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CNN Sunday Morning

Interview With Leonard Spector

Aired December 29, 2002 - 08:37   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


RENAY SAN MIGUEL, CNN ANCHOR: Back to the top story of the morning. North Korea is making bold moves to restart its nuclear program, or at least announcing that it's doing so. But just what is the timeline on firing up a nuclear reactor that's been moth balled since 1994? Joining us now from Washington is Leonard Spector. He's a long tenured expert on nuclear non-proliferation. He's now with the Monterey Institute and formerly with the U.S. Energy Department. Mr. Spector, thanks for being with us this morning.
LEONARD SPECTOR, CENTER FOR NON-PROLIFERATION STUDIES: Glad to be here.

SAN MIGUEL: We wanted to go step by step through the process here what it takes to develop a nuclear weapon and restart one of these reactors. But I would like to start off by asking you, this location we're talking about here, the Yangbyang location, several facilities at this one site. As far as we know, are there some that are more in a state of readiness than others?

SPECTOR: Well, I think a number of them were moth balled back in 1994. And they have to be started up if North Korea is going to go ahead with its announced plans. Some of them, even if they get started up, will take a long time to sort of make trouble for us. Others if they get started up could provide some problems pretty soon.

SAN MIGUEL: Let's go, OK, I guess those will come up as what parts will cause trouble earlier than others as we go through this process one step at a time. As you have described it to us, first, you need fresh fuel that goes into the reactor and it's then irradiated for a year and then becomes spent fuel. If it needs to be irradiated for a year, why are officials talking about North Korea maybe could have weapons ready to go within a month?

SPECTOR: Well, I think it's not the reactor that would be the problem. That part of the picture is one that will unfold over a year's time. Another part of the site, however, has a facility that can extract plutonium from spent fuel, and there is already some spent fuel in storage that has been around since 1994. And there's enough of it that if it was processed, North Korea could acquire four to six weapons in a matter of months. That's the real danger zone.

SAN MIGUEL: What is the timeframe for restarting a reactor that's been out of commission since 1994?

SPECTOR: Well, it will probably take a couple of months just to get it cranked up. They also have to make sure they have enough fuel to start it up. So far, they've brought about 10 percent of the necessary fuel to the reactor location. So this will take some time. And then, of course, once it's running, it takes a while for the fuel to be ready to be pulled out and used for plutonium extraction.

SAN MIGUEL: Let's talk about that part of the process. Spent fuel is taken out of the reactor, has about 1 percent plutonium in that spent fuel, and then that needs to be cooled, from what I understand. How long is the cooling process?

SPECTOR: Usually a month or two, but not for too long, because this kind of fuel corrodes. So at least when -- the normal process would be to move it as rapidly as possible to the processing plant, and in the processing plant, it would be out probably in a matter of weeks.

SAN MIGUEL: After cooling, it goes into that reprocessing plant, and then where the rods come into play, the rods that we've heard so much about here lately, those are dissolved in nitric acid from what we understand and various steps are taken for purifying. And once that happens, it's ready to be put into a weapon. How long is that timeframe we're talking about?

SPECTOR: Well, once the plutonium comes out of the plant, it may be in metal form at that point or it goes through another process to make it into metal. Fabricating it into weapons parts can be done probably in a week or two. By now, we assume the North Koreans know what they're doing. They've had some plutonium since the early 1990s and we think they've made two nuclear weapons. So they know how to make the plutonium parts once they have the plutonium, and they know how to make the non-nuclear parts based on past experience, so that part can go very quickly.

SAN MIGUEL: I may be deviating off the timeframe here, but we've heard so much about depleted uranium as well, particularly in the issue with Iraq. But also, you know, is there a point here in this process where you can get depleted uranium that can be put into tank shells and things like that and those can cause damage as well?

SPECTOR: No, this process does not involve the depleted uranium. Some other activities that they're engaged in might lead to it, but believe me, on the scale of what they're up to, that is the very, very low end. The dangerous stuff is the plutonium and possibly high enriched uranium in this other part of their nuclear fuel cycle that we're just learning about.

SAN MIGUEL: OK, thanks for clearing that up for us. The fuel seems to be the key here. The cameras kept an eye on that. But once the cameras and gone, of course inspectors are gone, but the cameras to monitor that situation, once they're gone and they move that fuel, we may never see it again, right?

SPECTOR: Well, that's right. It's now stored in a pool close to the reactor, where it was originally cooked or irradiated. If it gets moved next door to the processing plant, where there are no cameras now, there are no inspectors now, we don't know where it might wind up. Some could be moved there, some could be removed to a remote location. We wouldn't know when it was being processed, when it was being stored. We would really lose control of the situation.

SAN MIGUEL: So tell me, you've talked about the nuclear calendar, so to speak here. Talk to me about the diplomatic calendar. What needs to be done in conjunction with all these events that we've just talked about here.

SPECTOR: Well, I think you have to worry about the nuclear activities going ahead faster than the diplomacy can catch up. We've learned this morning that the administration is hoping that economic pressure on North Korea will lead it to change its views. The trouble is that economic pressure on a country like this is going to take many, many months to really have an impact and it's not clear that we'll be successful at putting on the economic squeeze because of uncertainties about China and Russia.

Meanwhile, in a matter of, let's say, three to four months, they might be able to get this processing plant started up and to move the spent fuel into that facility and begin extracting plutonium. So if they have two weapons today, let's say, two nuclear weapons, in a matter of months, they might have three or four while diplomacy was still attempting to use economic sanctions and the rest to get them to change their approach. We will be losing ground here pretty quickly, and I think the administration is certainly going to be recalibrating its policies very soon.

SAN MIGUEL: It does, indeed, help to focus the mind when you talk about a period of months instead of years in this situation. Leonard Spector with the Monterey Institute, formerly with the U.S. Energy Department, thanks so much for getting up early this morning on CNN SUNDAY MORNING.

SPECTOR: Thank you.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com







Aired December 29, 2002 - 08:37   ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
RENAY SAN MIGUEL, CNN ANCHOR: Back to the top story of the morning. North Korea is making bold moves to restart its nuclear program, or at least announcing that it's doing so. But just what is the timeline on firing up a nuclear reactor that's been moth balled since 1994? Joining us now from Washington is Leonard Spector. He's a long tenured expert on nuclear non-proliferation. He's now with the Monterey Institute and formerly with the U.S. Energy Department. Mr. Spector, thanks for being with us this morning.
LEONARD SPECTOR, CENTER FOR NON-PROLIFERATION STUDIES: Glad to be here.

SAN MIGUEL: We wanted to go step by step through the process here what it takes to develop a nuclear weapon and restart one of these reactors. But I would like to start off by asking you, this location we're talking about here, the Yangbyang location, several facilities at this one site. As far as we know, are there some that are more in a state of readiness than others?

SPECTOR: Well, I think a number of them were moth balled back in 1994. And they have to be started up if North Korea is going to go ahead with its announced plans. Some of them, even if they get started up, will take a long time to sort of make trouble for us. Others if they get started up could provide some problems pretty soon.

SAN MIGUEL: Let's go, OK, I guess those will come up as what parts will cause trouble earlier than others as we go through this process one step at a time. As you have described it to us, first, you need fresh fuel that goes into the reactor and it's then irradiated for a year and then becomes spent fuel. If it needs to be irradiated for a year, why are officials talking about North Korea maybe could have weapons ready to go within a month?

SPECTOR: Well, I think it's not the reactor that would be the problem. That part of the picture is one that will unfold over a year's time. Another part of the site, however, has a facility that can extract plutonium from spent fuel, and there is already some spent fuel in storage that has been around since 1994. And there's enough of it that if it was processed, North Korea could acquire four to six weapons in a matter of months. That's the real danger zone.

SAN MIGUEL: What is the timeframe for restarting a reactor that's been out of commission since 1994?

SPECTOR: Well, it will probably take a couple of months just to get it cranked up. They also have to make sure they have enough fuel to start it up. So far, they've brought about 10 percent of the necessary fuel to the reactor location. So this will take some time. And then, of course, once it's running, it takes a while for the fuel to be ready to be pulled out and used for plutonium extraction.

SAN MIGUEL: Let's talk about that part of the process. Spent fuel is taken out of the reactor, has about 1 percent plutonium in that spent fuel, and then that needs to be cooled, from what I understand. How long is the cooling process?

SPECTOR: Usually a month or two, but not for too long, because this kind of fuel corrodes. So at least when -- the normal process would be to move it as rapidly as possible to the processing plant, and in the processing plant, it would be out probably in a matter of weeks.

SAN MIGUEL: After cooling, it goes into that reprocessing plant, and then where the rods come into play, the rods that we've heard so much about here lately, those are dissolved in nitric acid from what we understand and various steps are taken for purifying. And once that happens, it's ready to be put into a weapon. How long is that timeframe we're talking about?

SPECTOR: Well, once the plutonium comes out of the plant, it may be in metal form at that point or it goes through another process to make it into metal. Fabricating it into weapons parts can be done probably in a week or two. By now, we assume the North Koreans know what they're doing. They've had some plutonium since the early 1990s and we think they've made two nuclear weapons. So they know how to make the plutonium parts once they have the plutonium, and they know how to make the non-nuclear parts based on past experience, so that part can go very quickly.

SAN MIGUEL: I may be deviating off the timeframe here, but we've heard so much about depleted uranium as well, particularly in the issue with Iraq. But also, you know, is there a point here in this process where you can get depleted uranium that can be put into tank shells and things like that and those can cause damage as well?

SPECTOR: No, this process does not involve the depleted uranium. Some other activities that they're engaged in might lead to it, but believe me, on the scale of what they're up to, that is the very, very low end. The dangerous stuff is the plutonium and possibly high enriched uranium in this other part of their nuclear fuel cycle that we're just learning about.

SAN MIGUEL: OK, thanks for clearing that up for us. The fuel seems to be the key here. The cameras kept an eye on that. But once the cameras and gone, of course inspectors are gone, but the cameras to monitor that situation, once they're gone and they move that fuel, we may never see it again, right?

SPECTOR: Well, that's right. It's now stored in a pool close to the reactor, where it was originally cooked or irradiated. If it gets moved next door to the processing plant, where there are no cameras now, there are no inspectors now, we don't know where it might wind up. Some could be moved there, some could be removed to a remote location. We wouldn't know when it was being processed, when it was being stored. We would really lose control of the situation.

SAN MIGUEL: So tell me, you've talked about the nuclear calendar, so to speak here. Talk to me about the diplomatic calendar. What needs to be done in conjunction with all these events that we've just talked about here.

SPECTOR: Well, I think you have to worry about the nuclear activities going ahead faster than the diplomacy can catch up. We've learned this morning that the administration is hoping that economic pressure on North Korea will lead it to change its views. The trouble is that economic pressure on a country like this is going to take many, many months to really have an impact and it's not clear that we'll be successful at putting on the economic squeeze because of uncertainties about China and Russia.

Meanwhile, in a matter of, let's say, three to four months, they might be able to get this processing plant started up and to move the spent fuel into that facility and begin extracting plutonium. So if they have two weapons today, let's say, two nuclear weapons, in a matter of months, they might have three or four while diplomacy was still attempting to use economic sanctions and the rest to get them to change their approach. We will be losing ground here pretty quickly, and I think the administration is certainly going to be recalibrating its policies very soon.

SAN MIGUEL: It does, indeed, help to focus the mind when you talk about a period of months instead of years in this situation. Leonard Spector with the Monterey Institute, formerly with the U.S. Energy Department, thanks so much for getting up early this morning on CNN SUNDAY MORNING.

SPECTOR: Thank you.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com