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CNN Live Sunday
Interview With Ivan Oelrich
Aired March 09, 2003 - 18:37 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
ANDERSON COOPER, CNN ANCHOR: So, just what sort of nuclear program does North Korea have?
Nuclear physicist Ivan Oelrich of the Federation of American Scientists joins us from Washington. Thanks very much for being with us. It is a very difficult topic and I appreciate you coming in trying to shed some light on it. As far as you know what does the United States think North Korea has and what do we think they can do with it?
IVAN OELRICH, FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS: Well, almost everything has certain amount of uncertainty, a certain degree of error associated with it. The North Koreans did sign up for the nonproliferation treaty back in 1985.
Part of the agreement -- when any nation signs a nonproliferation treaty it is to -- they have to file what they call an initial report which says that -- states everything that they have, all the nuclear materials, the reactor, the reprocessing plants, et cetera.
The North Koreans did this. The only problem is they did it five years late so they finally filed this report in 1992 and this is the first time that we officially knew about this five megawatt electric reactor which is probably 20 to 30 megawatts thermal, and that's the real measure of how much plutonium it can produce.
Part of the thing that the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency does is to check on these reactors to see how much plutonium is in the irradiated fuel rods and then to keep track of it.
So, in -- the North Koreans did not allow them to take samples from the fuel rods and in 1994 that's when they started removing the fuel rods and this is a procedure that should be under control of -- or, I shouldn't say control, under the observation of the IAEA, and the North Koreans did not allow that.
COOPER: I mean at this point, though, I hate to interrupt, but at this point do we know what the have in terms of was there weaponry things that can be utilized in terms of weaponry?
OELRICH: We -- no, we can make -- we can make very good -- we can make guesses on how much plutonium they have in the irradiated fuel rods and the numbers range from 20 to 30 kilograms of plutonium and most people think that they have about 25 kilograms.
COOPER: And what does that mean? I mean I'm sorry I'm so ignorant in this but in terms of...
OELRICH: No, no, that's another uncertainty is that how much plutonium does it take to make a bomb and that depends on how sophisticated your bomb-making technology is.
The IAEA argues that any country that is able to make a nuclear weapon should be able to make one if they have eight kilograms of plutonium and that's the most primitive kind of bomb, and if that's the case then they would have enough plutonium for three or four. Now, many people...
COOPER: But as far as I understand they never tested a nuclear weapon.
OELRICH: They have never tested a nuclear weapon. We do not know for certain that they have even assembled a nuclear weapon as far as (unintelligible).
COOPER: Do we know anything about the kind of technology, I mean how good their weaponry would be?
OELRICH: No, we don't. I don't believe that we have any direct evidence of that. We just have to make guesses based on the kind of training, the scientists they have available, the kind of training that they have got abroad typically in China and some of them have studied in Russia or Soviet Union. And, based on that we can make a guess of how -- what sort of the level of technical proficiency they might have.
COOPER: All right.
OELRICH: And I think that people would guess that they would be able to assemble an unsophisticated implosion device using plutonium.
COOPER: Well, I suppose that is what is so scary about it, not only a lot of unknowns but a lot of unknown unknowns as Donald Rumsfeld might say.
OELRICH: Yes.
COOPER: Ivan Oelrich, I'm sorry we're simply out of time but I very much appreciate you joining us this evening.
OELRICH: All right.
COOPER: It was interesting. Thank you very much.
OELRICH: Thank you. It's my pleasure.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com
Aired March 9, 2003 - 18:37 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
ANDERSON COOPER, CNN ANCHOR: So, just what sort of nuclear program does North Korea have?
Nuclear physicist Ivan Oelrich of the Federation of American Scientists joins us from Washington. Thanks very much for being with us. It is a very difficult topic and I appreciate you coming in trying to shed some light on it. As far as you know what does the United States think North Korea has and what do we think they can do with it?
IVAN OELRICH, FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS: Well, almost everything has certain amount of uncertainty, a certain degree of error associated with it. The North Koreans did sign up for the nonproliferation treaty back in 1985.
Part of the agreement -- when any nation signs a nonproliferation treaty it is to -- they have to file what they call an initial report which says that -- states everything that they have, all the nuclear materials, the reactor, the reprocessing plants, et cetera.
The North Koreans did this. The only problem is they did it five years late so they finally filed this report in 1992 and this is the first time that we officially knew about this five megawatt electric reactor which is probably 20 to 30 megawatts thermal, and that's the real measure of how much plutonium it can produce.
Part of the thing that the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency does is to check on these reactors to see how much plutonium is in the irradiated fuel rods and then to keep track of it.
So, in -- the North Koreans did not allow them to take samples from the fuel rods and in 1994 that's when they started removing the fuel rods and this is a procedure that should be under control of -- or, I shouldn't say control, under the observation of the IAEA, and the North Koreans did not allow that.
COOPER: I mean at this point, though, I hate to interrupt, but at this point do we know what the have in terms of was there weaponry things that can be utilized in terms of weaponry?
OELRICH: We -- no, we can make -- we can make very good -- we can make guesses on how much plutonium they have in the irradiated fuel rods and the numbers range from 20 to 30 kilograms of plutonium and most people think that they have about 25 kilograms.
COOPER: And what does that mean? I mean I'm sorry I'm so ignorant in this but in terms of...
OELRICH: No, no, that's another uncertainty is that how much plutonium does it take to make a bomb and that depends on how sophisticated your bomb-making technology is.
The IAEA argues that any country that is able to make a nuclear weapon should be able to make one if they have eight kilograms of plutonium and that's the most primitive kind of bomb, and if that's the case then they would have enough plutonium for three or four. Now, many people...
COOPER: But as far as I understand they never tested a nuclear weapon.
OELRICH: They have never tested a nuclear weapon. We do not know for certain that they have even assembled a nuclear weapon as far as (unintelligible).
COOPER: Do we know anything about the kind of technology, I mean how good their weaponry would be?
OELRICH: No, we don't. I don't believe that we have any direct evidence of that. We just have to make guesses based on the kind of training, the scientists they have available, the kind of training that they have got abroad typically in China and some of them have studied in Russia or Soviet Union. And, based on that we can make a guess of how -- what sort of the level of technical proficiency they might have.
COOPER: All right.
OELRICH: And I think that people would guess that they would be able to assemble an unsophisticated implosion device using plutonium.
COOPER: Well, I suppose that is what is so scary about it, not only a lot of unknowns but a lot of unknown unknowns as Donald Rumsfeld might say.
OELRICH: Yes.
COOPER: Ivan Oelrich, I'm sorry we're simply out of time but I very much appreciate you joining us this evening.
OELRICH: All right.
COOPER: It was interesting. Thank you very much.
OELRICH: Thank you. It's my pleasure.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com
