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CNN Sunday Morning

Interview With David Isby

Aired December 01, 2002 - 07:11   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


KRIS OSBORN, CNN ANCHOR: Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is widely regarded as a survivor. Survived the Golf War, and the 1998 offensive against Iraq, Operation Desert Fox, as well as U.S. efforts to instigate in internal revolt, strengthening right now.
How does he do it? For some insight, we are joined now from Washington, by defense consultant David Isby. Good morning to you.

DAVID ISBY, DEFENSE CONSULTANT: Good morning.

OSBORN: Well, certainly the prospect of war, and the language regime change, although emphasized less in recent days, sharpens the focus on Saddam's inner security apparatus. You're an expert on this. Let's start talking about it. What about the elite Republican Guard?

ISBY: Well, the people who are closest to him is an organization called the Special Republican Guard. It's 15 battalions throughout the country, five of which in the Baghdad area -- key thing that it's under his son Qusay, who is number one son, one of the really four human beings on this planet in whom Saddam has any trust whatsoever.

OSBORN: Then, what about the first battalion, which protects Saddam when he's in transit? There's been a lot of talk, and lot of reporting about Saddam often following his own motorcade and taxi's using doubles, things of that sort.

ISBY: Actually, these are the people who protect him while he's moving, they run his armored limousines, his fleet of Winnebago command vehicles, which were a key target in the Golf War, and yes, the first battalion of the Special Republican Guard, also moves around his Saddam doubles who complicates targeting, and brings high security people around, like Saddam's food tasters, another high risk job.

OSBORN: Yes, absolutely. You just mentioned the food tasters; I was going to ask you about those. What about the Special Security Service, and what is their function?

ISBY: OK, this is Am Alkas (ph) also run by Qusay, his son. They are a special intelligence service infiltrate, but they also have a brigade of troops, that kept in the Baghdad area, and one of the things these people do is, they watch the other Iraqi intelligence services; that's among their priorities.

OSBORN: And what about the National Security Council?

ISBY: OK, this is a, you know, not a military force. This is how Qusay, number one son, who has his tentacles into all the intelligence apparatus, this is how he runs it. They've got the joint operation room set up, which keeps track of what's going in the Baghdad area.

OSBORN: And then the Fedayeen Saddam?

ISBY: The Fedayeen El Saddam -- now, this is a militia group. It was already set -- it was set up originally by Uday, but they Qusay took it over as Uday was sort of demoted in the son's hierarchy. And it's a militia group, and the reason is, it's a counter weight for the Special Republican Guard, because in a war, if the army is deployed out fighting the Americans, you've only -- you'd have the Special Republican Guard, and the Fedayeen in Baghdad, and you can use one to counter the other.

OSBORN: And the Murafaqin.

ISBY: Morafaqin, the companions -- think secret service. These are bodyguards. Key thing is, this is the one that's not run by Qusay. This is run by Rocon (ph), another one of Saddam's -- the four people Saddam trusts, and this is sort of his little ace in the whole against Qusay. These are the people who are closest to him, they are his bodyguards, they are generally people related to him by tribe or clan.

OSBORN: Now, a couple of things about this -- I mean, it's sort of textbook Machiavellian rule, in a sense, you'd like to be feared rather than loved, because as a ruler, of course, men fear at your convenience, they love at their own convenience. But I also wanted to ask you about that very issue, in terms of all these different subsets of his security apparatus -- perhaps that's by design, so as to keep them divided from one another, keep the focus on yourself, your own security.

ISBY: Absolutely, and because of this, if you trying to plot a coup, you certainly make it more difficult to go outside the borders of your own organization, and it also means, if a coup starts, and your not involved, you've got to oppose it, because the coup parties aren't going to trust you. They've just proven they don't trust you because they didn't bring you in on it.

OSBORN: And lastly, I'm really interested in your thoughts on a recent article in "TIME" that talked about an increased amount of communication from within Saddam's inner circle to members of opposition groups, some of them in London. Is he more vulnerable now, and is there a greater degree perhaps of interest in seeing him replaced from within?

ISBY: Well, there may well be. I mean, as you said, fear and desperation are terrible motivating factors, and if these people, especially those in the military, feel they are going to die in an American attack, they may well take the desperate measure of moving against Saddam. So, ratcheting up the pressure against Saddam could increase the chances of overthrow, but its' going to be a very difficult business at the best of times.

OSBORN: Washington defense consultant David Isby, thank you very much for your perspective this morning.

ISBY: Thank you.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com








Aired December 1, 2002 - 07:11   ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
KRIS OSBORN, CNN ANCHOR: Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is widely regarded as a survivor. Survived the Golf War, and the 1998 offensive against Iraq, Operation Desert Fox, as well as U.S. efforts to instigate in internal revolt, strengthening right now.
How does he do it? For some insight, we are joined now from Washington, by defense consultant David Isby. Good morning to you.

DAVID ISBY, DEFENSE CONSULTANT: Good morning.

OSBORN: Well, certainly the prospect of war, and the language regime change, although emphasized less in recent days, sharpens the focus on Saddam's inner security apparatus. You're an expert on this. Let's start talking about it. What about the elite Republican Guard?

ISBY: Well, the people who are closest to him is an organization called the Special Republican Guard. It's 15 battalions throughout the country, five of which in the Baghdad area -- key thing that it's under his son Qusay, who is number one son, one of the really four human beings on this planet in whom Saddam has any trust whatsoever.

OSBORN: Then, what about the first battalion, which protects Saddam when he's in transit? There's been a lot of talk, and lot of reporting about Saddam often following his own motorcade and taxi's using doubles, things of that sort.

ISBY: Actually, these are the people who protect him while he's moving, they run his armored limousines, his fleet of Winnebago command vehicles, which were a key target in the Golf War, and yes, the first battalion of the Special Republican Guard, also moves around his Saddam doubles who complicates targeting, and brings high security people around, like Saddam's food tasters, another high risk job.

OSBORN: Yes, absolutely. You just mentioned the food tasters; I was going to ask you about those. What about the Special Security Service, and what is their function?

ISBY: OK, this is Am Alkas (ph) also run by Qusay, his son. They are a special intelligence service infiltrate, but they also have a brigade of troops, that kept in the Baghdad area, and one of the things these people do is, they watch the other Iraqi intelligence services; that's among their priorities.

OSBORN: And what about the National Security Council?

ISBY: OK, this is a, you know, not a military force. This is how Qusay, number one son, who has his tentacles into all the intelligence apparatus, this is how he runs it. They've got the joint operation room set up, which keeps track of what's going in the Baghdad area.

OSBORN: And then the Fedayeen Saddam?

ISBY: The Fedayeen El Saddam -- now, this is a militia group. It was already set -- it was set up originally by Uday, but they Qusay took it over as Uday was sort of demoted in the son's hierarchy. And it's a militia group, and the reason is, it's a counter weight for the Special Republican Guard, because in a war, if the army is deployed out fighting the Americans, you've only -- you'd have the Special Republican Guard, and the Fedayeen in Baghdad, and you can use one to counter the other.

OSBORN: And the Murafaqin.

ISBY: Morafaqin, the companions -- think secret service. These are bodyguards. Key thing is, this is the one that's not run by Qusay. This is run by Rocon (ph), another one of Saddam's -- the four people Saddam trusts, and this is sort of his little ace in the whole against Qusay. These are the people who are closest to him, they are his bodyguards, they are generally people related to him by tribe or clan.

OSBORN: Now, a couple of things about this -- I mean, it's sort of textbook Machiavellian rule, in a sense, you'd like to be feared rather than loved, because as a ruler, of course, men fear at your convenience, they love at their own convenience. But I also wanted to ask you about that very issue, in terms of all these different subsets of his security apparatus -- perhaps that's by design, so as to keep them divided from one another, keep the focus on yourself, your own security.

ISBY: Absolutely, and because of this, if you trying to plot a coup, you certainly make it more difficult to go outside the borders of your own organization, and it also means, if a coup starts, and your not involved, you've got to oppose it, because the coup parties aren't going to trust you. They've just proven they don't trust you because they didn't bring you in on it.

OSBORN: And lastly, I'm really interested in your thoughts on a recent article in "TIME" that talked about an increased amount of communication from within Saddam's inner circle to members of opposition groups, some of them in London. Is he more vulnerable now, and is there a greater degree perhaps of interest in seeing him replaced from within?

ISBY: Well, there may well be. I mean, as you said, fear and desperation are terrible motivating factors, and if these people, especially those in the military, feel they are going to die in an American attack, they may well take the desperate measure of moving against Saddam. So, ratcheting up the pressure against Saddam could increase the chances of overthrow, but its' going to be a very difficult business at the best of times.

OSBORN: Washington defense consultant David Isby, thank you very much for your perspective this morning.

ISBY: Thank you.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com