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American Morning
Discussion with Sean O'Keefe
Aired March 03, 2003 - 08:15 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: This is amazing. It's really getting fairly bright out there.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yup.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
PAULA ZAHN, CNN ANCHOR: NASA released a videotape on Friday that shows the Columbia astronauts minutes before the shuttle disintegrated, but it does not answer questions about what went so horribly wrong minutes later. We're finding out now that experts debated the risks facing the Columbia for more than five days before its break-up. Despite that, NASA's chief is defending the agency's handling of information prior to the disaster.
And NASA administrator Sean O'Keefe joins us now from Washington to discuss the investigation.
Welcome back, sir.
Thanks for joining us this morning.
SEAN O'KEEFE, NASA ADMINISTRATOR: Good morning, Paula.
How are you?
ZAHN: I'm fine, thanks.
So at what point did you become aware of these what if scenarios being posted in a number of e-mails?
O'KEEFE: Well, in the course of our efforts to gather up all the information and all the facts of what transpired during the course of the 16 day operation, over the course of these last four weeks, we have released all of that upon the determination and finding those facts. And, of course, the Columbia accident investigation board has all that information at their disposal.
And what went on here was what happens in every single flight, which is a consideration of any anomaly, any circumstance, all kinds of what ifs and at the conclusion of that debate that seems to have occurred internally among the engineers and technical folks, was a no safety of flight consideration.
ZAHN: But as you no doubt know, the criticism has been that through a lack of coordination or whatever the reason, those e-mails didn't get to you at the appropriate time.
O'KEEFE: Well, again, whether it had gotten to me or anybody else across-the-board, we would have gone back to the same technical experts, the same engineers, and said in your best judgment, based on your analysis and your examination of all the facts, what do you think the circumstance is and the probabilities of this occurring? And what they concluded at that time was that there was no safety of flight consideration.
Again, this is one theory. It could prove to be something entirely different than what they were speculating on and that's what the Columbia accident investigation board, that independent group is sorting through all the facts and evidence to find out what it is, rather than one theory favored over another. Let's let the facts speak for what ultimately led to this and then let's make a determination afterwards as to where the judgment should have resided and exactly what could have occurred differently.
ZAHN: So based on these trail of e-mails, you think the appropriate decision was made to allow Columbia to reenter in spite of the number of concerns expressed about the vulnerability of its left wing?
O'KEEFE: It appears that way because, again, they looked at the substantial body of evidence, came to a determination that based on all that information and without any sensors indicating a single problem on the Columbia during the course of that time, there was nothing that would suggest to them that any of the hypothets, any of the what if scenarios were likely to be a condition.
It's hard to go back at this juncture and try to second guess that determination on the part of the engineers and technical folks who look at this throughout the course of an entire 16 day mission. And if something comes forward by the Columbia accident investigation board, in their independent judgment, that would have supported a different view, then that becomes a judgment call and we ought to debate that.
But at this juncture, there is no dominant theory. They're trying to narrow this down to a handful of theories of what were the probable cause or cause of this horrific accident.
ZAHN: You rejected a formal request by the accident board to reassign top agency officials from participating in the investigation and in response to that decision Representative Anthony Wiener had this to say, who is a member of the House Science Committee. He said, "If O'Keefe wanted to give the impression he was more interested in circling the wagons than exposing the truth, he's done everything this week to do that."
Your response?
O'KEEFE: Well, you know, the interpretation here is that what Admiral Gehman and the board asked for is that we substitute some personnel for other folks that are involved in the supporting activity of the investigation rather than simply substitute folks and then come to find later that other people might actually have some material involvement in the operational activity.
What we've done and what Admiral Gehman and the board have agreed to is we're going to restructure our efforts with non-shuttle program management personnel, folks that have not had anything at all to do with the on orbit activity during that operation. And he's viewed that as a positive development. So I'm not sure what other concern would be expressed out there, but he is satisfied, as the board is satisfied, that the approach we're taking now is to, as we transition to this management and systems phase and looking at all the decisions and judgments made by operational personnel, is to remove them and not have them directly involved in the investigative support activity. And that's agreeable to the board and that's certainly the approach we'd like to take, as well.
ZAHN: We've just got 10 seconds left, sir. Was there anything that could have been done now in retrospect to have saved the shuttle?
O'KEEFE: Boy, if we had had any indication that was a confirmed view from any of those 4,000 sensors aboard, we would have poured everything we had into finding a way to avoid this tragedy. The reality is at 8:52 on the morning of Saturday, February the 1st, there was no anomaly that was supported by any of the sensor indications at all.
ZAHN: Sean O'Keefe, chief NASA administrator, thank you for spending some time with us this morning.
We appreciate it.
O'KEEFE: Thank you. Thank you, Paula.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com
Aired March 3, 2003 - 08:15 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: This is amazing. It's really getting fairly bright out there.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yup.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
PAULA ZAHN, CNN ANCHOR: NASA released a videotape on Friday that shows the Columbia astronauts minutes before the shuttle disintegrated, but it does not answer questions about what went so horribly wrong minutes later. We're finding out now that experts debated the risks facing the Columbia for more than five days before its break-up. Despite that, NASA's chief is defending the agency's handling of information prior to the disaster.
And NASA administrator Sean O'Keefe joins us now from Washington to discuss the investigation.
Welcome back, sir.
Thanks for joining us this morning.
SEAN O'KEEFE, NASA ADMINISTRATOR: Good morning, Paula.
How are you?
ZAHN: I'm fine, thanks.
So at what point did you become aware of these what if scenarios being posted in a number of e-mails?
O'KEEFE: Well, in the course of our efforts to gather up all the information and all the facts of what transpired during the course of the 16 day operation, over the course of these last four weeks, we have released all of that upon the determination and finding those facts. And, of course, the Columbia accident investigation board has all that information at their disposal.
And what went on here was what happens in every single flight, which is a consideration of any anomaly, any circumstance, all kinds of what ifs and at the conclusion of that debate that seems to have occurred internally among the engineers and technical folks, was a no safety of flight consideration.
ZAHN: But as you no doubt know, the criticism has been that through a lack of coordination or whatever the reason, those e-mails didn't get to you at the appropriate time.
O'KEEFE: Well, again, whether it had gotten to me or anybody else across-the-board, we would have gone back to the same technical experts, the same engineers, and said in your best judgment, based on your analysis and your examination of all the facts, what do you think the circumstance is and the probabilities of this occurring? And what they concluded at that time was that there was no safety of flight consideration.
Again, this is one theory. It could prove to be something entirely different than what they were speculating on and that's what the Columbia accident investigation board, that independent group is sorting through all the facts and evidence to find out what it is, rather than one theory favored over another. Let's let the facts speak for what ultimately led to this and then let's make a determination afterwards as to where the judgment should have resided and exactly what could have occurred differently.
ZAHN: So based on these trail of e-mails, you think the appropriate decision was made to allow Columbia to reenter in spite of the number of concerns expressed about the vulnerability of its left wing?
O'KEEFE: It appears that way because, again, they looked at the substantial body of evidence, came to a determination that based on all that information and without any sensors indicating a single problem on the Columbia during the course of that time, there was nothing that would suggest to them that any of the hypothets, any of the what if scenarios were likely to be a condition.
It's hard to go back at this juncture and try to second guess that determination on the part of the engineers and technical folks who look at this throughout the course of an entire 16 day mission. And if something comes forward by the Columbia accident investigation board, in their independent judgment, that would have supported a different view, then that becomes a judgment call and we ought to debate that.
But at this juncture, there is no dominant theory. They're trying to narrow this down to a handful of theories of what were the probable cause or cause of this horrific accident.
ZAHN: You rejected a formal request by the accident board to reassign top agency officials from participating in the investigation and in response to that decision Representative Anthony Wiener had this to say, who is a member of the House Science Committee. He said, "If O'Keefe wanted to give the impression he was more interested in circling the wagons than exposing the truth, he's done everything this week to do that."
Your response?
O'KEEFE: Well, you know, the interpretation here is that what Admiral Gehman and the board asked for is that we substitute some personnel for other folks that are involved in the supporting activity of the investigation rather than simply substitute folks and then come to find later that other people might actually have some material involvement in the operational activity.
What we've done and what Admiral Gehman and the board have agreed to is we're going to restructure our efforts with non-shuttle program management personnel, folks that have not had anything at all to do with the on orbit activity during that operation. And he's viewed that as a positive development. So I'm not sure what other concern would be expressed out there, but he is satisfied, as the board is satisfied, that the approach we're taking now is to, as we transition to this management and systems phase and looking at all the decisions and judgments made by operational personnel, is to remove them and not have them directly involved in the investigative support activity. And that's agreeable to the board and that's certainly the approach we'd like to take, as well.
ZAHN: We've just got 10 seconds left, sir. Was there anything that could have been done now in retrospect to have saved the shuttle?
O'KEEFE: Boy, if we had had any indication that was a confirmed view from any of those 4,000 sensors aboard, we would have poured everything we had into finding a way to avoid this tragedy. The reality is at 8:52 on the morning of Saturday, February the 1st, there was no anomaly that was supported by any of the sensor indications at all.
ZAHN: Sean O'Keefe, chief NASA administrator, thank you for spending some time with us this morning.
We appreciate it.
O'KEEFE: Thank you. Thank you, Paula.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com
