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American Morning
Talk with Former Weapons Inspector David Albright
Aired December 11, 2002 - 09:05 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
PAULA ZAHN, CNN ANCHOR: We're going to turn to John King now for the very latest from the White House on this and a couple of other stories making news this morning.
Good morning, John. How are you doing this morning?
JOHN KING, CNN SR. WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENT: Doing fine, Paula, a little soggy at the White House.
White House officials say they will meet with the government of Yemen, but senior White House officials telling us this administration will be extremely reluctant to deliver those missiles to Yemen. White House officials say Yemen, in its views, has no strategic need for these missiles. Officials saying they are worried that perhaps Yemen was a middle man, that somebody in Yemen might have been trying to get their hands on these missiles to turn them over to someone else.
U.S. officials say this interdiction is consistent with this new strategy. The Bush administration put out a summary late yesterday. In here, the administration says it will interdict weapons sales overseas if it believes that material could be used to make or deliver weapons of mass destruction against the United States, its military forces or its allies overseas.
And U.S. officials saying potentially SCUD missiles could be used by a government to deliver chemical or biological weapons. So the United States facing a potential diplomatic headache with a country that in recent months has been an ally in the war on terrorism, but arguing this seizure was the right thing to do.
In this new strategy, the administration also making clear it might respond, possibly even with nuclear weapons if any nation -- and this message was delivered because of the current confrontation with Iraq -- used chemical, biological or any such weapons of mass destruction against U.S. forces.
In this new strategy, the Bush administration saying -- quote -- "The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force, including through resort to all of our options to the use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our forces abroad and friends and allies."
The administration releasing the unclassified portion of this strategy just yesterday. Officials saying they are doing so quite publicly now to deliver a clear message to the Iraqi government that if there is a military confrontation and if the Iraqi government used its chemical or biological weapons, the United States would respond with overwhelming force and would not rule out using nuclear weapons -- Paula.
ZAHN: John, there are a bunch of different interpretations this morning of what this strategy really says. Is it your understanding that it would allow for the United States to authorize preemptive strikes against countries who are in the process of developing nuclear weapons.
KING: Yes. Especially in the classified version of this, we are told it makes crystal clear the president could authorize preemptive strikes if a government or if a terrorist group operating in a country somewhere, if the United States reached a finding that a terrorist group or a government was at the point of being able to deliver weapons of mass destruction, and it had identified the United States or a U.S. ally as a potential target, the government would have the authority under this new strategy to launch preemptive strikes to wipe out those weapons.
ZAHN: So what does that mean then strategically, John?
KING: Well, it will reinforce the criticism around the world you hear from some quarters that the United States is trying to be the world's policeman; this seizure of SCUD missiles will do that as well. But the administration said in the Cold War you have the strategy of the nuclear deterrence. The United States made crystal clear to the Soviet Union, if you use nuclear weapons, we will destroy you, and vice versa. The Soviet Union making clear the same thing. U.S. Officials say this is the new world, that the major threat now is not nuclear weapons, but chemical and biological weapons, and that the United States needs to have this deterrence policy on the books to convince governments and terrorist groups that they would use these weapons at their own peril.
ZAHN: All right. Stay dry, John. Looks pretty miserable out there this morning. Heading our way a little bit later on this afternoon. Appreciate your time.
KING: Back on to Iraq.
U.N. inspectors are picking up the pace and zeroing in on Iraqi nuclear facilities. More than 60 weapons inspectors are now on the ground, and 20 more should arrive by the year's end.
David Albright is a former nuclear weapons inspector. He knows what the current U.N. team is up against, and he joins us from Washington this morning.
Welcome, David. Glad to see you this morning.
DAVID ALBRIGHT, FMR. WEAPONS INSPECTOR: Good to be here.
ZAHN: Can you tell us about what the inspectors are up against today, and what they found yesterday?
ALBRIGHT: Well, the main thing is they do have to pick up the pace. They have to -- and they also have to go to some important sites like the Tuwait (ph) nuclear research center. There's a lot of uranium at that site, and they have to make sure that Iraq hasn't tampered with it and that all of it is there. And the reason you worry about that is if things have gone missing or it's been tampered with, your suspicions increase that Iraq was going to try to use it in a nuclear weapons program.
So it's -- while a lot of these inspections are really to re- establish kind of the baseline that the inspectors had in 1998, some of them are quite important to alleviate concerns that Iraq was moving ahead with nuclear weapons program.
ZAHN: David, what kind of challenge is it for inspectors to try to prove that perhaps the uranium had been tampered with?
ALBRIGHT: Well, what the inspectors did is they would put seals, tamper-proof seals, on the barrels that the material stored in. So if the barrel was opened, Iraq wouldn't be able to replace the seal in the same way. It's a very sophisticated item. These items have been developed over several decades. And so you get a pretty high assurance that you can tell if the barrel has been opened. On some of the first visits, they were just making sure the barrels were there.
ZAHN: And explain to us from an inspectors point of view how daunting that is, when you are on the scene of one of these inspections.
ALBRIGHT: Well, it is hard work, and it takes time, and you have to be very meticulous and careful. The inspectors, particularly the leadership and the International Atomic Energy Agency, have tremendous experience doing this, and so they know how to implement the procedures. They've brought in some of their very experienced people in order to accomplish this task. So I think they're proceeding.
One of the things they have to shift to, and I think they are beginning to realize this, they have to move now into an investigative phase. They have the declaration from Iraq, and they are going to have to go about really disproving Iraqi statements. I mean, as an inspector you really have to have an attitude of skepticism. You can't give Iraq the benefit of the doubt. You have to start assuming they are cheating, and you have to start creating inspection strategy that is -- that aims to show that Iraq has not revealed its nuclear weapons program.
ZAHN: You -- David, you say you can't get -- no, that's my fault. You say you can't get Iraq the benefit of the doubt, and yet "USA Today" is reporting this morning that U.N. monitors are still waiting for a list of Iraqi scientists from the government of Iraq. They have been, I guess, put that request in two weeks ago, and nothing has happened. How significant of a development is this?
ALBRIGHT: Well the resolution didn't put in a date when that list was required but I think the inspectors have to insist it be turned over right away. And particularly, this inspection effort is going to depend on being able to interview Iraqis, both inside Iraq and outside Iraq. And those procedures are being developed right now, and so you have to have this list to work with. Now, without the list, there is actually a huge list of the people who were involved in the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program; I mean, that list was developed in great detail. And so you can start there. But you do want the Iraqis to turn over a list of everybody that they view as being involved so you can check that list against the internal IAEA list.
ZAHN: David, want to close this morning with something that former national security adviser Bill Clinton wrote, Sandy Berger, in the "Washington Post" today. He writes -- quote -- "The burden of proof is on Iraq, and there it must remain. Inspectors, for example, can demand from Iraq in specific instances credible evidence to account for weapons that Iraq previously acknowledged it had but now claims, without proof, have been destroyed." Do you agree, and if you do, what exactly does that mean from an inspector's point of view?
ALBRIGHT: Well, that's actually how it's been done. That's what led to this crisis in the 1990s, where inspectors demanded proof from Iraq, that it had destroyed particularly biological weapons, and the Iraqis refused to give it. They've maintained that claim in the press conference that they gave on Monday and the request is still on to prove the evidence. In terms of the public's interest, and the -- I think there's been a clear movement that the burden of proof has also been shifted to the United States and Britain to start proving their claims, that they have to start producing evidence that Iraq really does have weapons of mass destruction, because -- and it's important from my own point of view to do that, because finally, we're being asked to support a war in Iraq, and I think we have to have a clear reason why we are going to war. And, therefore, I think the United States and Britain are going to have to present evidence it the public.
They're also going to have to present actionable intelligence to the inspectors, so they can go about disproving Iraq's statement that it has no weapons of mass destruction and has not had any since 1991.
ZAHN: That's a very interesting point you made about actionable intelligence. Love to have you come back so we can talk about that in greater detail. David Albright, thank you for your perspective. Appreciate it very much.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com
Aired December 11, 2002 - 09:05 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
PAULA ZAHN, CNN ANCHOR: We're going to turn to John King now for the very latest from the White House on this and a couple of other stories making news this morning.
Good morning, John. How are you doing this morning?
JOHN KING, CNN SR. WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENT: Doing fine, Paula, a little soggy at the White House.
White House officials say they will meet with the government of Yemen, but senior White House officials telling us this administration will be extremely reluctant to deliver those missiles to Yemen. White House officials say Yemen, in its views, has no strategic need for these missiles. Officials saying they are worried that perhaps Yemen was a middle man, that somebody in Yemen might have been trying to get their hands on these missiles to turn them over to someone else.
U.S. officials say this interdiction is consistent with this new strategy. The Bush administration put out a summary late yesterday. In here, the administration says it will interdict weapons sales overseas if it believes that material could be used to make or deliver weapons of mass destruction against the United States, its military forces or its allies overseas.
And U.S. officials saying potentially SCUD missiles could be used by a government to deliver chemical or biological weapons. So the United States facing a potential diplomatic headache with a country that in recent months has been an ally in the war on terrorism, but arguing this seizure was the right thing to do.
In this new strategy, the administration also making clear it might respond, possibly even with nuclear weapons if any nation -- and this message was delivered because of the current confrontation with Iraq -- used chemical, biological or any such weapons of mass destruction against U.S. forces.
In this new strategy, the Bush administration saying -- quote -- "The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force, including through resort to all of our options to the use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our forces abroad and friends and allies."
The administration releasing the unclassified portion of this strategy just yesterday. Officials saying they are doing so quite publicly now to deliver a clear message to the Iraqi government that if there is a military confrontation and if the Iraqi government used its chemical or biological weapons, the United States would respond with overwhelming force and would not rule out using nuclear weapons -- Paula.
ZAHN: John, there are a bunch of different interpretations this morning of what this strategy really says. Is it your understanding that it would allow for the United States to authorize preemptive strikes against countries who are in the process of developing nuclear weapons.
KING: Yes. Especially in the classified version of this, we are told it makes crystal clear the president could authorize preemptive strikes if a government or if a terrorist group operating in a country somewhere, if the United States reached a finding that a terrorist group or a government was at the point of being able to deliver weapons of mass destruction, and it had identified the United States or a U.S. ally as a potential target, the government would have the authority under this new strategy to launch preemptive strikes to wipe out those weapons.
ZAHN: So what does that mean then strategically, John?
KING: Well, it will reinforce the criticism around the world you hear from some quarters that the United States is trying to be the world's policeman; this seizure of SCUD missiles will do that as well. But the administration said in the Cold War you have the strategy of the nuclear deterrence. The United States made crystal clear to the Soviet Union, if you use nuclear weapons, we will destroy you, and vice versa. The Soviet Union making clear the same thing. U.S. Officials say this is the new world, that the major threat now is not nuclear weapons, but chemical and biological weapons, and that the United States needs to have this deterrence policy on the books to convince governments and terrorist groups that they would use these weapons at their own peril.
ZAHN: All right. Stay dry, John. Looks pretty miserable out there this morning. Heading our way a little bit later on this afternoon. Appreciate your time.
KING: Back on to Iraq.
U.N. inspectors are picking up the pace and zeroing in on Iraqi nuclear facilities. More than 60 weapons inspectors are now on the ground, and 20 more should arrive by the year's end.
David Albright is a former nuclear weapons inspector. He knows what the current U.N. team is up against, and he joins us from Washington this morning.
Welcome, David. Glad to see you this morning.
DAVID ALBRIGHT, FMR. WEAPONS INSPECTOR: Good to be here.
ZAHN: Can you tell us about what the inspectors are up against today, and what they found yesterday?
ALBRIGHT: Well, the main thing is they do have to pick up the pace. They have to -- and they also have to go to some important sites like the Tuwait (ph) nuclear research center. There's a lot of uranium at that site, and they have to make sure that Iraq hasn't tampered with it and that all of it is there. And the reason you worry about that is if things have gone missing or it's been tampered with, your suspicions increase that Iraq was going to try to use it in a nuclear weapons program.
So it's -- while a lot of these inspections are really to re- establish kind of the baseline that the inspectors had in 1998, some of them are quite important to alleviate concerns that Iraq was moving ahead with nuclear weapons program.
ZAHN: David, what kind of challenge is it for inspectors to try to prove that perhaps the uranium had been tampered with?
ALBRIGHT: Well, what the inspectors did is they would put seals, tamper-proof seals, on the barrels that the material stored in. So if the barrel was opened, Iraq wouldn't be able to replace the seal in the same way. It's a very sophisticated item. These items have been developed over several decades. And so you get a pretty high assurance that you can tell if the barrel has been opened. On some of the first visits, they were just making sure the barrels were there.
ZAHN: And explain to us from an inspectors point of view how daunting that is, when you are on the scene of one of these inspections.
ALBRIGHT: Well, it is hard work, and it takes time, and you have to be very meticulous and careful. The inspectors, particularly the leadership and the International Atomic Energy Agency, have tremendous experience doing this, and so they know how to implement the procedures. They've brought in some of their very experienced people in order to accomplish this task. So I think they're proceeding.
One of the things they have to shift to, and I think they are beginning to realize this, they have to move now into an investigative phase. They have the declaration from Iraq, and they are going to have to go about really disproving Iraqi statements. I mean, as an inspector you really have to have an attitude of skepticism. You can't give Iraq the benefit of the doubt. You have to start assuming they are cheating, and you have to start creating inspection strategy that is -- that aims to show that Iraq has not revealed its nuclear weapons program.
ZAHN: You -- David, you say you can't get -- no, that's my fault. You say you can't get Iraq the benefit of the doubt, and yet "USA Today" is reporting this morning that U.N. monitors are still waiting for a list of Iraqi scientists from the government of Iraq. They have been, I guess, put that request in two weeks ago, and nothing has happened. How significant of a development is this?
ALBRIGHT: Well the resolution didn't put in a date when that list was required but I think the inspectors have to insist it be turned over right away. And particularly, this inspection effort is going to depend on being able to interview Iraqis, both inside Iraq and outside Iraq. And those procedures are being developed right now, and so you have to have this list to work with. Now, without the list, there is actually a huge list of the people who were involved in the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program; I mean, that list was developed in great detail. And so you can start there. But you do want the Iraqis to turn over a list of everybody that they view as being involved so you can check that list against the internal IAEA list.
ZAHN: David, want to close this morning with something that former national security adviser Bill Clinton wrote, Sandy Berger, in the "Washington Post" today. He writes -- quote -- "The burden of proof is on Iraq, and there it must remain. Inspectors, for example, can demand from Iraq in specific instances credible evidence to account for weapons that Iraq previously acknowledged it had but now claims, without proof, have been destroyed." Do you agree, and if you do, what exactly does that mean from an inspector's point of view?
ALBRIGHT: Well, that's actually how it's been done. That's what led to this crisis in the 1990s, where inspectors demanded proof from Iraq, that it had destroyed particularly biological weapons, and the Iraqis refused to give it. They've maintained that claim in the press conference that they gave on Monday and the request is still on to prove the evidence. In terms of the public's interest, and the -- I think there's been a clear movement that the burden of proof has also been shifted to the United States and Britain to start proving their claims, that they have to start producing evidence that Iraq really does have weapons of mass destruction, because -- and it's important from my own point of view to do that, because finally, we're being asked to support a war in Iraq, and I think we have to have a clear reason why we are going to war. And, therefore, I think the United States and Britain are going to have to present evidence it the public.
They're also going to have to present actionable intelligence to the inspectors, so they can go about disproving Iraq's statement that it has no weapons of mass destruction and has not had any since 1991.
ZAHN: That's a very interesting point you made about actionable intelligence. Love to have you come back so we can talk about that in greater detail. David Albright, thank you for your perspective. Appreciate it very much.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com
