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American Morning

Interview with Former U.N. Weapons Inspector Terence Taylor

Aired January 26, 2004 - 08:14   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


SOLEDAD O'BRIEN, CNN ANCHOR: Just days after quitting his job as the top U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq, David Kay says his group found no evidence that Iraq had stockpiled weapons of mass destruction before the war. Kay believes the intelligence community failed the president by concluding that banned weapons did exist.
Joining us this morning from Washington, D.C. with his reaction is former United Nations weapons inspector Terence Taylor.

Nice to see you, Mr. Taylor.

Thanks for being with us.

TERENCE TAYLOR, FORMER UNITED NATIONS WEAPONS INSPECTOR: Good morning.

O'BRIEN: Well, we heard David Kay on National Public Radio. Really, he indicated that intelligence was the biggest issue and used the word failures of the CIA. Totally points the fingers at the CIA.

Do you think it's clear to you that the CIA made major massive mistakes in this area?

TAYLOR: Well, certainly there were important errors in the intelligence assessments, it seems. I think there was a lack of awareness of the state of disorganization within Iraq, within the regime, at least that's what one can conclude from Dr. Kay's remarks. And so there was a, if you like, an over emphasis on production and so on, which clearly wasn't taking place.

And even within the regime, I think there was an attempt, it seems, to deceive Saddam Hussein himself that programs were making more progress than they really were.

So it's not surprising that the intelligence services picked up evidence which perhaps might not have been true in the end.

O'BRIEN: The picture, in fact, that David Kay paints is pretty amazing, a regime in complete chaos. Scientists, as you mentioned, who had gotten so dishonest that they were talking about and getting funding for weapons programs that they weren't working on at all, just funneling the money away. Saddam Hussein had become so unilaterally in charge of the weapons program that he wasn't getting any kind of input from anybody else and working on his novel, apparently, on the side at the same time.

At the same time, isn't this something that the CIA, whose job it is to be able to under cover this kind of chaos and see what's actually happening in the regime, isn't this something that they should have been able to see?

TAYLOR: It should have been. I think what they lacked were human intelligence resources, reliable ones within Iraq itself, and I think that's the only way one could have uncovered this kind of activity, or lack of activity, going on. They had become heavily reliant on the U.N. inspection information that was coming in during the 1990s, which was understandable in a way. And I think judgments and assessments were based on that U.N. information.

We have to remember that Dr. Kay did say there were continuing programs. He spoke about a continuing effort to research, develop and produce ricin, a biological warfare agent.

So it's not that there was absolutely nothing going on. But there were not, I think his assessment is, there were no significant or large stockpiles of operational munitions. That's what he's really saying now.

O'BRIEN: Secretary of State Colin Powell says that these words from David Kay actually do not undercut the administration's rationale for going to war.

Do you agree with that?

TAYLOR: Well, I think what one could say is that the Iraqi regime had not met the requirements of the U.N. resolution, the Security Council Resolution 1441 -- that's the last one before the war took place -- where Iraq had not met its obligations. And I think from what Dr. Kay is saying, that is certainly the case, because there were continuing efforts.

What seems to be clear now, or what's becoming clear, because we don't yet know the full story, is there were not large stockpiles of operational weapons. That's really the key issue now, not that there was nothing going on. So I think it was clear that Iraq was in breach of that key U.N. Security Council resolution.

O'BRIEN: David Kay indicated that he quit because of funding issues and a waning commitment, he felt, on the part of the administration.

What do you think this means for Charles Duelfer, who is coming in now to take over David Kay's role?

TAYLOR: Well, if that's true, I mean Charles Duelfer has a tough job to do. I think Dr. Kay's complaint, it seems, was that because of the pressure of the insurgency that the Department of Defense, the military commanders diverted resources to deal with that absolute immediate problem. So in a sense it's understandable. But, of course, it wouldn't help Dr. Kay complete his job. And it would seem important now to have the adequate resources to clear up the issue. We need to know about the history of this program in order to understand what has happened in order that we can make a true assessment of how and why intelligence failures occurred. Because we don't know that yet. We don't yet know the full story.

O'BRIEN: Terence Taylor is a former U.N. weapons inspector, joining us this morning.

Mr. Taylor, thank you.

TAYLOR: My pleasure.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com





Taylor>


Aired January 26, 2004 - 08:14   ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
SOLEDAD O'BRIEN, CNN ANCHOR: Just days after quitting his job as the top U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq, David Kay says his group found no evidence that Iraq had stockpiled weapons of mass destruction before the war. Kay believes the intelligence community failed the president by concluding that banned weapons did exist.
Joining us this morning from Washington, D.C. with his reaction is former United Nations weapons inspector Terence Taylor.

Nice to see you, Mr. Taylor.

Thanks for being with us.

TERENCE TAYLOR, FORMER UNITED NATIONS WEAPONS INSPECTOR: Good morning.

O'BRIEN: Well, we heard David Kay on National Public Radio. Really, he indicated that intelligence was the biggest issue and used the word failures of the CIA. Totally points the fingers at the CIA.

Do you think it's clear to you that the CIA made major massive mistakes in this area?

TAYLOR: Well, certainly there were important errors in the intelligence assessments, it seems. I think there was a lack of awareness of the state of disorganization within Iraq, within the regime, at least that's what one can conclude from Dr. Kay's remarks. And so there was a, if you like, an over emphasis on production and so on, which clearly wasn't taking place.

And even within the regime, I think there was an attempt, it seems, to deceive Saddam Hussein himself that programs were making more progress than they really were.

So it's not surprising that the intelligence services picked up evidence which perhaps might not have been true in the end.

O'BRIEN: The picture, in fact, that David Kay paints is pretty amazing, a regime in complete chaos. Scientists, as you mentioned, who had gotten so dishonest that they were talking about and getting funding for weapons programs that they weren't working on at all, just funneling the money away. Saddam Hussein had become so unilaterally in charge of the weapons program that he wasn't getting any kind of input from anybody else and working on his novel, apparently, on the side at the same time.

At the same time, isn't this something that the CIA, whose job it is to be able to under cover this kind of chaos and see what's actually happening in the regime, isn't this something that they should have been able to see?

TAYLOR: It should have been. I think what they lacked were human intelligence resources, reliable ones within Iraq itself, and I think that's the only way one could have uncovered this kind of activity, or lack of activity, going on. They had become heavily reliant on the U.N. inspection information that was coming in during the 1990s, which was understandable in a way. And I think judgments and assessments were based on that U.N. information.

We have to remember that Dr. Kay did say there were continuing programs. He spoke about a continuing effort to research, develop and produce ricin, a biological warfare agent.

So it's not that there was absolutely nothing going on. But there were not, I think his assessment is, there were no significant or large stockpiles of operational munitions. That's what he's really saying now.

O'BRIEN: Secretary of State Colin Powell says that these words from David Kay actually do not undercut the administration's rationale for going to war.

Do you agree with that?

TAYLOR: Well, I think what one could say is that the Iraqi regime had not met the requirements of the U.N. resolution, the Security Council Resolution 1441 -- that's the last one before the war took place -- where Iraq had not met its obligations. And I think from what Dr. Kay is saying, that is certainly the case, because there were continuing efforts.

What seems to be clear now, or what's becoming clear, because we don't yet know the full story, is there were not large stockpiles of operational weapons. That's really the key issue now, not that there was nothing going on. So I think it was clear that Iraq was in breach of that key U.N. Security Council resolution.

O'BRIEN: David Kay indicated that he quit because of funding issues and a waning commitment, he felt, on the part of the administration.

What do you think this means for Charles Duelfer, who is coming in now to take over David Kay's role?

TAYLOR: Well, if that's true, I mean Charles Duelfer has a tough job to do. I think Dr. Kay's complaint, it seems, was that because of the pressure of the insurgency that the Department of Defense, the military commanders diverted resources to deal with that absolute immediate problem. So in a sense it's understandable. But, of course, it wouldn't help Dr. Kay complete his job. And it would seem important now to have the adequate resources to clear up the issue. We need to know about the history of this program in order to understand what has happened in order that we can make a true assessment of how and why intelligence failures occurred. Because we don't know that yet. We don't yet know the full story.

O'BRIEN: Terence Taylor is a former U.N. weapons inspector, joining us this morning.

Mr. Taylor, thank you.

TAYLOR: My pleasure.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com





Taylor>