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American Morning
Doomed Mission of Shuttle Columbia
Aired February 27, 2003 - 07:09 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
PAULA ZAHN, CNN ANCHOR: Now on to the shuttle investigation and new details about what NASA scientists knew and when they knew it. E- mail messages indicate just how concerned engineers were that Columbia's wing had been damaged, and that the crew could face disaster upon re-entry.
For example, one NASA contractor wrote: "Why are we talking about this on the day before landing and not the day after launch?"
Joining us now from Atlanta to talk about these revelations, our space shuttle analyst, Randy Avera.
Good morning -- Randy. Thanks for being with us.
RANDY AVERA, CNN SHUTTLE ANALYST: Good morning, Paula.
ZAHN: We wanted to start off with the first piece of these series of e-mails, which begin on January 28, when a landing gear specialist in NASA's Langley Research Center in Virginia asked a Houston colleague -- quote: "Any more activity today on the tile damage, or are people just relegated to crossing their fingers and hoping for the best?" Now, to put this into context, this e-mail was sent four days before the shuttle exploded.
Did these concerns ever make it to the top of the NASA command?
AVERA: At this point, it's not obvious that the upper levels of NASA management and the upper levels of contractor management were thoroughly aware of this. As we reported over the weekend here at CNN that the contractor, Boeing, that had conducted the analysis of the strike of the tiles on the belly of the orbiter's left wing, that analysis had indicated that there were temperatures double what the aluminum skin of the orbiter could tolerate if a single tile were to be lost. And at the end of that report, it concluded that it's not an issue.
So, it's possible that the upper level of management did not understand the severity of this particular event. And as we have found through e-mails of that last week prior to the re-entry of Columbia, that there was a very much heightened awareness of this problem, and engineers and mid-level managers e-mailing back and forth between Johnson Space Center and NASA Langley in Virginia about their concerns. And as they detailed the technical details of what could happen if there is a breach in the main landing gear wheel well and door area of the belly of the orbiter, that they were recommending a bailout to be considered for the astronauts, because of the very complex issues associated with flat tires on the orbiter and trying to make a landing at very high speeds of around 212 miles per hour on the runway.
ZAHN: Randy, is there any justification for these kinds of e- mails not ever reaching, what you believe, not ever having reached the upper levels of NASA management?
AVERA: Well, as I've written in the truth about Challenger a significant amount about this that it's the process that's very important. If we have meaningful rules and are accountable to the process, we minimize the possibility of having important information that would be overlooked otherwise.
ZAHN: Finally this morning, even if the top brass had been made aware of all of this e-mail traffic, was there anything they could have done to save the crew of Columbia?
AVERA: Well, at this point, we're looking in hindsight back at what we saw happen on the 1st of February in 2003, where Columbia broke up in the sky over Texas and other states, like Louisiana. Well, in hindsight, we can say, well, it's not a survivable condition and there's nothing you could do. But again, we're talking about the process and understanding problems and solving problems and giving recommendations to the commander of that flight as to what the situation truly is and what are the options for that crew under all considerations.
ZAHN: So, you're saying there could have been a way out if they had confronted these problems much earlier on in the mission?
AVERA: Well, looking back, this particular scenario is not survivable as it's obviously been shown. But again, it's about the process and keeping the crew informed as to what is going on, what are your options. And there was a very heightened level of concern about the ability of an orbiter to safely land on a runway in a crippled state due to the re-entry heating where a possibility of a tile could be damaged or missing on the belly of the orbiter.
So, that's why the engineers in these e-mails -- we're talking a half-a-dozen or a dozen e-mails that we've been reviewing -- they're very concerned about that, and they're indicating that they would be calling for a bailout, where the astronauts would bail out with parachutes by slowing down to 250 knots of air speed and blowing the side hatch and bailing out prior to landing on a runway.
ZAHN: Wow! It's chilling to think about all of that. Randy Avera, thanks for your insights this morning. We appreciate it.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com.
Aired February 27, 2003 - 07:09 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
PAULA ZAHN, CNN ANCHOR: Now on to the shuttle investigation and new details about what NASA scientists knew and when they knew it. E- mail messages indicate just how concerned engineers were that Columbia's wing had been damaged, and that the crew could face disaster upon re-entry.
For example, one NASA contractor wrote: "Why are we talking about this on the day before landing and not the day after launch?"
Joining us now from Atlanta to talk about these revelations, our space shuttle analyst, Randy Avera.
Good morning -- Randy. Thanks for being with us.
RANDY AVERA, CNN SHUTTLE ANALYST: Good morning, Paula.
ZAHN: We wanted to start off with the first piece of these series of e-mails, which begin on January 28, when a landing gear specialist in NASA's Langley Research Center in Virginia asked a Houston colleague -- quote: "Any more activity today on the tile damage, or are people just relegated to crossing their fingers and hoping for the best?" Now, to put this into context, this e-mail was sent four days before the shuttle exploded.
Did these concerns ever make it to the top of the NASA command?
AVERA: At this point, it's not obvious that the upper levels of NASA management and the upper levels of contractor management were thoroughly aware of this. As we reported over the weekend here at CNN that the contractor, Boeing, that had conducted the analysis of the strike of the tiles on the belly of the orbiter's left wing, that analysis had indicated that there were temperatures double what the aluminum skin of the orbiter could tolerate if a single tile were to be lost. And at the end of that report, it concluded that it's not an issue.
So, it's possible that the upper level of management did not understand the severity of this particular event. And as we have found through e-mails of that last week prior to the re-entry of Columbia, that there was a very much heightened awareness of this problem, and engineers and mid-level managers e-mailing back and forth between Johnson Space Center and NASA Langley in Virginia about their concerns. And as they detailed the technical details of what could happen if there is a breach in the main landing gear wheel well and door area of the belly of the orbiter, that they were recommending a bailout to be considered for the astronauts, because of the very complex issues associated with flat tires on the orbiter and trying to make a landing at very high speeds of around 212 miles per hour on the runway.
ZAHN: Randy, is there any justification for these kinds of e- mails not ever reaching, what you believe, not ever having reached the upper levels of NASA management?
AVERA: Well, as I've written in the truth about Challenger a significant amount about this that it's the process that's very important. If we have meaningful rules and are accountable to the process, we minimize the possibility of having important information that would be overlooked otherwise.
ZAHN: Finally this morning, even if the top brass had been made aware of all of this e-mail traffic, was there anything they could have done to save the crew of Columbia?
AVERA: Well, at this point, we're looking in hindsight back at what we saw happen on the 1st of February in 2003, where Columbia broke up in the sky over Texas and other states, like Louisiana. Well, in hindsight, we can say, well, it's not a survivable condition and there's nothing you could do. But again, we're talking about the process and understanding problems and solving problems and giving recommendations to the commander of that flight as to what the situation truly is and what are the options for that crew under all considerations.
ZAHN: So, you're saying there could have been a way out if they had confronted these problems much earlier on in the mission?
AVERA: Well, looking back, this particular scenario is not survivable as it's obviously been shown. But again, it's about the process and keeping the crew informed as to what is going on, what are your options. And there was a very heightened level of concern about the ability of an orbiter to safely land on a runway in a crippled state due to the re-entry heating where a possibility of a tile could be damaged or missing on the belly of the orbiter.
So, that's why the engineers in these e-mails -- we're talking a half-a-dozen or a dozen e-mails that we've been reviewing -- they're very concerned about that, and they're indicating that they would be calling for a bailout, where the astronauts would bail out with parachutes by slowing down to 250 knots of air speed and blowing the side hatch and bailing out prior to landing on a runway.
ZAHN: Wow! It's chilling to think about all of that. Randy Avera, thanks for your insights this morning. We appreciate it.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com.
