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American Morning
Interview with Former Iraqi Nuclear Chief
Aired January 30, 2003 - 07:04 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
PAULA ZAHN, CNN ANCHOR: A troubling report suggests that Iraq may be getting tipped off in advance about weapons inspections. "USA Today" says some American officials suspect that Iraq is using the information to clean up sites before U.N. teams even arrive.
Chief weapons inspector Hans Blix doesn't believe anyone from his team is leaking information.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
HANS BLIX, CHIEF U.N. WEAPONS INSPECTOR: Well, we haven't seen any details about the reports, but we have a good discussion in the United States and a good relation to the people on the intelligence side, and I don't think anyone at the high level would contend that there had been leaks.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
ZAHN: Joining us now to talk about whether Iraq may have infiltrated the inspections process, Khidhir Hamza, the former head of Iraq's nuclear weapons program.
Good morning. Thanks for joining us this morning.
KHIDHIR HAMZA, FMR. IRAQI NUCLEAR CHIEF: Good morning.
ZAHN: So, you heard what Hans Blix had to say. Let's contrast that with what the president had to say the other night about the potential infiltration of the U.N. inspections team. Let's listen.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
GEORGE W. BUSH, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: The dictator of Iraq is not disarming. To the contrary, he is deceiving. From intelligence sources, we know for instance that thousands of Iraqi security personnel are at work hiding documents and materials from the U.N. inspectors, sanitizing inspection sites and monitoring the inspectors themselves.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
ZAHN: Is it your belief that the Iraqis have somehow infiltrated this U.N. inspection team?
HAMZA: I believe so. I believe that Iraq will make it his business to use friendly countries to have some of their inspectors cooperate with Iraq in providing information. We had that in the past.
ZAHN: What happened when you were in Iraq?
HAMZA: When I was in Iraq, my boss, former boss, the head of the Iraqi military industry, Saddam's son-in-law, had an agent at the headquarters I believe of UNSCOM or the International Atomic Energy. And he was surprised when he defected to Jordan when the debriefing team came over to debrief him, his own agent was with the team debriefing him too.
ZAHN: Surprise, surprise.
HAMZA: Surprise, surprise. So, he told him, "What are you doing here? You were working for me. Get out." And he threw him out.
And so, Iraq made it its business to infiltrate the inspections team in the past, and I believe they would do now, and I believe they would be successful, because lots of countries, including possibly France -- and I don't know if Russia is on board now; it was on board in the past -- to cooperate by providing one or two of the inspectors to be the liaison between the Iraqis and the inspection team.
ZAHN: You're saying when you were in Iraq, there was actually evidence of the French government putting a person on the inspection team in place. He was working for the Iraqis?
HAMZA: I don't know if it was the French government. No, we had an agent inside the headquarters of the inspection team.
ZAHN: Right.
HAMZA: We had an agent, and we had a cooperating government -- nobody told me which one -- I believe it could be the French, it could be the Russians -- who were acting as liaisons to provide information of where the inspections were going to be. For example, the parking lot incident, we knew the inspectors were coming to inspect the former headquarters of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, and the site was sanitized, but a box was forgotten. Somebody forgot to take out a box, and...
ZAHN: And this was a box then that David Kay...
HAMZA: Yes, David Kay...
ZAHN: ... the U.N. inspector wanted to look at.
HAMZA: Exactly.
ZAHN: And then what happened?
HAMZA: And what happened is that -- that was the only mistake they made. After that, no such mistake was made. And after that, the Iraqis asked that they make a list of their reports in that box.
After a standoff for three days, David Kay agreed and his team, the Iraqis took the report to a back room, changed the documents, kept the cover, changed even the names on the cover, put new covers on them but they looked the same, and gave them back...
ZAHN: And you were...
HAMZA: ... and gave them back to David Kay.
ZAHN: To Davis Kay.
HAMZA: Yes.
ZAHN: Now, this was back in 1994. Some of this stuff went on before that, you allege. Why are you so convinced that that is the case today?
HAMZA: I don't believe with the inspection team resistance to implement U.N. resolutions in terms of taking scientists out of Iraq. It's (UNINTELLIGIBLE) not really forcing themselves to make the scientists talk in private. They are more or less just too accommodating. It tells me that there is lots of pressure on the teams from various nations, possibly France, possibly some European, possibly even Arab nations, who have inspectors on the team to make them not find anything, because so far, the report -- I mean, the (UNINTELLIGIBLE) was too eager to say there is no evidence Iraq reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. Where did he get that? He never talked to a single scientist in private.
So, I think the team is just too accommodating, which means there's a lot of pressure on it, which means there is also possibly a lot of inside information given to the Iraqis, because sites are being sanitized now, according to the Iraqi opposition, days before.
ZAHN: How effectively do you think the Iraqis can sanitize these sites?
HAMZA: There is a team headed by Saddam's son, Qusay, the youngest son. He's the heir apparent to the throne in Iraq, whatever, who runs before the inspectors come with the trucks and exprerts and technicians, sanitize the sites, move them to backup sites, and the inspectors arrive with nothing there to find or see all of the time.
ZAHN: And to this day, you think that...
(CROSSTALK)
HAMZA: To this day. In the past with 6,000 inspectors between 1991 and 1998, and hundreds, possibly thousands of inspections, only seven were (UNINTELLIGIBLE) as inspections to Iraq. So, that tells you how much inside information the Iraqis are getting from inspectors and from its own agents.
ZAHN: It certainly is a loaded number, isn't it?
HAMZA: Yes.
ZAHN: Khidhir Hamza, thank you very much for dropping by in person.
HAMZA: Thank you, Paula.
ZAHN: We really appreciate your time.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com
Aired January 30, 2003 - 07:04 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
PAULA ZAHN, CNN ANCHOR: A troubling report suggests that Iraq may be getting tipped off in advance about weapons inspections. "USA Today" says some American officials suspect that Iraq is using the information to clean up sites before U.N. teams even arrive.
Chief weapons inspector Hans Blix doesn't believe anyone from his team is leaking information.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
HANS BLIX, CHIEF U.N. WEAPONS INSPECTOR: Well, we haven't seen any details about the reports, but we have a good discussion in the United States and a good relation to the people on the intelligence side, and I don't think anyone at the high level would contend that there had been leaks.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
ZAHN: Joining us now to talk about whether Iraq may have infiltrated the inspections process, Khidhir Hamza, the former head of Iraq's nuclear weapons program.
Good morning. Thanks for joining us this morning.
KHIDHIR HAMZA, FMR. IRAQI NUCLEAR CHIEF: Good morning.
ZAHN: So, you heard what Hans Blix had to say. Let's contrast that with what the president had to say the other night about the potential infiltration of the U.N. inspections team. Let's listen.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
GEORGE W. BUSH, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: The dictator of Iraq is not disarming. To the contrary, he is deceiving. From intelligence sources, we know for instance that thousands of Iraqi security personnel are at work hiding documents and materials from the U.N. inspectors, sanitizing inspection sites and monitoring the inspectors themselves.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
ZAHN: Is it your belief that the Iraqis have somehow infiltrated this U.N. inspection team?
HAMZA: I believe so. I believe that Iraq will make it his business to use friendly countries to have some of their inspectors cooperate with Iraq in providing information. We had that in the past.
ZAHN: What happened when you were in Iraq?
HAMZA: When I was in Iraq, my boss, former boss, the head of the Iraqi military industry, Saddam's son-in-law, had an agent at the headquarters I believe of UNSCOM or the International Atomic Energy. And he was surprised when he defected to Jordan when the debriefing team came over to debrief him, his own agent was with the team debriefing him too.
ZAHN: Surprise, surprise.
HAMZA: Surprise, surprise. So, he told him, "What are you doing here? You were working for me. Get out." And he threw him out.
And so, Iraq made it its business to infiltrate the inspections team in the past, and I believe they would do now, and I believe they would be successful, because lots of countries, including possibly France -- and I don't know if Russia is on board now; it was on board in the past -- to cooperate by providing one or two of the inspectors to be the liaison between the Iraqis and the inspection team.
ZAHN: You're saying when you were in Iraq, there was actually evidence of the French government putting a person on the inspection team in place. He was working for the Iraqis?
HAMZA: I don't know if it was the French government. No, we had an agent inside the headquarters of the inspection team.
ZAHN: Right.
HAMZA: We had an agent, and we had a cooperating government -- nobody told me which one -- I believe it could be the French, it could be the Russians -- who were acting as liaisons to provide information of where the inspections were going to be. For example, the parking lot incident, we knew the inspectors were coming to inspect the former headquarters of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, and the site was sanitized, but a box was forgotten. Somebody forgot to take out a box, and...
ZAHN: And this was a box then that David Kay...
HAMZA: Yes, David Kay...
ZAHN: ... the U.N. inspector wanted to look at.
HAMZA: Exactly.
ZAHN: And then what happened?
HAMZA: And what happened is that -- that was the only mistake they made. After that, no such mistake was made. And after that, the Iraqis asked that they make a list of their reports in that box.
After a standoff for three days, David Kay agreed and his team, the Iraqis took the report to a back room, changed the documents, kept the cover, changed even the names on the cover, put new covers on them but they looked the same, and gave them back...
ZAHN: And you were...
HAMZA: ... and gave them back to David Kay.
ZAHN: To Davis Kay.
HAMZA: Yes.
ZAHN: Now, this was back in 1994. Some of this stuff went on before that, you allege. Why are you so convinced that that is the case today?
HAMZA: I don't believe with the inspection team resistance to implement U.N. resolutions in terms of taking scientists out of Iraq. It's (UNINTELLIGIBLE) not really forcing themselves to make the scientists talk in private. They are more or less just too accommodating. It tells me that there is lots of pressure on the teams from various nations, possibly France, possibly some European, possibly even Arab nations, who have inspectors on the team to make them not find anything, because so far, the report -- I mean, the (UNINTELLIGIBLE) was too eager to say there is no evidence Iraq reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. Where did he get that? He never talked to a single scientist in private.
So, I think the team is just too accommodating, which means there's a lot of pressure on it, which means there is also possibly a lot of inside information given to the Iraqis, because sites are being sanitized now, according to the Iraqi opposition, days before.
ZAHN: How effectively do you think the Iraqis can sanitize these sites?
HAMZA: There is a team headed by Saddam's son, Qusay, the youngest son. He's the heir apparent to the throne in Iraq, whatever, who runs before the inspectors come with the trucks and exprerts and technicians, sanitize the sites, move them to backup sites, and the inspectors arrive with nothing there to find or see all of the time.
ZAHN: And to this day, you think that...
(CROSSTALK)
HAMZA: To this day. In the past with 6,000 inspectors between 1991 and 1998, and hundreds, possibly thousands of inspections, only seven were (UNINTELLIGIBLE) as inspections to Iraq. So, that tells you how much inside information the Iraqis are getting from inspectors and from its own agents.
ZAHN: It certainly is a loaded number, isn't it?
HAMZA: Yes.
ZAHN: Khidhir Hamza, thank you very much for dropping by in person.
HAMZA: Thank you, Paula.
ZAHN: We really appreciate your time.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com
