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CNN Sunday Morning
Interview With John Warden
Aired December 29, 2002 - 09:10 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
CATHERINE CALLAWAY, CNN ANCHOR: As the U.S. begins mobilizing troops for a possible war with Iraq, Saudi Arabia's quietly giving U.S. permission to use its air bases for a campaign against Baghdad. And joining us now to discuss the significance of this is retired Air Force Colonel John Warden. You may remember Colonel Warden. He's credited with being the architect of the Desert Storm air campaign. He's also the author of several books out there. His latest being "Winning in Fast Time." Colonel Warden joining us from Montgomery, Alabama, this morning. Thanks for being with us, Colonel.
COL. JOHN WARDEN (RET.), U.S. AIR FORCE: Catherine, good morning.
CALLAWAY: Good morning to you. I don't know how earth shattering the news is that Saudi Arabia is going to allow the U.S. to use their air bases, but certainly it has to be crucial in any air campaign against Iraq.
WARDEN: Well, it's certainly helpful. I think that what we have from the latest information is that the Saudis apparently have agreed fairly categorically to allow us to use the combined air operations center at Prince Sultan Air Base near Riyadh, but there may still be some doubt about whether we can use the other bases in Saudi Arabia to launch aircraft in the air space.
In any event, it's one of these things that if you get it, it's good. If you don't, you can live without it. But it also illustrates that, you know, we really shouldn't be dependent on Saudi Arabia or anybody else for bases. We really need to start building our combined air operations centers and the rest of these things in the United States so we don't have to ask somebody else for permission to do things.
CALLAWAY: Yeah, good point. But are you the only one feeling that way?
WARDEN: I don't think so. There's a fairly -- there are a lot of people that think that, but there are some -- there are combined set of cultural and political problems that have kind of kept us tied to trying to put our bases and our operations centers very, very near what are considered the front lines. And it's really sort of an old idea about warfare, and it's not capitalizing on the technology that we really have available to us.
CALLAWAY: But Colonel, it seems the country is walking the fine line here with Saudi Arabia, using their air bases is something I'm certain that the country would not want publicized. What kind of negotiations had to take place to get this type of agreement?
WARDEN: Well, I would guess that probably there were a couple of sets of things. On the one hand, that the Saudis are probably feeling a bit uncomfortable from the standpoint of their relations with the United States because of all of the accusations, the evidence...
CALLAWAY: 9/11.
WARDEN: The 9/11 sort of things, that's right. So they're probably trying to do some things to get back a bit into the good graces. And on the other hand, obviously it's desirable for us to have those capabilities, so we're probably offering them some things to use the bases. And we shouldn't be in that position.
CALLAWAY: Some things, like money?
WARDEN: Probably money, probably some cooperation. Just good, better relations. There's always an extraordinary price that goes along for anything that you want to do in somebody else's territory. And, I mean, if you have to do it, you have to do it. But this is one of these things where it's time for us to start weaning ourselves from that.
CALLAWAY: I know you're looking at this from the military angle, but you are also able to look at it from the political angle. That has to be a coup for some.
WARDEN: Yeah, I think so, for sure, that it's certainly -- certainly some advantage in having that operation out of Prince Sultan Air Base. So somebody can certainly say, we did a pretty good job here.
CALLAWAY: Somebody, hm, let me think who.
WARDEN: Yeah.
CALLAWAY: All right, Colonel, let's look at it from the military angle, then. Is this going to make any difference on the plans that have been made, which we know have been made, to do an air campaign? Because this would obviously be a largely air based campaign against Iraq. Any changes at all, or do you think they just took for granted this would happen?
WARDEN: I -- what I would suspect are two things. Number one, from the standpoint of the combined air operations center, we already had the alternate facility in Qatar so we're probably pretty capable of conducting operations without the Prince Sultan facility. Then, because that there was always some possibility that we wouldn't end up with bases in Saudi Arabia, then I would guess -- and I certainly would have done this -- would have put the campaign together in order to make it successful without those Saudi bases.
Now, if towards the last minute or within the last couple of months that all of a sudden they become available, then what that probably does is give me the option to put some additional airplanes in that, they give me just a little bit more cushion, or maybe to disperse things a little bit more than I otherwise would have.
So it's obviously useful, but probably not -- probably wasn't crucial insofar as our ability to conduct operations against Iraq.
CALLAWAY: Colonel, how different will the plan that's being made, or has been made, differ from yours in Desert Storm?
WARDEN: It depends on a couple of things. One is certainly what the overall strategy is. In the 1991 Gulf War, that in addition to doing things, strategic operations against Baghdad and Saddam Hussein, we also spent an enormous amount of time and effort destroying an awful lot of Iraqi tanks and artillery pieces of the Iraqi army in Kuwait.
Now, if we do this right this time, then I would hope we wouldn't have to attack very many at all of Iraqi military facilities, because if we do it right, the majority of our effort should be focused against Saddam Hussein and his -- and his internal security, and the Iraqi military, then, actually, would become an active ally on our side and probably do the ones actually to depose Saddam and the people around him.
CALLAWAY: All right, a lot of special forces and information will be used in this war. Thank you for being with us, Colonel.
WARDEN: My pleasure. Thank you.
CALLAWAY: Colonel Warden. Have a great holiday. Happy new year to you.
WARDEN: Happy new year to you all, thank you.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com
Aired December 29, 2002 - 09:10 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
CATHERINE CALLAWAY, CNN ANCHOR: As the U.S. begins mobilizing troops for a possible war with Iraq, Saudi Arabia's quietly giving U.S. permission to use its air bases for a campaign against Baghdad. And joining us now to discuss the significance of this is retired Air Force Colonel John Warden. You may remember Colonel Warden. He's credited with being the architect of the Desert Storm air campaign. He's also the author of several books out there. His latest being "Winning in Fast Time." Colonel Warden joining us from Montgomery, Alabama, this morning. Thanks for being with us, Colonel.
COL. JOHN WARDEN (RET.), U.S. AIR FORCE: Catherine, good morning.
CALLAWAY: Good morning to you. I don't know how earth shattering the news is that Saudi Arabia is going to allow the U.S. to use their air bases, but certainly it has to be crucial in any air campaign against Iraq.
WARDEN: Well, it's certainly helpful. I think that what we have from the latest information is that the Saudis apparently have agreed fairly categorically to allow us to use the combined air operations center at Prince Sultan Air Base near Riyadh, but there may still be some doubt about whether we can use the other bases in Saudi Arabia to launch aircraft in the air space.
In any event, it's one of these things that if you get it, it's good. If you don't, you can live without it. But it also illustrates that, you know, we really shouldn't be dependent on Saudi Arabia or anybody else for bases. We really need to start building our combined air operations centers and the rest of these things in the United States so we don't have to ask somebody else for permission to do things.
CALLAWAY: Yeah, good point. But are you the only one feeling that way?
WARDEN: I don't think so. There's a fairly -- there are a lot of people that think that, but there are some -- there are combined set of cultural and political problems that have kind of kept us tied to trying to put our bases and our operations centers very, very near what are considered the front lines. And it's really sort of an old idea about warfare, and it's not capitalizing on the technology that we really have available to us.
CALLAWAY: But Colonel, it seems the country is walking the fine line here with Saudi Arabia, using their air bases is something I'm certain that the country would not want publicized. What kind of negotiations had to take place to get this type of agreement?
WARDEN: Well, I would guess that probably there were a couple of sets of things. On the one hand, that the Saudis are probably feeling a bit uncomfortable from the standpoint of their relations with the United States because of all of the accusations, the evidence...
CALLAWAY: 9/11.
WARDEN: The 9/11 sort of things, that's right. So they're probably trying to do some things to get back a bit into the good graces. And on the other hand, obviously it's desirable for us to have those capabilities, so we're probably offering them some things to use the bases. And we shouldn't be in that position.
CALLAWAY: Some things, like money?
WARDEN: Probably money, probably some cooperation. Just good, better relations. There's always an extraordinary price that goes along for anything that you want to do in somebody else's territory. And, I mean, if you have to do it, you have to do it. But this is one of these things where it's time for us to start weaning ourselves from that.
CALLAWAY: I know you're looking at this from the military angle, but you are also able to look at it from the political angle. That has to be a coup for some.
WARDEN: Yeah, I think so, for sure, that it's certainly -- certainly some advantage in having that operation out of Prince Sultan Air Base. So somebody can certainly say, we did a pretty good job here.
CALLAWAY: Somebody, hm, let me think who.
WARDEN: Yeah.
CALLAWAY: All right, Colonel, let's look at it from the military angle, then. Is this going to make any difference on the plans that have been made, which we know have been made, to do an air campaign? Because this would obviously be a largely air based campaign against Iraq. Any changes at all, or do you think they just took for granted this would happen?
WARDEN: I -- what I would suspect are two things. Number one, from the standpoint of the combined air operations center, we already had the alternate facility in Qatar so we're probably pretty capable of conducting operations without the Prince Sultan facility. Then, because that there was always some possibility that we wouldn't end up with bases in Saudi Arabia, then I would guess -- and I certainly would have done this -- would have put the campaign together in order to make it successful without those Saudi bases.
Now, if towards the last minute or within the last couple of months that all of a sudden they become available, then what that probably does is give me the option to put some additional airplanes in that, they give me just a little bit more cushion, or maybe to disperse things a little bit more than I otherwise would have.
So it's obviously useful, but probably not -- probably wasn't crucial insofar as our ability to conduct operations against Iraq.
CALLAWAY: Colonel, how different will the plan that's being made, or has been made, differ from yours in Desert Storm?
WARDEN: It depends on a couple of things. One is certainly what the overall strategy is. In the 1991 Gulf War, that in addition to doing things, strategic operations against Baghdad and Saddam Hussein, we also spent an enormous amount of time and effort destroying an awful lot of Iraqi tanks and artillery pieces of the Iraqi army in Kuwait.
Now, if we do this right this time, then I would hope we wouldn't have to attack very many at all of Iraqi military facilities, because if we do it right, the majority of our effort should be focused against Saddam Hussein and his -- and his internal security, and the Iraqi military, then, actually, would become an active ally on our side and probably do the ones actually to depose Saddam and the people around him.
CALLAWAY: All right, a lot of special forces and information will be used in this war. Thank you for being with us, Colonel.
WARDEN: My pleasure. Thank you.
CALLAWAY: Colonel Warden. Have a great holiday. Happy new year to you.
WARDEN: Happy new year to you all, thank you.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com
