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The Situation Room
Senate Hearing on Worldwide Threats with Trump Intel Officials; Lawmakers Question top Trump Intel Officials About Iran War; Gabbard Questioned About Foreign Threats to Midterm Elections. Aired 10:30-11a ET
Aired March 18, 2026 - 10:30 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
[10:30:00]
TULSI GABBARD, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: Since January, U.S. officials have only had a handful of encounters at our borders with individuals associated with terrorist groups. This is a positive trend, however, our interagency coordinated efforts to continue to identify, locate, and remove known or suspected terrorists who may already be in the United States continues with vigilance.
In 2025, there were at least three Islamist terrorist attacks in the United States. Law enforcement disrupted at least 15 U.S.-based Islamist terrorist plotters. Roughly half of last year's disrupted plotters had some online contact with Islamist terrorists inspired by Islamist foreign terrorist organizations abroad. For example, in the recent attempt to attack a synagogue in Michigan, the shooter had familial ties to a Hezbollah leader.
Al Qaeda and ISIS pose the biggest threat to U.S. interests overseas in parts of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, where these groups operate. In the Middle East, AQAP in Yemen, ISIS-K in South Asia, and ISIS in Syria are among the most likely groups conducting external plotting. ISIS in Syria is likely seeking to rebuild its ranks, expand support networks, and solicit funds by reengaging with and recruiting from the likely hundreds of ISIS detainees, and thousands of ISIS-linked women and children who were either released or escaped from prisons and displaced person camps that were previously run by the Syrian Democratic Forces in northeast Syria.
Meanwhile, state actors present a risk broader in scope by seeking new capabilities in kinetic and cyber warfare. The United States' secure nuclear deterrent continues to ensure safety in the homeland against strategic threats. However, the Intelligence Community assesses that Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan have been researching and developing an array of novel, advanced, or traditional missile delivery systems with nuclear and conventional payloads that put our homeland within range.
The IC assesses that threats to the homeland will expand collectively to more than 16,000 missiles by 2035, from the current assessed figure of more than 3,000 missiles. The IC assesses that China and Russia are developing advanced delivery systems meant to be capable of penetrating or bypassing U.S. missile defenses. North Korea's ICBMs can already reach U.S. soil, and the IC assesses that it is committed to expanding its nuclear arsenal. Pakistan's long-range ballistic missile development potentially could include ICBMs with a range capable of striking the homeland.
The IC assesses that Iran has previously demonstrated space launch and other technology it could use to begin to develop a militarily viable ICBM before 2035, should Tehran attempt to pursue that capability. However, these assessments will clearly be updated as the full impact of Operation Epic Fury's devastating strikes on Iran's missile production facilities, stockpiles, and launch capabilities is determined. These nations collectively will likely seek to understand U.S. plans for advanced missile defense for the homeland, probably for the purpose of shaping their own missile development programs and assessing U.S. intentions regarding deterrence.
Shifting to the cyber domain, the IC assesses that China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and non-state ransomware groups will continue to seek to compromise U.S. government and private sector networks, as well as critical infrastructure, to collect intelligence, create options for future disruption, and for financial gain. The IC assesses that China and Russia present the most persistent and active threats and are continuing their R&D efforts.
North Korea's cyber program is sophisticated and agile. In 2025 alone, North Korea's cryptocurrency heist probably stole $2 billion, which the IC assesses is helping to fund the regime and include further development of its strategic weapons programs. Financially or ideologically motivated non-state actors are becoming more bold, with ransomware groups shifting to faster high-volume attacks that are harder to identify and mitigate.
Innovation in the field of artificial intelligence will likely accelerate these threats in the cyber domain. The IC assesses that it will increasingly shape cyber operations with both cyber operators and defenders using these tools to improve their speed and effectiveness. For example, in August of 2025, cyber actors used an A.I. tool to conduct a data extortion operation against international government, health care, and public health emergency service sectors, as well as religious institutions.
Moving to the Arctic, the IC assesses that Russia, and to a lesser extent China, aim to strengthen their presence in the region through increased maritime trade, natural resource extraction, and military activity. Russia, which has the longest coastline in the Arctic, has long sought recognition of its polar great power status and is deploying more military forces in building new permanent infrastructure.
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China, though not an Arctic country, is engaged in more limited efforts in the region to advance its own strategic and economic interests. The IC assesses that China is the most capable competitor in the field of artificial intelligence. The IC assesses that A.I. technology is the most advanced in the field of artificial intelligence. The IC assesses that A.I. capabilities are rapidly advancing and changing the threat landscape. As this is a defining technology that enables computers and machines to simulate human learning comprehension, problem solving, creativity, and autonomy, it will be critical to ensure that humans remain in control of how A.I. is used and of the machines that may threaten to autonomously violate the interests of the American people across all domains. A.I. adoption at scale across the spectrum of usage poses serious risks. A.I. has the potential to aid in weapons and systems design and has been used in recent conflicts to influence targeting and streamline decision making, underscoring the risk and likely threats that could manifest on the battlefield.
Early developers in quantum computers will give countries an extraordinary technological advantage over others to quickly process national security information and break current encryption methodology used to protect sensitive finance, healthcare, and government information. The global security landscape is volatile and complex, with armed conflict growing more common and posing potential threats against U.S. interests. Strategic competition and regional and smaller powers are becoming more willing to use force to pursue their interests, heightening the risk of conflict.
The IC assesses the space domain is becoming increasingly contested, with China and Russia developing counter space capabilities to challenge U.S. space efforts. The threat of nuclear proliferation and advancing chemical and biological warfare capabilities continues to grow.
I'll turn now to our neighborhood in the Western Hemisphere, where flagging economies, high crime rates, pervasive organized crime, migration flows, corruption, narcotics trafficking, all of these present a spectrum of risks to U.S. interests and where strategic competitors seek to gain greater influence in the region.
The IC assesses that Latin America and the Caribbean almost certainly will see hot spots of volatility in the coming year. Since Maduro's arrest, the IC assesses a shift in Venezuela's leadership towards cooperating with the U.S. to open its economy, to develop the country's oil and gas extraction capability, and we've seen their movement in releasing political prisoners. The U.S.-Mexico-Canada agreement review in 2026 will likely increase uncertainty in many Latin American countries, especially those that rely on Mexico as an export destination for intermediate goods for manufacture and onward export to the U.S. China, Russia, and Iran are likely seeking to sustain economic, political, and military engagement with Latin America.
The IC assesses that China's demand for raw materials is likely to continue to drive its economic outreach, while Russia likely wants to expand its current security and diplomatic ties with Cuba and Nicaragua. The IC assesses that China aims to elevate its own political, economic, military, and technological power to increase its own regional positioning and global influence to fend off threats to their interests. While there are challenging areas where interests diverge, President Trump's diplomatic engagements with President Xi to work towards U.S. interests have enabled progress where those interests align. The IC assesses that China continues to rapidly modernize its military forces across all domains in pursuit of its goal to achieve world- class status by mid-century. This includes building a force with the aim of being capable of deterring U.S. and allied forces in the region, and to achieve their stated objective of developing the ability to seize Taiwan by force if necessary. However, the IC assesses that China likely prefers to set the conditions for an eventual peaceful reunification with Taiwan short of conflict.
The IC assesses that an increasingly confident North Korean regime remains a source of concern regionally and globally. Its weapons of mass destruction, its conventional military capabilities, illicit cyber activities, and demonstrated willingness to use asymmetric capabilities poses a threat to U.S. and its allies, particularly South Korea and Japan. North Korea's partnership with Russia is growing, and in 2025, Kim took steps to improve ties with China, still North Korea's most important trading partner and economic benefactor.
The IC assesses that North Korea's support for Russia in the war against Ukraine has increased North Korea's capabilities as their forces have gained combat experience in 21st century warfare, along with equipment.
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In 2024, North Korea deployed more than 11,000 troops to Russia to support combat operations in Kursk. Pyongyang continues to develop and expand its strategic weapons programs, including missiles that can evade U.S. and regional missile defenses. It is continuing to work to increase its nuclear warhead stockpile and maintains biological and chemical weapons capabilities.
Russia retains the capability to selectively challenge U.S. interests globally by military and non-military means. The IC assesses that the most dangerous threat posed by Russia to the U.S. is the potential of an escalatory spiral in an ongoing conflict, such as Ukraine, or a new conflict that led to direct hostilities, including the potential deployment of nuclear weapons.
The IC assesses that Putin continues to invest in Russia's defense industrial base, as well as novel capabilities that may pose a greater threat to the U.S. homeland and forces abroad than conventional weapons. Russia has advanced systems, hypersonic missiles, and undersea capabilities designed to negate U.S. military advantage. Moscow also relies on other tools to exert pressure, using gray zone tactics to further its goals and compete below the level of armed conflict.
Russia is also building an extensive counter-space capabilities to contest U.S. space dominance. Its development of a nuclear counter- space weapon poses the greatest single threat to the world's space architecture. During the past year, the IC assesses that Russia has maintained the upper hand in the war against Ukraine. U.S.-led negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv are ongoing. Until such an agreement is met, Moscow is likely to continue fighting a slow war of attrition until they view their objectives have been achieved. In the Middle East, conflict and instability will shape security, political, and economic dynamics in a variety of ways. The IC assesses that Operation Epic Fury is advancing fundamental change in the region that began with Hamas' attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and continued with the 12-day war last year, resulting in weakening Iran and its proxies. The IC assesses the regime in Iran appears to be intact but largely degraded due to attacks on its leadership and military capabilities. Its conventional military power projection capabilities have largely been destroyed, leaving limited options.
Iran's strategic position has been significantly degraded. The U.S.- led maximum pressure campaign and snapback of European sanctions added additional pressure to an already bleak Iranian economy, resulting in mass protests earlier this year that Tehran suppressed by killing thousands of protesters. Even if the regime remains intact, the IC assesses that internal tensions are likely to increase as Iran's economy worsens.
Even so, Iran and its proxies continue to attack U.S. and allied interests in the Middle East. The IC assesses that if a hostile regime survives, it will likely seek to begin a years-long effort to rebuild its military, missiles, and UAV forces. Prior to Operation Epic Fury, the IC assesses Iran was trying to recover from the severe damage to its nuclear infrastructure sustained during the 12-day war and continued to refuse to comply with its nuclear obligations with the IAEA, refusing them access to key facilities.
The IC assesses that China, Russia, and North Korea see the United States as a strategic competitor and potential adversary. Iran has long viewed the U.S. as an adversary and is engaged in active conflict with the U.S. as of today. These four countries, the IC assesses, are likely to continue their selective cooperation with each other, which could bolster their individual capabilities and threats to U.S. interests more broadly.
However, currently these relationships are primarily bilateral on selective issues and depend on broader circumstances, divergent sovereign interests, and in some cases, concerns over directly confronting the United States. These factors, the IC assesses are likely to constrain their relationships.
Finally, conflicts on the continent of Africa are likely to persist through 2026 due to poor governance, economic demands, and external support. Tensions continue between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which could rapidly accelerate to conflict. Contentious national elections in Somalia could distract the federal government away from counterterrorism actions against Al-Shabaab, which continues to conduct terror attacks while providing funding and propaganda support to other elements of Al-Qaeda in Yemen. The civil war in Sudan continues even as external negotiations occur.
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ISIS in West Africa and the Sahel have increased the intensity of their attacks against local security forces, expanding their areas of operation, and moving closer to cities with the U.S. presence. The IC assesses that African governments will likely use their wealth and critical minerals to seek partnerships that deliver them meaningful benefit.
Concurrent conflicts and crises across the continent will continue to put U.S. citizens at risk and cause further instability. In closing, as leaders of the Intelligence Community, we remain committed to providing the President and policymakers with timely, unbiased, relevant intelligence to inform decision-making and to ensure the safety, security, and freedom of the American people. Thank you.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Thank you, Director Gabbard.
WOLF BLITZER, CNN ANCHOR: We're going to continue to monitor this very, very important hearing, an annual hearing on worldwide threats facing the United States right now. She just outlined about a dozen worldwide threats right now. We're going to continue to monitor what's going on. The questioning will begin. We'll take a quick break. Much more of our special coverage right here in the Situation Room after a short break.
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BLITZER: We've been monitoring the Senate Intelligence Committee's annual worldwide threats hearing. It's very important.
PAMELA BROWN, CNN ANCHOR: That's right. Top members of the Trump administration, including Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, FBI Director Kash Patel, and CIA Director John Ratcliffe are there. You see the CIA Director speaking right now.
I want to bring in CNN National Security Analyst and former Deputy Director of National Intelligence Beth Saner, also with us is CNN Military Analyst and retired Air Force Colonel Cedric Leighton.
BLITZER: Beth, what stood out to you so far? Because I know you used to be involved when you worked for the Director of National Intelligence in helping to prepare this kind of annual testimony.
BETH SANNER, CNN NATIONAL SECURITY ANALYST AND FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: Yes. I think one of the things that really struck me was her opening line, that this didn't reflect her personal views. And this was new. She didn't say that last year. And the reason is because she knows the president monitors this, and she knows that some of the things that she said last year and the things that she said this year are not necessarily fully supported of U.S. policy.
BROWN: Yes. Well, and it also comes amid the war in Iran, which she has been public about prior to this, right?
SANNER: Exactly.
BROWN: And her views are very much -- were very much, I should say, I mean, she hasn't said what they are today, but in line with Joe Kent, a top national security official who just resigned yesterday in opposition to the war.
SANNER: Exactly. So, we're going to see, I think, more fireworks. This is the kind of, you know, pablum, boring part, but the fireworks are going to come when she's put on the hot spot about what her views are on, did they brief the president on these things, like was the strait going to be closed, et cetera? Because there are a lot of controversies here, and Joe Kent opened up the Pandora's box.
BROWN: Yes.
BLITZER: All right. Guys, I want to go right back to the hearing of the chairman of this intelligence committee, Tom Cotton, is asking questions now to the guests, to the experts. Let's listen in.
JOHN RATCLIFFE, CIA DIRECTOR: You're right to be concerned about Iran's development of longer-range ballistic missiles, Senator. If Iran were allowed to develop at the IRBM ranges, which is 3,000 kilometers, it would threaten most of Europe, and yes, as you mentioned, we know that Iran is gaining experience in these larger, more powerful booster technologies through its so-called space launch vehicle program.
If left unimpeded, yes, Senator, they would have the ability to range missiles to the continental U.S. It's one of the reasons why degrading Iran's missile production capabilities that is taking place right now in Operation Epic Fury is so important to our national security.
SEN. TOM COTTON (R-AR): Thank you. Vice chairman.
SEN. MARK WARNER (D- VA), VICE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Gabbard, the whole country knows that you were recently involved in a FBI operation to seize ballots in Fulton County, Georgia. Yet this was despite the fact that the warrant showed no foreign interference or nexus. As a matter of fact, the warrant was based entirely on conspiracy theories that have already been examined and rejected repeatedly. Now, where is the authority for you to involve yourself in a domestic law enforcement activity?
GABBARD: Thank you, Vice Chairman. I appreciate the question. As you know, I've addressed every issue you've raised in detail in a letter, but I'm grateful for the opportunity to do it in this forum. As you stated, Congress provided by statute, ODNI, with the responsibility of election security and counterintelligence.
In 2021. As you also know, ODNI has purview --
WARNER: Ma'am, could you -- I know the history very well, but could you just address --
GABBARD: I am addressing the question. ODNI also has purview and overview over two domestic-related agencies, the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI, both of which have purview over election security responsibilities to ensure the integrity of our elections.
I want to correct one of your statements that you've made multiple times, which is false. I did not participate in a law enforcement activity, nor would I, because that does not exist within my authorities.
WARNER: You were present on the scene. Are the photos of you on the scene false?
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GABBARD: I was at Fulton County, sir, at the request of the president, and to work with the FBI to observe this action that had long been awaited. I was not aware of what was in the warrant or was not in the warrant.
WARNER: And what was the president's specific request for you to go to --
GABBARD: -- and to say thank you to the FBI agents --
WARNER: What was the specific request that was made by the president for you to show up in Fulton County?
GABBARD: To go and observe the FBI's activities on this issue.
WARNER: So, why --
GABBARD: When you look at the fort --
WARNER: Do you have the answer why the president was knowing about this affidavit before it was even served?
GABBARD: I'm not aware that the president knew about an affidavit before it was served.
WARNER: Then why was he sending you to Fulton County?
GABBARD: This occurred the day that the FBI had it approved, their warrant approved by a local judge, and they began to execute this. To address your question, sir, about the foreign nexus question. In order for us to better understand the vulnerabilities in our election systems that may exist today, as we look to 2026, and yes, we are very focused on trying to make sure that this election is one that the American people have faith in.
WARNER: Director Gabbard, let me -- I've got a number of questions. Director Gabbard, I have a number of questions. Let me ask my next question, please. You have not provided any of the required reports or briefings to this committee on foreign interference. This is the first threat assessment since 2017 that didn't even mention foreign interference.
Last year, when you were in it was already confirmed. It mentioned it at a high level. Are you saying there is no foreign threat to our elections in the midterms this year?
GABBARD: As I stated in the outset of my remarks, this year's annual threat assessment matches the prioritization of threats and -- WARNER: Please answer the question, yes or no. Is there foreign
threat interference to our elections this year?
GABBARD: -- has laid out.
WARNER: Are there foreign --
GABBARD: Please allow me to answer the question, sir. The Intelligence Community has been and continues to remain focused on any collection and intelligence products that show a potential foreign threat for those who are --
WARNER: So, so far there has been none then because you've made no reports -- excuse me, ma'am. If you want to ask the questions, you should have stayed in Congress. Please answer the questions.
GABBARD: I didn't ask you a question, sir. I'm trying to answer your questions.
WARNER: So, you're saying the failure to provide any reports or the failure to have any mention of a foreign threat assessment, I would draw the conclusion there must be no foreign threat to our elections in 26. So, that brings me a question that I have for both you, ma'am and Director Patel. There are reports that in 2020 the president was preparing an executive order potentially seize ballots or bring in federal forces.
There is a published report that there is a similar EO being drafted right now about 2026 citing China. Director Patel, do you have any knowledge of that draft EO?
KASH PATEL, FBI DIRECTOR: Thank you, Vice Chairman. I do not, sir.
WARNER: Director Gabbard, do you have any?
GABBARD: I do not.
WARNER: Thank you. Let me move to Iran. Now, I understand -- and I appreciated Director Gabbard comments yesterday about agreeing that the president has sole authority, I guess, in his bones to declare whether something is an imminent threat. I didn't agree with your friend, Mr. Kent, but I didn't -- again, I agreed with him yesterday on the fact that there was no imminent threat.
I guess what I'm concerned about one thing is even in your printed testimony today on page six and your last paragraph on page six as a result of Operation Midnight Hammer, Iran's nuclear enrichment program was obliterated. There's been no effort to try to rebuild their enrichment capability. You omitted that paragraph from your oral opening. Was that because the president said there was an imminent threat two weeks ago?
GABBARD: No, sir. I recognized that the time was running long and I skipped through some of the portions --
WARNER: So, you chose to take -- omit -- GABBARD: -- of my oral delivered remarks, sir.
WARNER: You chose to omit the parts that contradict the president. The president continues to say as well that, you know, he had no idea. He was shocked that the Iranians had move to take over the Strait of Hormuz. Did you provide any intelligence that would say that it would be -- that it was not likely that the Iranians would try to move on the Strait?
GABBARD: I'm not aware of those remarks, and I think those of us here at the table can point to the fact that historically the Iranians have always threatened to leverage their controllable --
WARNER: Well, why would the president say he was amazed?
GABBARD: I'm not aware of those remarks.
WARNER: What about the comments the president made that thought that he was surprised, again, reports that Iran struck the adjacent Gulf States?
GABBARD: Again I'm not aware of those remarks. We have been --
WARNER: Well, let ask you this. Did you brief the president? Did you brief the president? Did you brief the president if he starts a war of choice, that the likely result would be that Iran would strike adjacent --
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