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American Morning

Interview With Joel Wit

Aired December 31, 2002 - 07:06   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


PAULA ZAHN, CNN ANCHOR: Will Washington's efforts to put the squeeze on the defiant north get the job done?
Joel Wit is a senior fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He joins us from Washington this morning.

Good to have you with this morning, sir -- welcome. Happy New Year.

JOEL WIT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIOAL STUDIES: Happy to be here.

ZAHN: Thank you.

WIT: Thank you.

ZAHN: We'll take as many of those happy New Year's wishes as we can get this morning.

As you know, the administration has made it quite clear that they believe that they might have some success through their policy of containment and isolation. I know you view a policy of containment as a policy of surrender. Why?

WIT: Well, I think the policy of containment that the administration has outlined basically acquiesces in North Korea building a growing nuclear weapons stockpile. And I think that's the wrong approach for the United States to take, because it's counter to 40 years of nonproliferation policy, and it will result in a festering sore in that part of the world that it will be difficult to deal with in the future.

ZAHN: Are you suggesting a military option here?

WIT: No, I'm not suggesting a military option. What I'm suggesting is a coherent strategy that uses all of the tools at our disposal, and by that I mean dialogue with North Korea, possibly taking tough measures such as going to the UN Security Council, and also possibly taking military measures. And by that I don't mean attacking North Korea, but there are military steps the United States can take short of a preemptive strike that will communicate that we are very serious about this situation.

ZAHN: Walk us through what some of those options might be.

WIT: Well, if you look back at the past crisis we had in 1994 with North Korea, the Clinton administration, as that crisis mounted, started to move additional forces to the Far East in order to prepare for the possibility that the crisis would not be resolved and the worst-case outcome would happen. Those moves communicated to North Korea that the United States was very serious about this situation, but the moves were small enough not to provoke North Korea to launch its own preemptive attack.

ZAHN: I don't know if you just heard any of Dana Bash's reporting from the White House of the critical communications going on between the Bush administration and South Korean officials. Where do you think that might lead? Do you have any faith that that is a good track to pursue?

WIT: Well, of course, the United States has to pursue a very close approach with South Korea, because they're our major ally in the region, and they're the ones who are most intimately involved in this crisis. The problem is the administration's current approach may not win over South Korean support, as you heard from your news clip. And the reason for that is, South Korea needs to see that the United States is trying to peacefully resolve this situation before it gets out of hand, and the administration so far has refused to have any contact with North Korea to try to reach a diplomatic solution.

ZAHN: We should, in closing, make it clear you were part of the team that helped negotiate the 1994 agreement with North Korea. And some have argued that in essence, North Korea is practicing nuclear blackmail, because of the appeasement the Clinton administration posed for Kim Jong Il's rule. Do you want to defend your turf on that one this morning?

WIT: Well, look, I'm not going to say that the '94 agreement was a total success. That would fly in the face of reality. But the fact is that in 1994, we were faced with a very large plutonium production program that was frozen by that agreement, and if the agreement had never been signed, today we would be looking at a much different situation than we are even now. We would be looking at a North Korea that might have 100 or more nuclear weapons at its disposal.

So, the situation today is certainly not very good, but it would be a lot worse without the agreement that was reached in 1994.

ZAHN: Joel Wit, we appreciate your perspective this morning. Good of you to join us on the day before the day when hopefully most Americans will get to rest. Appreciate your perspective.

WIT: Thank you.

ZAHN: Take care.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com.







Aired December 31, 2002 - 07:06   ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
PAULA ZAHN, CNN ANCHOR: Will Washington's efforts to put the squeeze on the defiant north get the job done?
Joel Wit is a senior fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He joins us from Washington this morning.

Good to have you with this morning, sir -- welcome. Happy New Year.

JOEL WIT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIOAL STUDIES: Happy to be here.

ZAHN: Thank you.

WIT: Thank you.

ZAHN: We'll take as many of those happy New Year's wishes as we can get this morning.

As you know, the administration has made it quite clear that they believe that they might have some success through their policy of containment and isolation. I know you view a policy of containment as a policy of surrender. Why?

WIT: Well, I think the policy of containment that the administration has outlined basically acquiesces in North Korea building a growing nuclear weapons stockpile. And I think that's the wrong approach for the United States to take, because it's counter to 40 years of nonproliferation policy, and it will result in a festering sore in that part of the world that it will be difficult to deal with in the future.

ZAHN: Are you suggesting a military option here?

WIT: No, I'm not suggesting a military option. What I'm suggesting is a coherent strategy that uses all of the tools at our disposal, and by that I mean dialogue with North Korea, possibly taking tough measures such as going to the UN Security Council, and also possibly taking military measures. And by that I don't mean attacking North Korea, but there are military steps the United States can take short of a preemptive strike that will communicate that we are very serious about this situation.

ZAHN: Walk us through what some of those options might be.

WIT: Well, if you look back at the past crisis we had in 1994 with North Korea, the Clinton administration, as that crisis mounted, started to move additional forces to the Far East in order to prepare for the possibility that the crisis would not be resolved and the worst-case outcome would happen. Those moves communicated to North Korea that the United States was very serious about this situation, but the moves were small enough not to provoke North Korea to launch its own preemptive attack.

ZAHN: I don't know if you just heard any of Dana Bash's reporting from the White House of the critical communications going on between the Bush administration and South Korean officials. Where do you think that might lead? Do you have any faith that that is a good track to pursue?

WIT: Well, of course, the United States has to pursue a very close approach with South Korea, because they're our major ally in the region, and they're the ones who are most intimately involved in this crisis. The problem is the administration's current approach may not win over South Korean support, as you heard from your news clip. And the reason for that is, South Korea needs to see that the United States is trying to peacefully resolve this situation before it gets out of hand, and the administration so far has refused to have any contact with North Korea to try to reach a diplomatic solution.

ZAHN: We should, in closing, make it clear you were part of the team that helped negotiate the 1994 agreement with North Korea. And some have argued that in essence, North Korea is practicing nuclear blackmail, because of the appeasement the Clinton administration posed for Kim Jong Il's rule. Do you want to defend your turf on that one this morning?

WIT: Well, look, I'm not going to say that the '94 agreement was a total success. That would fly in the face of reality. But the fact is that in 1994, we were faced with a very large plutonium production program that was frozen by that agreement, and if the agreement had never been signed, today we would be looking at a much different situation than we are even now. We would be looking at a North Korea that might have 100 or more nuclear weapons at its disposal.

So, the situation today is certainly not very good, but it would be a lot worse without the agreement that was reached in 1994.

ZAHN: Joel Wit, we appreciate your perspective this morning. Good of you to join us on the day before the day when hopefully most Americans will get to rest. Appreciate your perspective.

WIT: Thank you.

ZAHN: Take care.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com.