look at these places.
And that's why it's important that the inspectors can now do so, where in the past, we were prevented from doing so, because of what was called the dignity and sovereignty of Iraq that attached to those presidential areas.
HEMMER: Richard, help me with this argument today. This is the way things are starting to shape up. The U.S. is not happy with the inspectors and the inspections, the way they're carrying them out. Iraq now has expressed its displeasure. The U.N. in the middle is saying, so far, so good.
Size these up from one end to the other, and then the middle, and tell us what we need to look for going forward and how this scenario plays itself out.
BUTLER: The U.S. is being a bit impatient. It knows very well that the game is not really afoot. It will start after we get the Iraqi declaration on the forthcoming weekend.
Iraq's stance at the other end of the spectrum is a bunch of propaganda, frankly. We've got President Saddam Hussein playing nice cop, saying to his people, be patient, be friendly to the inspectors, it will be OK. His vice president is calling them spies. I mean, it's the Iraqi propaganda machine at its best.
The U.N., of course, is talking them up, saying, so far, so good, which one can kind of understand. But frankly, the U.N. track record in this context is not terrific. Where I would put my money is actually on objective work by the inspectors, but provided Iraq is prepared to let them do that work.
HEMMER: Richard, listen...
BUTLER: And that part we will see...
HEMMER: We're out of time here.
BUTLER: ... in the weeks ahead.
HEMMER: We appreciate it. Tomorrow when we talk, I want to know whether or not you think it would be good or not, better or not, for you to be back on that inspection team today, would you want it or not? So, we'll tee that up tomorrow. Thank you, Richard, have a good evening in Sydney.
BUTLER: It's a theoretical question.
HEMMER: Well, we got a laugh out of you. That's new. Thank you, Richard -- talk to you tomorrow.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com.
