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American Morning
Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas Blames Israel for Collapse of Cease-Fire
Aired September 04, 2003 - 07:31 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
SOLEDAD O'BRIEN, CNN ANCHOR: Now to the Middle East. In a fiery speech before Palestinian lawmakers, this morning Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas blamed Israel for the collapse of the cease- fire and while he admitted his dealings with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat are tense, he called on the U.S. to end its political isolation of Arafat.
CNN's Michael Holmes joins us live from Ramallah with more this morning -- Michael, good morning.
MICHAEL HOLMES, CNN CORRESPONDENT: Hi, Soledad.
Yes, indeed, it was a fiery speech. He had a lot to say and he certainly got a lot off his chest. He did blame Israel for the collapse of the hudna, or cease-fire, saying that Israeli military actions in the West Bank before that West Jerusalem bus bombing had helped bring about the end of the cease-fire and had provoked militants. He also, as you pointed out, called, significantly, perhaps, given the rift between he and Yasser Arafat, he called on the U.S. to stop trying to isolate the Palestinian president, saying that he had a role to play.
Now, he also called on Israel to talk, to carry out its side of the road map. He said that the Palestinian side, in his words, "embraced the road map" and were keen to get it back on track. And, indeed, Saeb Erakat, the former Palestinian chief negotiator, is once more in that position. He told me just a few minutes ago he plans on calling Israel as soon as possible to try to get something salvaged from what's left of the road map -- Soledad.
O'BRIEN: All right, well, what impact could all of this have on the road map to peace?
Joining me now, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
He is the author of a new book called "Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises.
Nice to see you.
Good morning, Dr. Kissinger.
HENRY KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE: Good to be here.
O'BRIEN: Thanks for joining us. The first you talk about in your book is 1973, Israel is attacked by Egypt and Syria in the Yom Kippur War. Thirty years later, much has changed, and yet there are many similarities. Give me a sense of the differences now.
KISSINGER: Well, the passions are still the same. In many ways they are greater. The differences are that the conflicts that were between states, the biggest threat to peace now is from terrorist groups, which existed, but not to anything like the extent that they do today. So the sort of killing of civilians was not going on at that time. It was to be in a military unit. The war was between military units.
At that time, the Soviet Union was a major player in the Middle East, pouring arms into the region. Today, there's no outside supplier of the radical forces. They have to get it from wherever they can.
O'BRIEN: At that time, America was very invested, as well, in a very fragile peace. So do you think now that the road map to peace is dead, as we have heard Arafat say?
KISSINGER: Well, the road map is sort of a set of general statements, which by themselves don't mean much. But they give each side an excuse to enter negotiations. I think that the objective conditions for negotiations still exist, strangely enough, mostly in the fact that both parties have suffered so much in the last 30 years that they are reaching a point of exhaustion.
But there are a number of fundamental issues that they don't seem to be able to get across. The Palestinians find it very hard to accept the state of Israel's existence. The Israelis find it very hard to accept the fact that in any settlement they will have to give up some of the settlements they made on the West Bank.
Those are the two big issues.
O'BRIEN: How much of a role does the infighting that Michael Holmes was just talking about between Arafat and Abbas, how much of a role does that play in lack of movement towards peace?
KISSINGER: Oh, it plays some role. I don't think one can deal with the Palestinian issue by inventing a leader who then is supposed to replace Arafat, because that has been proved it's not going to work fully. What I believe will have to happen eventually, and probably will happen, is that a group of moderate Arab states -- Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, maybe Morocco -- will assume responsibility for the substance of the Palestinian negotiations so that the leaders in this strife-torn Gaza don't have to be the ones that face all the mobs by themselves, but that it becomes some sort of a joint Arab responsibility.
O'BRIEN: So when Mahmoud Abbas says that the U.S. has to end its policy of isolating Arafat, you agree with that?
KISSINGER: I think that Arafat will be a player whether we isolate him or not, and that has been proved now. I agree with the criticisms people make of Arafat. He's been tricky and -- but that's been his way of surviving.
O'BRIEN: One thing I found so fascinating in the transcripts in your book, which is a series of transcripts, because you were essentially on the phone consistently through the two crises, how much you relied on the U.N. in what was going on behind-the-scenes.
So are you surprised, then, that when we talk about Iraq, to sort of change gears a little bit, that the U.N. seems to be sidelined so much?
KISSINGER: Well, I used the U.N. to pass information around because that's the easiest way to get the word around. And the U.N. had some observers in the region. But this was a special circumstance.
O'BRIEN: It seemed you had a very good relationship with the U.N. I mean the communication was excellent.
KISSINGER: I had a good relationship with the U.N., but the conditions were somewhat different. The reason the administration as so reluctant to get the U.N. involved at first has to go back to February and March, when our closest allies were attempting to isolate us at the U.N. and we had a very difficult experience with allies working against the United States and the secretary general playing a somewhat ambiguous role.
So I can understand why, in the middle of the war, the administration felt they couldn't get the U.N. involved. And I understand now and agree that they want to get it involved now, because it is impossible for the United States alone to take the international responsibility for governing an area in the middle of the Arab world. It is better to spread that part of the responsibility, even when we retain the fighting responsibility.
O'BRIEN: Dr. Henry Kissinger, it's nice to have you this morning. Thank you so much.
KISSINGER: Always good to be here.
O'BRIEN: And I have to tell you, I loved your book, "Crisis."
KISSINGER: Thank you.
O'BRIEN: It's wonderful, I think, for any student of history. Really a terrific read.
KISSINGER: Thank you.
O'BRIEN: Appreciate it.
KISSINGER: Good to be here.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com
Cease-Fire>
Aired September 4, 2003 - 07:31 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
SOLEDAD O'BRIEN, CNN ANCHOR: Now to the Middle East. In a fiery speech before Palestinian lawmakers, this morning Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas blamed Israel for the collapse of the cease- fire and while he admitted his dealings with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat are tense, he called on the U.S. to end its political isolation of Arafat.
CNN's Michael Holmes joins us live from Ramallah with more this morning -- Michael, good morning.
MICHAEL HOLMES, CNN CORRESPONDENT: Hi, Soledad.
Yes, indeed, it was a fiery speech. He had a lot to say and he certainly got a lot off his chest. He did blame Israel for the collapse of the hudna, or cease-fire, saying that Israeli military actions in the West Bank before that West Jerusalem bus bombing had helped bring about the end of the cease-fire and had provoked militants. He also, as you pointed out, called, significantly, perhaps, given the rift between he and Yasser Arafat, he called on the U.S. to stop trying to isolate the Palestinian president, saying that he had a role to play.
Now, he also called on Israel to talk, to carry out its side of the road map. He said that the Palestinian side, in his words, "embraced the road map" and were keen to get it back on track. And, indeed, Saeb Erakat, the former Palestinian chief negotiator, is once more in that position. He told me just a few minutes ago he plans on calling Israel as soon as possible to try to get something salvaged from what's left of the road map -- Soledad.
O'BRIEN: All right, well, what impact could all of this have on the road map to peace?
Joining me now, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
He is the author of a new book called "Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises.
Nice to see you.
Good morning, Dr. Kissinger.
HENRY KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE: Good to be here.
O'BRIEN: Thanks for joining us. The first you talk about in your book is 1973, Israel is attacked by Egypt and Syria in the Yom Kippur War. Thirty years later, much has changed, and yet there are many similarities. Give me a sense of the differences now.
KISSINGER: Well, the passions are still the same. In many ways they are greater. The differences are that the conflicts that were between states, the biggest threat to peace now is from terrorist groups, which existed, but not to anything like the extent that they do today. So the sort of killing of civilians was not going on at that time. It was to be in a military unit. The war was between military units.
At that time, the Soviet Union was a major player in the Middle East, pouring arms into the region. Today, there's no outside supplier of the radical forces. They have to get it from wherever they can.
O'BRIEN: At that time, America was very invested, as well, in a very fragile peace. So do you think now that the road map to peace is dead, as we have heard Arafat say?
KISSINGER: Well, the road map is sort of a set of general statements, which by themselves don't mean much. But they give each side an excuse to enter negotiations. I think that the objective conditions for negotiations still exist, strangely enough, mostly in the fact that both parties have suffered so much in the last 30 years that they are reaching a point of exhaustion.
But there are a number of fundamental issues that they don't seem to be able to get across. The Palestinians find it very hard to accept the state of Israel's existence. The Israelis find it very hard to accept the fact that in any settlement they will have to give up some of the settlements they made on the West Bank.
Those are the two big issues.
O'BRIEN: How much of a role does the infighting that Michael Holmes was just talking about between Arafat and Abbas, how much of a role does that play in lack of movement towards peace?
KISSINGER: Oh, it plays some role. I don't think one can deal with the Palestinian issue by inventing a leader who then is supposed to replace Arafat, because that has been proved it's not going to work fully. What I believe will have to happen eventually, and probably will happen, is that a group of moderate Arab states -- Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, maybe Morocco -- will assume responsibility for the substance of the Palestinian negotiations so that the leaders in this strife-torn Gaza don't have to be the ones that face all the mobs by themselves, but that it becomes some sort of a joint Arab responsibility.
O'BRIEN: So when Mahmoud Abbas says that the U.S. has to end its policy of isolating Arafat, you agree with that?
KISSINGER: I think that Arafat will be a player whether we isolate him or not, and that has been proved now. I agree with the criticisms people make of Arafat. He's been tricky and -- but that's been his way of surviving.
O'BRIEN: One thing I found so fascinating in the transcripts in your book, which is a series of transcripts, because you were essentially on the phone consistently through the two crises, how much you relied on the U.N. in what was going on behind-the-scenes.
So are you surprised, then, that when we talk about Iraq, to sort of change gears a little bit, that the U.N. seems to be sidelined so much?
KISSINGER: Well, I used the U.N. to pass information around because that's the easiest way to get the word around. And the U.N. had some observers in the region. But this was a special circumstance.
O'BRIEN: It seemed you had a very good relationship with the U.N. I mean the communication was excellent.
KISSINGER: I had a good relationship with the U.N., but the conditions were somewhat different. The reason the administration as so reluctant to get the U.N. involved at first has to go back to February and March, when our closest allies were attempting to isolate us at the U.N. and we had a very difficult experience with allies working against the United States and the secretary general playing a somewhat ambiguous role.
So I can understand why, in the middle of the war, the administration felt they couldn't get the U.N. involved. And I understand now and agree that they want to get it involved now, because it is impossible for the United States alone to take the international responsibility for governing an area in the middle of the Arab world. It is better to spread that part of the responsibility, even when we retain the fighting responsibility.
O'BRIEN: Dr. Henry Kissinger, it's nice to have you this morning. Thank you so much.
KISSINGER: Always good to be here.
O'BRIEN: And I have to tell you, I loved your book, "Crisis."
KISSINGER: Thank you.
O'BRIEN: It's wonderful, I think, for any student of history. Really a terrific read.
KISSINGER: Thank you.
O'BRIEN: Appreciate it.
KISSINGER: Good to be here.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com
Cease-Fire>
