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American Morning

Discussion on North Korean Nuclear Standoff

Aired August 29, 2003 - 07:17   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


ANDERSON COOPER, CNN ANCHOR: We want to talk about now -- we want to go to Beijing, where talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program ended today with an agreement to meet again. Now, that consensus was made all the more urgent by a report yesterday saying that Pyongyang plans to prove it is a nuclear power by testing one of its bombs. That's what North Korea apparently said.
Joining us from Washington is Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution. He has written a new book on the stalemate with North Korea titled, "Crisis on the Korean Peninsula."

Michael, thanks for being with us this morning.

First of all, North Korea in these talks apparently said, both to the U.S. privately and later on, that they have nuclear weapons and they'll even test them to prove it. Is that a bluff?

MICHAEL O'HANLON, AUTHOR, "CRISIS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA": It may not be a bluff, Anderson. I think that North Korea feels it has to get our attention, and they are willing to have these talks. They feel like that's a small concession perhaps already, because, of course, as you know, we had six countries involved in these talks, and the North Koreans just wanted to talk to us.

So, they're going to make sure they don't come across as too soft and too weak. And they're going to make sure that they grab our attention and make us worry about what might come next if we don't expand our current position or our current offer beyond what it already is.

COOPER: Do you think -- I mean, is the U.S. offering anything? I mean, is there a policy? What are we offering to North Korea?

O'HANLON: We're not offering much. We're essentially saying to North Korea, listen, you're the problem, you broke the deal back in '94 that said you couldn't have nuclear weapons. That's also a well- established international principle. You've got to get rid of your nuclear weapons first, and then all things are possible.

The North Koreans are thinking, at least I think they're thinking, listen, we don't have much besides our nuclear weapons to get people's attention, and we tried to have this deal before back in '94 that promised a lot of economic and diplomatic benefits somewhere down the road. They never really happened. We've got to use our nuclear weapons to get more. If we're going to give them up, we've got to get more first. COOPER: You know, they come out and they make this bellicose statement, and then the Bush administration is basically downplaying it, saying, you know, this is all just part of the process. The North Koreans often say things like this, often say things which aren't true. Is that simply because Washington really doesn't have many options other than to downplay this?

O'HANLON: Yes, I think Mr. Bush is right in a narrow sense not to get too worked up about any one particular North Korean statement, because they are prone to bluster and brinkmanship.

On the other hand, President Bush needs a serious strategy, and waiting for the North Koreans to give up their nuclear weapons first is just not going to cut it. We've got to demand more of them and offer more. It doesn't have to be giving in to blackmail.

If we try to force them to change much of their regime, cut their conventional military forces, reform their economy, reform their human rights practices, do all of that as a condition for aid and for trade benefits and diplomatic ties, that's the sort of deal we need to offer. Because that's not giving in to blackmail, and yet it offers some kind of potential for progress here.

COOPER: But...

O'HANLON: Right now, the plan we've got doesn't work.

COOPER: But let me ask you, I mean, if North Korea goes ahead and declares themselves a nuclear power, does that paint the United States into a corner? I ask this because earlier in the year both the U.S. and South Korea put forward a joint statement saying that they would not tolerate a nuclear North Korea.

O'HANLON: That's right. We cannot tolerate a nuclear North Korea. We would be painted into a corner. However, we can always walk the North Korean's back. The fact that they have tested a nuclear weapon doesn't mean they have to keep nuclear weapons forever. They could actually get rid of all of their nuclear material. And even if the knowledge still exists somewhere in North Korean minds about how to build a nuclear weapon, it wouldn't matter if they didn't have the means to build any more.

So, as long as we can verifiably tell they've given up all of their nuclear materials -- their plutonium or whatever highly-enriched uranium they might have produced -- we can live with that deal. But we're nowhere near in getting to that point just yet.

COOPER: All right, Michael O'Hanlon from Brookings, thanks very much.

O'HANLON: My pleasure.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com.







Aired August 29, 2003 - 07:17   ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
ANDERSON COOPER, CNN ANCHOR: We want to talk about now -- we want to go to Beijing, where talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program ended today with an agreement to meet again. Now, that consensus was made all the more urgent by a report yesterday saying that Pyongyang plans to prove it is a nuclear power by testing one of its bombs. That's what North Korea apparently said.
Joining us from Washington is Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution. He has written a new book on the stalemate with North Korea titled, "Crisis on the Korean Peninsula."

Michael, thanks for being with us this morning.

First of all, North Korea in these talks apparently said, both to the U.S. privately and later on, that they have nuclear weapons and they'll even test them to prove it. Is that a bluff?

MICHAEL O'HANLON, AUTHOR, "CRISIS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA": It may not be a bluff, Anderson. I think that North Korea feels it has to get our attention, and they are willing to have these talks. They feel like that's a small concession perhaps already, because, of course, as you know, we had six countries involved in these talks, and the North Koreans just wanted to talk to us.

So, they're going to make sure they don't come across as too soft and too weak. And they're going to make sure that they grab our attention and make us worry about what might come next if we don't expand our current position or our current offer beyond what it already is.

COOPER: Do you think -- I mean, is the U.S. offering anything? I mean, is there a policy? What are we offering to North Korea?

O'HANLON: We're not offering much. We're essentially saying to North Korea, listen, you're the problem, you broke the deal back in '94 that said you couldn't have nuclear weapons. That's also a well- established international principle. You've got to get rid of your nuclear weapons first, and then all things are possible.

The North Koreans are thinking, at least I think they're thinking, listen, we don't have much besides our nuclear weapons to get people's attention, and we tried to have this deal before back in '94 that promised a lot of economic and diplomatic benefits somewhere down the road. They never really happened. We've got to use our nuclear weapons to get more. If we're going to give them up, we've got to get more first. COOPER: You know, they come out and they make this bellicose statement, and then the Bush administration is basically downplaying it, saying, you know, this is all just part of the process. The North Koreans often say things like this, often say things which aren't true. Is that simply because Washington really doesn't have many options other than to downplay this?

O'HANLON: Yes, I think Mr. Bush is right in a narrow sense not to get too worked up about any one particular North Korean statement, because they are prone to bluster and brinkmanship.

On the other hand, President Bush needs a serious strategy, and waiting for the North Koreans to give up their nuclear weapons first is just not going to cut it. We've got to demand more of them and offer more. It doesn't have to be giving in to blackmail.

If we try to force them to change much of their regime, cut their conventional military forces, reform their economy, reform their human rights practices, do all of that as a condition for aid and for trade benefits and diplomatic ties, that's the sort of deal we need to offer. Because that's not giving in to blackmail, and yet it offers some kind of potential for progress here.

COOPER: But...

O'HANLON: Right now, the plan we've got doesn't work.

COOPER: But let me ask you, I mean, if North Korea goes ahead and declares themselves a nuclear power, does that paint the United States into a corner? I ask this because earlier in the year both the U.S. and South Korea put forward a joint statement saying that they would not tolerate a nuclear North Korea.

O'HANLON: That's right. We cannot tolerate a nuclear North Korea. We would be painted into a corner. However, we can always walk the North Korean's back. The fact that they have tested a nuclear weapon doesn't mean they have to keep nuclear weapons forever. They could actually get rid of all of their nuclear material. And even if the knowledge still exists somewhere in North Korean minds about how to build a nuclear weapon, it wouldn't matter if they didn't have the means to build any more.

So, as long as we can verifiably tell they've given up all of their nuclear materials -- their plutonium or whatever highly-enriched uranium they might have produced -- we can live with that deal. But we're nowhere near in getting to that point just yet.

COOPER: All right, Michael O'Hanlon from Brookings, thanks very much.

O'HANLON: My pleasure.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com.