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CNN Sunday Morning

Interview With Jeremy Binnie

Aired November 17, 2002 - 08:37   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


MILES O'BRIEN, CNN ANCHOR: If the showdown with Iraq escalates into war, what will the allied forces be facing? Let's get an assessment of Iraq's military. In London for us this morning is Jeremy Binnie. He is the Middle East editor for "Jane's Sentinel." They're out with a fabulous report, which really lays out the capabilities or lack thereof in some cases of Iraq. And in Tucson, our military analyst, General Don Shepperd, to talk about how that interfaces with U.S. capabilities.
I want to begin with you, Mr. Binnie. First of all, that was a fascinating look at Iraq. How much work was involved in just putting this report together and what were your sources?

JEREMY BINNIE, JANE'S SENTINEL: We compile our information from a variety of sources. It is open source information, so information on weapons of mass destruction will come from -- we have based mainly on the U.K.'s government dossier. But also, we take information from Iraqi defectors. That's an excellent source of information. And also, just generally talking to defense people and people who know the political situation in the Middle East as well.

O'BRIEN: All right. Lot of information here. Let's try to run through a little bit of it. We have some graphics to try to support what we're talking about here. First of all, when we talk about the Iraqi armed forces, the military strength right now is estimated to be approximately 350,000. The air force is 30,000, and the navy is 5,000. Now, I think we can pretty much outright discount the navy and the air force as non-players in all this, right?

BINNIE: Well, that's right. They have no navy to speak of, really, in terms of ships. As far as the air force is concerned, if any of the Iraqi jets take off, they would be extremely lucky to return to their bases.

O'BRIEN: Don Shepperd, in 1991, the Iraqi air force sat it out. Is that likely to happen this time? And even if they do fly, are they dead?

GEN. DONALD SHEPPERD (RET)., CNN MILITARY ANALYST: Jeremy's right on. They didn't just sit it out, they fled, many of them to Iraq, with their airplanes. The airplanes didn't...

O'BRIEN: Iran. They went to Iran.

SHEPPERD: Iran, I'm sorry, not Iraq. They fled to Iran and the airplanes have been detained in Iran and not returned. They've had very little flying time. Their spare parts situation due to the embargoes is very low. And we're going to obviously close the bases, try to prevent them from taking off. If they do take off, they will be dead meat very quickly.

O'BRIEN: All right, let's go back and take a little closer look at some of the ground forces here, if we could. You've got several layers of military. You've got the army, the Republican Guards, the Special Republican Guard, the special forces and the popular army. Mr. Binnie, walk us through that. Some of that is paper tiger type forces and some of that is for real, isn't it?

BINNIE: That's right. Basically the way that the Iraqi regime organizes its security is in concentric rings. So on the outside you have the sort of main military, the main -- all the army units, based on conscripts pressed into -- pressed into service. And then you have more increasingly elite units, which are closer to the regime, they are more loyal and they're expected to fight harder for the survival of the regime.

O'BRIEN: At what point, what concentric circle do you have to be before you get the fight to the death kind of guys?

BINNIE: Well, even this time around, the units of the Republican Guard, their loyalty is suspect. So it could come down to the Special Republican Guard. Also, there have been new, more political units formed over recent years and months. These include Saddam's Feddain (ph), Saddam's Men of Sacrifice, who are supposed to be a politically motivated force of thugs, basically. They're also arming the Ba'ath Party. This is the political apparatus which Saddam rules through. It is supposed to be more loyal to Saddam. But by arming these people, then he expects to raise a military force which will be more loyal and defend him to the end.

O'BRIEN: General Shepperd, I remember a decade ago there was an awful lot of talk about this formidable Republican Guard and the concerns that the U.S. had about facing this Iraqi military machine. It's not the same anymore, is it?

SHEPPERD: It is not. And even before, when those were the threats, if you will, the regular Iraqi army was deployed into the field, poorly trained, poorly equipped, poorly fed and watered. They surrendered in hordes. The vaunted Republican Guard, no matter how ferocious they were, could not be loosed very far from Baghdad because they were to protect the inner circle, if you will, of Saddam Hussein.

And I agree with Jeremy, that their loyalty is questionable. You can't take them for granted. But clearly, there's a small core of people who are going to fight to the death around him and those are the ones we're really concerned about.

O'BRIEN: Let's look briefly at the sorts of aircraft they have in their air force. And I only bring this up because I don't think the air force is really a player here. I think both of your gentlemen would agree, but we talk about Mirage F-1s, MiG-29s, MiG-25s. What they have is an awful lot of Soviet era hardware, right, Mr. Binnie?

BINNIE: That's correct.

O'BRIEN: And much of that is in disrepair, hasn't been replenished, hasn't been properly serviced or maintained. And that doesn't go just for the air force. That goes for the ground forces as well, correct?

BINNIE: That goes to everything. All Iraq's military capability, basically, much of their equipment now is either obsolete. And even if -- and whether it's serviceable is deeply questionable, and how much they can actually field, which is going to be of any use in a modern conventional warfare is seriously questionable.

O'BRIEN: All right. And going back briefly, talking about that navy we mentioned, that's -- General Shepperd, I assume the navy is just a complete non-player.

SHEPPERD: It really is, Miles. It's a non-player. They can't do anything, especially against our own navy. They're not a factor.

O'BRIEN: All right. Let's go to the issue that really is the issue which is at the heart and soul of U.S. planning and strategy, coalition strategy. And that is the issue of biological or chemical weapons. This is what really underguards all of the strategy, doesn't it, Mr. Binnie? It's not so much how many tanks, troops, airplanes and ships Saddam Hussein has; it's the question of chemical or biological weapons and whether Saddam Hussein will use them, correct?

BINNIE: I mean, this is going to be a major consideration of any defense planner looking to go into Iraq. The situation with weapons of mass destruction, it's similar to the rest of the conventional military capability in the respect that they lost an awful lot of that capability during the weapons inspections in the 1990s. But Western intelligence agencies do believe that they have a significant capability with which they could do various things with to obstruct and make the job of deposing Saddam Hussein much more difficult.

We don't really know at this stage how dangerous they are, but for example, he will not be able to deliver bombs, chemical weapons using his aircraft, but he might well still be able to use chemical weapons on artillery shells against U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq.

O'BRIEN: All right. And Don Shepperd, looking at the regional map just quickly here, now that we've sort of laid out that Iraqi capability, give us a sense of where the coalition staging points might be. We're obviously talking about Kuwait. We're talking about bases in Turkey. Big question mark still about Saudi Arabia. How crucial is Saudi Arabia toward staging any sort of ground invasion, or for that matter using the Prince Sultan Air Base?

SHEPPERD: Well, Saudi Arabia is critical for all sorts of reasons. They're an important ally. They're important to the world economy, to the world oil supply. And the bases there are very, very convenient, as is their air space.

We've heard that they aren't going to allow us to use that air space and their bases. That may or may not be true. There's a lot that happens in the Mideast that is done but not said publicly for all sorts of political reasons.

I have pretty good confidence that in the end, we will get what we need from the Saudis. We may not be able to bomb from there. Maybe we'll be able to station a refueling aircraft or surveillance aircraft there. I think we'll get what we need from the Saudis. And they are an important factor, even though you do have Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Oman that are other factors there with bases. And you also have the carriers, of course.

O'BRIEN: Mr. Binnie, in a word, we are out of time, is it apt to be a rout?

BINNIE: It's not necessarily a rout. There are various, more asymmetrical, unconventional things that Saddam can do to defend himself. But ultimately there can only be one outcome, if there is a war, and that is Saddam Hussein's destruction.

O'BRIEN: Jeremy Binnie, with "Jane's Sentinel," excellent report. I invite you to try to find your way to that one. It is an excellent assessment of Iraq's military capabilities. General Don Shepperd, as always a pleasure to have you join us from Tucson.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com






Aired November 17, 2002 - 08:37   ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
MILES O'BRIEN, CNN ANCHOR: If the showdown with Iraq escalates into war, what will the allied forces be facing? Let's get an assessment of Iraq's military. In London for us this morning is Jeremy Binnie. He is the Middle East editor for "Jane's Sentinel." They're out with a fabulous report, which really lays out the capabilities or lack thereof in some cases of Iraq. And in Tucson, our military analyst, General Don Shepperd, to talk about how that interfaces with U.S. capabilities.
I want to begin with you, Mr. Binnie. First of all, that was a fascinating look at Iraq. How much work was involved in just putting this report together and what were your sources?

JEREMY BINNIE, JANE'S SENTINEL: We compile our information from a variety of sources. It is open source information, so information on weapons of mass destruction will come from -- we have based mainly on the U.K.'s government dossier. But also, we take information from Iraqi defectors. That's an excellent source of information. And also, just generally talking to defense people and people who know the political situation in the Middle East as well.

O'BRIEN: All right. Lot of information here. Let's try to run through a little bit of it. We have some graphics to try to support what we're talking about here. First of all, when we talk about the Iraqi armed forces, the military strength right now is estimated to be approximately 350,000. The air force is 30,000, and the navy is 5,000. Now, I think we can pretty much outright discount the navy and the air force as non-players in all this, right?

BINNIE: Well, that's right. They have no navy to speak of, really, in terms of ships. As far as the air force is concerned, if any of the Iraqi jets take off, they would be extremely lucky to return to their bases.

O'BRIEN: Don Shepperd, in 1991, the Iraqi air force sat it out. Is that likely to happen this time? And even if they do fly, are they dead?

GEN. DONALD SHEPPERD (RET)., CNN MILITARY ANALYST: Jeremy's right on. They didn't just sit it out, they fled, many of them to Iraq, with their airplanes. The airplanes didn't...

O'BRIEN: Iran. They went to Iran.

SHEPPERD: Iran, I'm sorry, not Iraq. They fled to Iran and the airplanes have been detained in Iran and not returned. They've had very little flying time. Their spare parts situation due to the embargoes is very low. And we're going to obviously close the bases, try to prevent them from taking off. If they do take off, they will be dead meat very quickly.

O'BRIEN: All right, let's go back and take a little closer look at some of the ground forces here, if we could. You've got several layers of military. You've got the army, the Republican Guards, the Special Republican Guard, the special forces and the popular army. Mr. Binnie, walk us through that. Some of that is paper tiger type forces and some of that is for real, isn't it?

BINNIE: That's right. Basically the way that the Iraqi regime organizes its security is in concentric rings. So on the outside you have the sort of main military, the main -- all the army units, based on conscripts pressed into -- pressed into service. And then you have more increasingly elite units, which are closer to the regime, they are more loyal and they're expected to fight harder for the survival of the regime.

O'BRIEN: At what point, what concentric circle do you have to be before you get the fight to the death kind of guys?

BINNIE: Well, even this time around, the units of the Republican Guard, their loyalty is suspect. So it could come down to the Special Republican Guard. Also, there have been new, more political units formed over recent years and months. These include Saddam's Feddain (ph), Saddam's Men of Sacrifice, who are supposed to be a politically motivated force of thugs, basically. They're also arming the Ba'ath Party. This is the political apparatus which Saddam rules through. It is supposed to be more loyal to Saddam. But by arming these people, then he expects to raise a military force which will be more loyal and defend him to the end.

O'BRIEN: General Shepperd, I remember a decade ago there was an awful lot of talk about this formidable Republican Guard and the concerns that the U.S. had about facing this Iraqi military machine. It's not the same anymore, is it?

SHEPPERD: It is not. And even before, when those were the threats, if you will, the regular Iraqi army was deployed into the field, poorly trained, poorly equipped, poorly fed and watered. They surrendered in hordes. The vaunted Republican Guard, no matter how ferocious they were, could not be loosed very far from Baghdad because they were to protect the inner circle, if you will, of Saddam Hussein.

And I agree with Jeremy, that their loyalty is questionable. You can't take them for granted. But clearly, there's a small core of people who are going to fight to the death around him and those are the ones we're really concerned about.

O'BRIEN: Let's look briefly at the sorts of aircraft they have in their air force. And I only bring this up because I don't think the air force is really a player here. I think both of your gentlemen would agree, but we talk about Mirage F-1s, MiG-29s, MiG-25s. What they have is an awful lot of Soviet era hardware, right, Mr. Binnie?

BINNIE: That's correct.

O'BRIEN: And much of that is in disrepair, hasn't been replenished, hasn't been properly serviced or maintained. And that doesn't go just for the air force. That goes for the ground forces as well, correct?

BINNIE: That goes to everything. All Iraq's military capability, basically, much of their equipment now is either obsolete. And even if -- and whether it's serviceable is deeply questionable, and how much they can actually field, which is going to be of any use in a modern conventional warfare is seriously questionable.

O'BRIEN: All right. And going back briefly, talking about that navy we mentioned, that's -- General Shepperd, I assume the navy is just a complete non-player.

SHEPPERD: It really is, Miles. It's a non-player. They can't do anything, especially against our own navy. They're not a factor.

O'BRIEN: All right. Let's go to the issue that really is the issue which is at the heart and soul of U.S. planning and strategy, coalition strategy. And that is the issue of biological or chemical weapons. This is what really underguards all of the strategy, doesn't it, Mr. Binnie? It's not so much how many tanks, troops, airplanes and ships Saddam Hussein has; it's the question of chemical or biological weapons and whether Saddam Hussein will use them, correct?

BINNIE: I mean, this is going to be a major consideration of any defense planner looking to go into Iraq. The situation with weapons of mass destruction, it's similar to the rest of the conventional military capability in the respect that they lost an awful lot of that capability during the weapons inspections in the 1990s. But Western intelligence agencies do believe that they have a significant capability with which they could do various things with to obstruct and make the job of deposing Saddam Hussein much more difficult.

We don't really know at this stage how dangerous they are, but for example, he will not be able to deliver bombs, chemical weapons using his aircraft, but he might well still be able to use chemical weapons on artillery shells against U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq.

O'BRIEN: All right. And Don Shepperd, looking at the regional map just quickly here, now that we've sort of laid out that Iraqi capability, give us a sense of where the coalition staging points might be. We're obviously talking about Kuwait. We're talking about bases in Turkey. Big question mark still about Saudi Arabia. How crucial is Saudi Arabia toward staging any sort of ground invasion, or for that matter using the Prince Sultan Air Base?

SHEPPERD: Well, Saudi Arabia is critical for all sorts of reasons. They're an important ally. They're important to the world economy, to the world oil supply. And the bases there are very, very convenient, as is their air space.

We've heard that they aren't going to allow us to use that air space and their bases. That may or may not be true. There's a lot that happens in the Mideast that is done but not said publicly for all sorts of political reasons.

I have pretty good confidence that in the end, we will get what we need from the Saudis. We may not be able to bomb from there. Maybe we'll be able to station a refueling aircraft or surveillance aircraft there. I think we'll get what we need from the Saudis. And they are an important factor, even though you do have Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Oman that are other factors there with bases. And you also have the carriers, of course.

O'BRIEN: Mr. Binnie, in a word, we are out of time, is it apt to be a rout?

BINNIE: It's not necessarily a rout. There are various, more asymmetrical, unconventional things that Saddam can do to defend himself. But ultimately there can only be one outcome, if there is a war, and that is Saddam Hussein's destruction.

O'BRIEN: Jeremy Binnie, with "Jane's Sentinel," excellent report. I invite you to try to find your way to that one. It is an excellent assessment of Iraq's military capabilities. General Don Shepperd, as always a pleasure to have you join us from Tucson.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com