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CNN Saturday Morning News

Reporter's Notebook

Aired July 06, 2002 - 09:41   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
ROBIN MEADE, CNN ANCHOR: All right, joining us from Washington to answer your questions is CNN security analyst Kelly McCann. Good morning, Kelly. And from Bagram is -- in Afghanistan is our senior international correspondent, Nic Robertson. And thank you for joining us as well, Nic.

Want to start off with the e-mail, folks, and this would be from Mike in New York. And he says, "What kind of protection do the Afghan government officials have, especially those at the ministerial level like Qadir, or even Hamid Karzai himself? I was very surprised that he had only a driver with him," this is Qadir, "when he was killed. Why doesn't the ISAF help out in this regard?"

I'm going to toss this question to Nic, since he's there in Afghanistan. And obviously this question is in regards to the assassination of one of the vice presidents there in Afghanistan this morning. Nic, go ahead, what do you say to this person? What kind of protection do the officials have is what he's asking.

NIC ROBERTSON, CNN SENIOR INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENT: The officials do have security, bodyguards here. In fact, that's traditionally the way that many sort of Afghan power brokers in the past have traveled around the countryside. They'll take their faithful gunmen with them.

And in the case of Haji Abdul Qadir, who was assassinated today, we understand that his 10 bodyguards, we're told, have already been arrested, and they were appointed by the previous incumbent of his ministerial position. That was -- he was a minister in charge of rebuilding.

So they do have a level of security, but this is not a rich country. The money -- there's not enough money here for see -- even ministers or vice presidents to travel around in armored cars. And of course international security force here, ISAF, only has about 4,000 soldiers inside Afghanistan and in and around Kabul, in fact.

And when they do patrol around the streets, the impression is, and the fact is, they're just not everywhere all the time, and they're not assigned to protecting Afghan government ministers at this time.

MEADE: Nic, thanks. You know, Nic and Kelly, there's also an e- mail...

KELLY MCCANN, CNN SECURITY ANALYST: There's, there's, there's another important point there.

MEADE: Go ahead.

MCCANN: The important point to know also is, if the security goes to guns, then that's a very one-dimensional approach to security. If you're planning for the point of impact, then you've got to realize the people who would assassinate you have already conducted surveillance, they've figured in your motorcade, how many weapons you have, how many people, et cetera.

So the higher levels of protection go to surveillance detection efforts, itinerary control, staying time and place unpredictable. And our experience is that in countries that are not normally that sophisticated, it goes to just the gun issue, which was where you have this kind of point of impact problem.

MEADE: Here's another e-mail, gentlemen, from Bobby, and this -- Bobby says, "It appears that the new vice president of Afghanistan's assassination occurred because the vehicle that he was riding in was not bullet-proof. Do you think the United States should provide the new leadership with a fleet of bullet-proof vehicles to ensure their safety?"

Kind of a basic thing there. I'm going to ask Kelly to answer that one -- Kelly.

MCCANN: In some cases, the Department of State does do that, and it depends on the buy-back program or what kind of funding exists. However, Lexan windows and a hard armored car, level four cars, are not also an answer as well. There are ways to defeat them that adversaries know of, et cetera.

Again, it goes to the tactics, techniques, procedures, technology, and the human cleverness to avoid getting to the point of impact. But it is something to consider.

MEADE: Nic, I bet you'd like to comment back on that as well.

ROBERTSON: There's another concern -- yes, absolutely. And there would be another concern here, of course, that by so overtly giving a status symbol or protection, if you will, to a government minister here by showering, if you will, gifts from the United States on government ministers here, would be a very overt way of providing support for the Afghan government.

One of the key things here is this is a government in transition. It doesn't need to be perceived, it doesn't want to be perceived by the population here as being in the pocket of the United States. Not that it would be, if its ministers were provided with armored cars, but it's a perception thing here. So that would also be an issue for Afghan ministers considering whether or not they would accept this type of donation.

MEADE: Nic, thank you so much.

Obviously we're talking about security in Afghanistan. On the minds of many of you are also security at home as well as abroad.

Ed on the phone now from Iowa has a question about airport security. Hi, Ed.

CALLER: Hello. We have a lot -- we're spending a lot of time and money doing security as people are trying to get into the airport. Why is it, then, that once we're through security, you can buy a lot of improvised weapons? In my time when traveling in the past few months, I've been through airports, I've seen full-sized metal license plates, miniature metal license plates, full-sized bottles of rubbing alcohol with lighters being sold in the same kiosk, chains, ties, computer cables.

Why is it that we can buy improvised weapons inside the airport secure areas?

MCCANN: That's a good question, Ed, and in fact, you've hit the absolute key. Why take my fingernail file but let me steal a -- let me fly with a stainless steel pen?

The bottom line is, is that we'd fly naked, and in fact, anything could be used as a weapon. So it goes to the mentality. That is really what drives an attacker. And unless you can match the mentality, therein lies the problem. So you've hit a very good problem, which is, how do you get your arms around that?

MEADE: Kelly, you made up some information that we're going to show on the screen here regarding airport security, and I'd like for you to talk about that. Go ahead.

ROBERTSON: Sure. I mean, this is a notional representation of what El Al has suggested would work here domestically. Basically, you know, you'd have vehicles come up to a point where they would be screened, there'd be human interaction, someone would talk to people and say, you know, OK, you're flying today, et cetera, sure, you show the itinerary.

You'd then pull your car into a screening area. All the cars would be checked for improvised explosive devices. There would be another level of human interaction. You'd be checked for weapons, et cetera.

If you notice on the left, that would be the express entrance, and that would only be accessible by shuttle buses, buses, taxis, et cetera.

That would work. But think of the kind of money that it would take to do that at 429 airports. And that's the problem, and why U.S. is not analogous to Israel. They have one international airport. So of course they can mass effort there, and it's practicable for them to do that.

We -- people have argued and debated over the last couple of days, (UNINTELLIGIBLE) we're not safe in our airports. We very well could be. However, there'll always be a place near the perimeter where people mass. When people are lining up their vehicles to wait to get through that external point, that would be a lucrative target for drive-by shootings, et cetera.

So again, it's a very complex issue, and one that no nation or no person or no group of individuals has all the answers to. People are struggling with this.

And also, it's got to be bounced against the palatability of the American people. How much are they willing to be inconvenienced?

MEADE: Now, you've heard that saying before, you can only give people the amount of security that they will tolerate.

I have a e-mail here for Nic. This is from Brian in Canada. Brian says, "We've been told about sleeper cells that may have been in our country and others for years. This shows a very extreme level of commitment by those involved. Most people think of small groups coordinating their efforts, such as the 9/11 hijackers. But what about committed individuals carrying out smaller attacks on their own? Could LAX-type attacks become a frequent occurrence? Or are we overestimating the al Qaeda's numbers and their capabilities?"

I guess that would be part of the question for Nic.

ROBERTSON: Well, I think most security analysts analyze security or potential threat as several things. One is capability. One is intent. Now, hat we're told here in Afghanistan about al Qaeda cells, although they now lack some of their capability, they lack the capability to operate freely in some territories, they lack the capability to operate in numbers, they lack the capability to get to some of their weapons, their weapons (UNINTELLIGIBLE).

What we are told, they do not lack at this time is the intent, that they still are intent about going about their operations, that groups of them still are active, albeit small in numbers, and albeit so far beyond the reach of the coalition forces that are looking for them.

But the intent by those small groups, we are told, is still out there.

MEADE: Nic Robertson and Kelly McCann, and folks, our viewers, thank you as well for your e-mails and your calls as we talk about homeland at home -- yes, security at home and abroad.

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