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American Morning

British Intelligence?

Aired February 10, 2003 - 08:17   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


PAULA ZAHN, CNN ANCHOR: British Prime Minister Tony Blair and his government are doing some damage control after admitting that much of a report on Iraq was actually copied from other sources. At the U.N. last week, you might remember that the British dossier won praise from Secretary of State Colin Powell.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE: Iraq is relentlessly attempting to tap all of their communications both voice and electronics. I would call my colleague's attention to the fine paper that United Kingdom distributed yesterday which describes in exquisite detail Iraqi deception activities.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

ZAHN: Well it turns out that fine paper included the work of Ibrahim al-Marashi, a research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in California. His published article was copied, portions of it, word for word in the British report.

And Ibrahim al-Marashi joins us from Mountain View, California.

Thanks for getting up early for us this morning -- Ibrahim.

IBRAHIM AL-MARASHI, RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES: My pleasure.

ZAHN: So, Mr. Marashi, the British Prime Minister's office now stands by the complete report saying the only mistake it made was not crediting or acknowledging your work. What was your biggest surprise in hearing your work used basically to declare -- make a case for war against Iraq?

AL-MARASHI: Well, my biggest surprise was that a paper I had published would reach -- would be utilized by the U.K. government. I would get a circulation among such a wide audience as well because of this. The fact that it was being used for the case to go to war was, as well, it took me by surprise.

Nevertheless, when I published it, I realized it could be used to argue justifiably for war saying that there's a security apparatus in Iraq concealing his weapons. Conversely, I realized that it could also be used to maybe not necessarily justify war. You could also say OK look, there's a massive apparatus protecting the regime of Saddam Hussein, they would put up stiff resistance to U.S. attacks so I expected it to be used to justify war as well as to use it the case against war as well.

ZAHN: Let's come back to that first point where you were saying you were surprised that perhaps your work is being used to build a case against Iraq. Were you surprised because the information in your report was so old?

AL-MARASHI: Well let me clarify that point. The information I wrote for that report included up-to-date information up to September 2002. Granted, a lot has happened in Iraq after September 2002. But I was surprised that something that was basically just supposed to be a guide and analysis to Iraq's domestic politics as well as its security apparatus would be used by the U.K. government.

ZAHN: Is that because you thought maybe the British government was being too lazy to do its own work and lift yours word for word?

AL-MARASHI: Well I assumed that the British intelligence capabilities are better than mine, so yes, that's where the surprise came from.

ZAHN: Where was the weakness that you would find in how the British used your research to build its case?

AL-MARASHI: Well basically the weakness was they attributed it to intelligence sources rather than just saying this is a -- came from a printed academic journal. Ultimately that might -- the criticism later came then that if there's weakness in intelligence sources from the U.K, then perhaps the intelligence sources Colin Powell used would also be faulty. And I just wanted to clarify that having studied Iraq's weapons of mass destruction in the past and its concealment techniques, I thought Powell's presentation brought a lot of valid evidence to -- towards the case that Iraq is concealing weapons of mass destruction. So I don't -- didn't want any link between what the U.K. government did and what the U.S. government said at the U.N. on February 5.

ZAHN: Well understood. Ibrahim al-Marashi, thanks for joining us.

AL-MARASHI: My pleasure.

ZAHN: We are going to be paying very close attention to what you write in the future. No telling where it may end up and in whose reports, right?

AL-MARASHI: Thank you.

ZAHN: In advance of you even getting your doctorate. Again, Ibrahim al-Marashi from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Mountain View, California.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com







Aired February 10, 2003 - 08:17   ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
PAULA ZAHN, CNN ANCHOR: British Prime Minister Tony Blair and his government are doing some damage control after admitting that much of a report on Iraq was actually copied from other sources. At the U.N. last week, you might remember that the British dossier won praise from Secretary of State Colin Powell.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE: Iraq is relentlessly attempting to tap all of their communications both voice and electronics. I would call my colleague's attention to the fine paper that United Kingdom distributed yesterday which describes in exquisite detail Iraqi deception activities.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

ZAHN: Well it turns out that fine paper included the work of Ibrahim al-Marashi, a research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in California. His published article was copied, portions of it, word for word in the British report.

And Ibrahim al-Marashi joins us from Mountain View, California.

Thanks for getting up early for us this morning -- Ibrahim.

IBRAHIM AL-MARASHI, RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES: My pleasure.

ZAHN: So, Mr. Marashi, the British Prime Minister's office now stands by the complete report saying the only mistake it made was not crediting or acknowledging your work. What was your biggest surprise in hearing your work used basically to declare -- make a case for war against Iraq?

AL-MARASHI: Well, my biggest surprise was that a paper I had published would reach -- would be utilized by the U.K. government. I would get a circulation among such a wide audience as well because of this. The fact that it was being used for the case to go to war was, as well, it took me by surprise.

Nevertheless, when I published it, I realized it could be used to argue justifiably for war saying that there's a security apparatus in Iraq concealing his weapons. Conversely, I realized that it could also be used to maybe not necessarily justify war. You could also say OK look, there's a massive apparatus protecting the regime of Saddam Hussein, they would put up stiff resistance to U.S. attacks so I expected it to be used to justify war as well as to use it the case against war as well.

ZAHN: Let's come back to that first point where you were saying you were surprised that perhaps your work is being used to build a case against Iraq. Were you surprised because the information in your report was so old?

AL-MARASHI: Well let me clarify that point. The information I wrote for that report included up-to-date information up to September 2002. Granted, a lot has happened in Iraq after September 2002. But I was surprised that something that was basically just supposed to be a guide and analysis to Iraq's domestic politics as well as its security apparatus would be used by the U.K. government.

ZAHN: Is that because you thought maybe the British government was being too lazy to do its own work and lift yours word for word?

AL-MARASHI: Well I assumed that the British intelligence capabilities are better than mine, so yes, that's where the surprise came from.

ZAHN: Where was the weakness that you would find in how the British used your research to build its case?

AL-MARASHI: Well basically the weakness was they attributed it to intelligence sources rather than just saying this is a -- came from a printed academic journal. Ultimately that might -- the criticism later came then that if there's weakness in intelligence sources from the U.K, then perhaps the intelligence sources Colin Powell used would also be faulty. And I just wanted to clarify that having studied Iraq's weapons of mass destruction in the past and its concealment techniques, I thought Powell's presentation brought a lot of valid evidence to -- towards the case that Iraq is concealing weapons of mass destruction. So I don't -- didn't want any link between what the U.K. government did and what the U.S. government said at the U.N. on February 5.

ZAHN: Well understood. Ibrahim al-Marashi, thanks for joining us.

AL-MARASHI: My pleasure.

ZAHN: We are going to be paying very close attention to what you write in the future. No telling where it may end up and in whose reports, right?

AL-MARASHI: Thank you.

ZAHN: In advance of you even getting your doctorate. Again, Ibrahim al-Marashi from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Mountain View, California.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com