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CNN Saturday Morning News

Discussion of First Week of U.N. Weapons Inspections

Aired November 30, 2002 - 07:32   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


KRIS OSBORN, CNN ANCHOR: Well, as we mentioned, in Iraq, international arms inspectors today deployed to a large industrial complex somewhat south of Baghdad.
Former U.N. Weapons Inspector Richard Butler joins us now from Sydney, Australia to talk about the inspectors first week. I guess it's good evening to you, ambassador.

RICHARD BUTLER, FMR. CHIEF WEAPONS INSPECTOR: Good evening.

OSBOURN: Let's start with today. South of Baghdad, an industrial complex, on the heels of that vaccine factory. Your sense of how these inspections are going so far.

BUTLER: Kris, they're doing quite well within the parameters that are being set. The inspectors are starting cautiously and slowly, checking on places where we were four years ago to see what has changed.

They have a book -- they have their data. They have a million pages of data, in fact, which tells them what happened in these places in the past. They need to see what has happened in four years without inspection, and get some sense of whether or not Iraq has been using those places to create weapons where in some of them they did in the past.

They're checking basic data. It is exactly what they should be doing while they wait for the day, now seven days away, when Iraq will be obliged to lodge a declaration on its total weapons of mass destruction program. And that will be a crucial document.

OSBOURN: Well, ambassador you mentioned the past. Obviously you've been down this road before. I wanted to ask you about how could the second day of inspections -- that if reporters went along -- is your sense that this is perhaps a PR attempt on the part of the Iraqi regime, or is this significant?

BUTLER: Yes, Kris, I think that's a very -- a very well placed question. I'm a bit concerned about what I've been seeing -- you know -- with media accompaniment to inspections.

Good heavens, I'm not against public information and public discourse and the media being able to tell the world -- the public -- you know, what's happening. After all, that's what you and I are doing right now. But, I think that there is an issue here and we've been seeing it on CNN screens in the last few days about the way in which the Iraqis are playing the media presence and I think there is a need for caution.

There's -- in some ways -- it's almost been a little bit like keystone cops, you know -- the inspectors go in one door, and come out another door and then the media go in the same door and they come out the other door. And you get a factory manager saying, as I saw a couple of days ago, saying to the media -- I can assure you there is nothing bad in this factory.

I ask you in all seriousness, what else do you expect him to say? And, so what? He's not going to take the media in and say see those bottles on the shelf there? They're filled with anthrax. Of course not.

And so you've got to ask yourself, what is exactly happening here. Is Iraq using the media to try to deal with this situation through the court of public opinion rather than the one court that really counts, which is the Security Council and to which they must make this declaration a week from now on all of the weapons of mass destruction that they hold.

OSBOURN: Well it brings up that really interesting issue that's been discussed at great length, which is this notion of dual use facilities. Of course with the vaccine factory a lot of potential weapons of mass destruction also have legitimate commercial uses.

BUTLER: That's right. There is a very basic problem, especially in the biology area, and to some extent in the chemical area, that exactly the same processes that you might use to make aspirin or antibiotics or penicillin -- you know -- are those processes that are used to make chemical or biological weapons. That's the concept of dual use. And the problem the inspectors have is to sort out to which purpose a given facility or factory was being put at any given time. It's not easy but with the modern equipment that they've got now and if Iraq actually let's them have complete access to -- to their facilities -- then it can be done.

OSBOURN: Yes, I wanted to ask you about intelligence. In his interview with Christiane Amanpour, Hans Blix talked about the difference between evidence and intelligence. There may be intelligence such as that British dossier and other CIA reports about the existence of weapons of mass destruction, but in his view that's something different from specific evidence of it existing. Mobile factories they're believed to have -- believed to be very deep under ground.

Wanted to get your sense of this as to -- as it pertains to sharing intelligence and before hand I want to read for you what we have is a text, a full screen, of a portion of the U.N. resolution, which talks specifically about this issue and it says, "Requests all member states to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates." -- ambassador.

BUTLER: Yes, I'm really glad you read out that text because it's a point that I've been making for some time and indeed four years ago when we were accused four years ago of working for the CIA or in some way having been penetrated by intelligence operatives. We weren't. And that was nonsense.

The only ones who penetrated us then were actually the Iraqis. And I would point out then and you've just read it out now that the law says that all member states of the U.N. must help the inspectors get their job done by providing them with whatever information they have.

Now Hans Blix has drawn a distinction between evidence and intelligence and in strict intellectual terms that's correct. There is such a distinction. But to the extent that he was implying that intelligence is somehow of a lesser quality and doesn't require to be investigated, I disagree.

I think intelligence is crucial and maybe he would clear that up and say that he didn't disagree with me but I think intelligence is crucial and it will be very useful to the inspectors as they go forward especially after Iraq makes its declaration. What other basis do they have for checking whether Iraq's declaration is honest or dishonest? Other than to go back to their data base and to use information, intelligence, that is given tot hem by member states of the U.N. whether it's the U.S. or any other country? That information can be very important.

OSBOURN: Richard Butler, thank you very much. Former Chief U.N. Weapons Inspector. We appreciate your time on this morning and evening.

BUTLER: Thank you.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com







Aired November 30, 2002 - 07:32   ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
KRIS OSBORN, CNN ANCHOR: Well, as we mentioned, in Iraq, international arms inspectors today deployed to a large industrial complex somewhat south of Baghdad.
Former U.N. Weapons Inspector Richard Butler joins us now from Sydney, Australia to talk about the inspectors first week. I guess it's good evening to you, ambassador.

RICHARD BUTLER, FMR. CHIEF WEAPONS INSPECTOR: Good evening.

OSBOURN: Let's start with today. South of Baghdad, an industrial complex, on the heels of that vaccine factory. Your sense of how these inspections are going so far.

BUTLER: Kris, they're doing quite well within the parameters that are being set. The inspectors are starting cautiously and slowly, checking on places where we were four years ago to see what has changed.

They have a book -- they have their data. They have a million pages of data, in fact, which tells them what happened in these places in the past. They need to see what has happened in four years without inspection, and get some sense of whether or not Iraq has been using those places to create weapons where in some of them they did in the past.

They're checking basic data. It is exactly what they should be doing while they wait for the day, now seven days away, when Iraq will be obliged to lodge a declaration on its total weapons of mass destruction program. And that will be a crucial document.

OSBOURN: Well, ambassador you mentioned the past. Obviously you've been down this road before. I wanted to ask you about how could the second day of inspections -- that if reporters went along -- is your sense that this is perhaps a PR attempt on the part of the Iraqi regime, or is this significant?

BUTLER: Yes, Kris, I think that's a very -- a very well placed question. I'm a bit concerned about what I've been seeing -- you know -- with media accompaniment to inspections.

Good heavens, I'm not against public information and public discourse and the media being able to tell the world -- the public -- you know, what's happening. After all, that's what you and I are doing right now. But, I think that there is an issue here and we've been seeing it on CNN screens in the last few days about the way in which the Iraqis are playing the media presence and I think there is a need for caution.

There's -- in some ways -- it's almost been a little bit like keystone cops, you know -- the inspectors go in one door, and come out another door and then the media go in the same door and they come out the other door. And you get a factory manager saying, as I saw a couple of days ago, saying to the media -- I can assure you there is nothing bad in this factory.

I ask you in all seriousness, what else do you expect him to say? And, so what? He's not going to take the media in and say see those bottles on the shelf there? They're filled with anthrax. Of course not.

And so you've got to ask yourself, what is exactly happening here. Is Iraq using the media to try to deal with this situation through the court of public opinion rather than the one court that really counts, which is the Security Council and to which they must make this declaration a week from now on all of the weapons of mass destruction that they hold.

OSBOURN: Well it brings up that really interesting issue that's been discussed at great length, which is this notion of dual use facilities. Of course with the vaccine factory a lot of potential weapons of mass destruction also have legitimate commercial uses.

BUTLER: That's right. There is a very basic problem, especially in the biology area, and to some extent in the chemical area, that exactly the same processes that you might use to make aspirin or antibiotics or penicillin -- you know -- are those processes that are used to make chemical or biological weapons. That's the concept of dual use. And the problem the inspectors have is to sort out to which purpose a given facility or factory was being put at any given time. It's not easy but with the modern equipment that they've got now and if Iraq actually let's them have complete access to -- to their facilities -- then it can be done.

OSBOURN: Yes, I wanted to ask you about intelligence. In his interview with Christiane Amanpour, Hans Blix talked about the difference between evidence and intelligence. There may be intelligence such as that British dossier and other CIA reports about the existence of weapons of mass destruction, but in his view that's something different from specific evidence of it existing. Mobile factories they're believed to have -- believed to be very deep under ground.

Wanted to get your sense of this as to -- as it pertains to sharing intelligence and before hand I want to read for you what we have is a text, a full screen, of a portion of the U.N. resolution, which talks specifically about this issue and it says, "Requests all member states to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates." -- ambassador.

BUTLER: Yes, I'm really glad you read out that text because it's a point that I've been making for some time and indeed four years ago when we were accused four years ago of working for the CIA or in some way having been penetrated by intelligence operatives. We weren't. And that was nonsense.

The only ones who penetrated us then were actually the Iraqis. And I would point out then and you've just read it out now that the law says that all member states of the U.N. must help the inspectors get their job done by providing them with whatever information they have.

Now Hans Blix has drawn a distinction between evidence and intelligence and in strict intellectual terms that's correct. There is such a distinction. But to the extent that he was implying that intelligence is somehow of a lesser quality and doesn't require to be investigated, I disagree.

I think intelligence is crucial and maybe he would clear that up and say that he didn't disagree with me but I think intelligence is crucial and it will be very useful to the inspectors as they go forward especially after Iraq makes its declaration. What other basis do they have for checking whether Iraq's declaration is honest or dishonest? Other than to go back to their data base and to use information, intelligence, that is given tot hem by member states of the U.N. whether it's the U.S. or any other country? That information can be very important.

OSBOURN: Richard Butler, thank you very much. Former Chief U.N. Weapons Inspector. We appreciate your time on this morning and evening.

BUTLER: Thank you.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com