Return to Transcripts main page
CNN Sunday Morning
A Look at NASA Mission Control on Day of Shuttle Disaster
Aired February 16, 2003 - 09:23 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
MILES O'BRIEN, CNN ANCHOR: NASA flight controllers are trained to handle problems with the space shuttle with calm, precision and terse understatement. On the morning of February 1, that training was put to a severe test.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
O'BRIEN (voice-over): Veteran flight director Leroy Cain as sitting at the top of the pyramid in the space shuttle flight control room as Columbia plummeted to earth.
Watching his data, constantly polling his team of specialists, he saw the tragedy unfold around him.
LEROY CAIN, FLIGHT DIRECTOR: When we came in in the morning, it was as things should be on entry day, and everything was setting up to be just as I would want it to be with respect to being able to do everything and land that day.
O'BRIEN: As we now know, the trouble first began as Columbia streaked 237,000 feet above the Pacific at nearly 24 times the speed of sound.
Just after 8:52 eastern, temperatures rose abnormally in three brake lines in the left wheel well. And then, about minute later, several temperature sensors in the hydraulic lines at the back of Columbia's left wing failed in rapid succession.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Flight, Max.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Go ahead, Max.
O'BRIEN: Max was Jeff Kling, ground controller in charge of maintenance, mechanical and crew systems.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: FYI, I've just lost four separate temperature transducers on the left side of the vehicle, the hydraulic return temperatures.
CAIN: From the very first indications that we had of the hydraulic return temperature indications being failed, I -- that gave me pause. There were several of the smaller events leading up to the loss of signal.
So there was some increasing concern. We remained focused and we did the things that we were trained to do. O'BRIEN: At 8:54, Columbia was streaking over Yosemite. Onboard computers began moving some control flaps to compensate for drag on the left side. At the same time, sensors in Columbia's left fuselage wall detected abnormally high readings.
The, with the drag apparently worsening, Columbia's computers fired rocket thrusters to try and right the craft.
At the same time, left brake line temperatures continued rising, while heat sensors on the upper and lower left wing failed.
Cain new a lot of things were going wrong on Columbia's left side and then at 8:59:13, he heard from Max once again.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Flight, Max.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Go.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: We just lost tire pressure on left outboard and left inboard, both tires.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Columbia, Houston, we see your tire pressure messages and we did not copy your last.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Roger...
O'BRIEN: Before the loss of signal, Columbia's computers were still desperately fighting that pull to the left by adjusting flaps and firing rockets.
Two minutes after the signal went silent, 9:01:24, Kane heard from his instrumentation and communications engineer, Laura Hopp (ph). Or INCO.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Flight, INCO. I didn't expect this bad of a hit on com.
O'BRIEN: The astronaut in charge of talking with the flight crew, Charlie Hobard (ph), tried raising Columbia four times.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Columbia, Houston, com check.
O'BRIEN: At this point, Cain could only hope Columbia had suffered a drastic communication failure.
But the tension grew at 9:04, when the orbiter should have appeared on a radar screen near Cape Canaveral.
Cain to flight dynamics officer Richard Jones, or Fido, at 9:05.
CAIN: Fido, when are you expecting tracking?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: One minute ago, flight.
O'BRIEN: Cain paused before acting.
CAIN: What I was doing right at that moment in time is I was saying a prayer.
O'BRIEN: At 9:10, Cain turns to lead flight director, Phil Engola (ph), and astronaut Ellen Achoa (ph), who have more bad news: unconfirmed sightings of the shuttle breaking up over Texas.
CAIN: And after I did that, I knew it was time to go and take the next step. So I began to think about things like ground forces and getting people mobilized and looking for chutes and things of that nature.
And it was difficult to accept, but it wasn't difficult to execute. Again, I would say because of our training.
O'BRIEN: And that is what he did. Thirteen minutes after Columbia fell off the screens, Cain, to Bill Foster, his ground controller, or GC.
CAIN: GC, flight. GC, flight.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: GC.
CAIN: Lock the doors.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Copy.
O'BRIEN: Eleven minutes after he ordered the doors locked to ensure crucial data was preserved for the investigation, Cain and his team saw this: footage of Columbia's breakup, shot by WFAA, carried on CNN.
In an instant, they knew there would be no parachutes.
Miles O'Brien, CNN, Atlanta.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com
Aired February 16, 2003 - 09:23 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
MILES O'BRIEN, CNN ANCHOR: NASA flight controllers are trained to handle problems with the space shuttle with calm, precision and terse understatement. On the morning of February 1, that training was put to a severe test.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
O'BRIEN (voice-over): Veteran flight director Leroy Cain as sitting at the top of the pyramid in the space shuttle flight control room as Columbia plummeted to earth.
Watching his data, constantly polling his team of specialists, he saw the tragedy unfold around him.
LEROY CAIN, FLIGHT DIRECTOR: When we came in in the morning, it was as things should be on entry day, and everything was setting up to be just as I would want it to be with respect to being able to do everything and land that day.
O'BRIEN: As we now know, the trouble first began as Columbia streaked 237,000 feet above the Pacific at nearly 24 times the speed of sound.
Just after 8:52 eastern, temperatures rose abnormally in three brake lines in the left wheel well. And then, about minute later, several temperature sensors in the hydraulic lines at the back of Columbia's left wing failed in rapid succession.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Flight, Max.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Go ahead, Max.
O'BRIEN: Max was Jeff Kling, ground controller in charge of maintenance, mechanical and crew systems.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: FYI, I've just lost four separate temperature transducers on the left side of the vehicle, the hydraulic return temperatures.
CAIN: From the very first indications that we had of the hydraulic return temperature indications being failed, I -- that gave me pause. There were several of the smaller events leading up to the loss of signal.
So there was some increasing concern. We remained focused and we did the things that we were trained to do. O'BRIEN: At 8:54, Columbia was streaking over Yosemite. Onboard computers began moving some control flaps to compensate for drag on the left side. At the same time, sensors in Columbia's left fuselage wall detected abnormally high readings.
The, with the drag apparently worsening, Columbia's computers fired rocket thrusters to try and right the craft.
At the same time, left brake line temperatures continued rising, while heat sensors on the upper and lower left wing failed.
Cain new a lot of things were going wrong on Columbia's left side and then at 8:59:13, he heard from Max once again.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Flight, Max.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Go.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: We just lost tire pressure on left outboard and left inboard, both tires.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Columbia, Houston, we see your tire pressure messages and we did not copy your last.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Roger...
O'BRIEN: Before the loss of signal, Columbia's computers were still desperately fighting that pull to the left by adjusting flaps and firing rockets.
Two minutes after the signal went silent, 9:01:24, Kane heard from his instrumentation and communications engineer, Laura Hopp (ph). Or INCO.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Flight, INCO. I didn't expect this bad of a hit on com.
O'BRIEN: The astronaut in charge of talking with the flight crew, Charlie Hobard (ph), tried raising Columbia four times.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Columbia, Houston, com check.
O'BRIEN: At this point, Cain could only hope Columbia had suffered a drastic communication failure.
But the tension grew at 9:04, when the orbiter should have appeared on a radar screen near Cape Canaveral.
Cain to flight dynamics officer Richard Jones, or Fido, at 9:05.
CAIN: Fido, when are you expecting tracking?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: One minute ago, flight.
O'BRIEN: Cain paused before acting.
CAIN: What I was doing right at that moment in time is I was saying a prayer.
O'BRIEN: At 9:10, Cain turns to lead flight director, Phil Engola (ph), and astronaut Ellen Achoa (ph), who have more bad news: unconfirmed sightings of the shuttle breaking up over Texas.
CAIN: And after I did that, I knew it was time to go and take the next step. So I began to think about things like ground forces and getting people mobilized and looking for chutes and things of that nature.
And it was difficult to accept, but it wasn't difficult to execute. Again, I would say because of our training.
O'BRIEN: And that is what he did. Thirteen minutes after Columbia fell off the screens, Cain, to Bill Foster, his ground controller, or GC.
CAIN: GC, flight. GC, flight.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: GC.
CAIN: Lock the doors.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Copy.
O'BRIEN: Eleven minutes after he ordered the doors locked to ensure crucial data was preserved for the investigation, Cain and his team saw this: footage of Columbia's breakup, shot by WFAA, carried on CNN.
In an instant, they knew there would be no parachutes.
Miles O'Brien, CNN, Atlanta.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com
